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The magnitude of the global economic and financial crisis, erupting in the 
second half of 2008, shook experts and public opinion across the world. 
Unsurprisingly, the economic debate has focused on the international 
financial crisis and its impact on the real economy. This debate revolved 
around the short-term mechanisms for confronting the crisis and the best 
ways to overcome it.
This publication is distinct in that it invites the reader to take a long-
term view from the outset and insists on the need to develop a strategic 
vision of the future for Latin America and the Caribbean. There is a grow-
ing consensus in the region that in an era of globalization, the foundations 
for macroeconomic stability, while necessary, are insufficient for the devel-
opment of the countries of the region and their economic convergence with 
the richer countries of the world.
With this in mind, the authors of the book, like Fernando Fajnzylber in 
his time, turn their attention to a group of successful countries outside the 
region and the impact that medium- and long-term strategies supported 
by industrial policies have had on their productive transformation and 
development.
The importance of this research, which is at the heart of this book, is 
found not only in the analysis of the strategies themselves, which relate to 
the economic, political, and cultural context and are impossible to recre-
ate, but also in the common operational principles guiding the public sec-
tor’s organization for effective formulation and implementation of these 
strategies.
One of the first points highlighted is the extent and nature of the col-
laboration between government and the private sector and the influences 
of this collaboration on the development of long-term strategies and the 
manner of their implementation through programs and incentives within 
the framework of a public good. Called “public-private alliances” by the 
authors, these collaborations are a fundamental topic developed in this 
publication. The selected case studies show that formulating consensus-
based, intelligent strategies, and the institutionally well-governed public-
private collaboration that accompanies them, has a close relationship to the 
effectiveness of the policies and supporting programs.
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How is this relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean?
The region has made progress in achieving macroeconomic stability 
and, given the previous period of debt crisis, in certain aspects of export 
growth. However, the countries of the region have remained behind their 
nonregional competitors in productivity growth, export diversification, 
and the incorporation of added value and knowledge to exports and related 
activities. This lack of progress introduces a source of vulnerability in the 
face of unexpected changes in the price of primary commodities and the 
threat of low-wage competition from emerging countries in Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and other regions that could reposition themselves in the future. It 
also explains why countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have been 
unable to sustain a process of closing the income gap with richer countries 
of the world.
Although countries outside the region have prioritized the foundations 
for macroeconomic stability, they have also constantly been using and read-
justing strategies and industrial policies designed to climb the hierarchy of 
world production and exports. Furthermore, following the international 
crisis, this proactive attitude allowed many country economies to recover 
quickly and reposition themselves more competitively in the medium and 
long term.
Regarding Latin America and the Caribbean, the authors point out that, 
beside the recent economic stimulus to combat the global recession, public 
programs that aim to promote economic activity and exports frequently 
constitute “archeological structures” passed down from one government to 
another, rather than a coherent collection of incentives arising from a stra-
tegic vision of the future for productive transformation. Moreover, these 
programs often do not have the resources available for their implementa-
tion, their technical teams lack consolidation, they are beset by excessive 
politicization, and they are not the outcome of a consistent dialogue with 
the participation of the private sector. Although many factors can explain 
the shortcomings in the pace of economic transformation, competitiveness, 
and export development in Latin America and the Caribbean in relation 
to competitors, there is a need to pay close attention to the lack of a stra-
tegic focus and the transient characteristic of public-private alliances, as 
well as to the inconsistent efforts to develop the capacity of the state to 
effectively design and deploy industrial policies that promote economic 
transformation. 
The research findings manifest a concerted effort to examine in depth 
the “how” of public sector institutional organization for developing and 
implementing strategies and support programs that address the microeco-
nomic dimensions of productive transformation. The authors observe that 
these operational details for public sector action are as important as the 
strategies and policies themselves. Indeed, the uniqueness of the study is its 
focus on the “how,” an area often overlooked in the policy debate. 
foreword xix
Last, the relevance of the inductive method used by the authors should 
be noted. It is through this method and analysis of real experiences that 
they have been able to identify “operational principles” for public sector 
organization that can effectively support transformation strategies. 
It is undeniable that this publication is a valuable contribution to 
the debate on industrial policies and public-private alliances as strategic 
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1Introduction
As a region Latin America and the Caribbean (hereon Latin America) has 
not performed well economically. Since the colonial era, notwithstand-
ing episodic growth spurts by some countries, the region has watched as 
successive countries in other parts of the world have raised their gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, leapfrogging past Latin America on 
the world economic stage. Several of these countries moved out of dire 
poverty to reach the upper echelons of world income. The one Latin 
American country to stand above this trend, Argentina, had the distinction 
of rising to the ranks of the richest countries in the world at the beginning 
of the 1900s, only to slip steadily to an undistinguished middle-income 
status in subsequent decades.
Beginning in the last half of the 20th century, the primary means by 
which countries successfully engaged in a process of catch-up with rich 
countries was by strengthening and improving the quality of their inte-
gration into the international economy. In this context, export develop-
ment was a major tool to stimulate investment, innovation, and growth. 
The role of exports was boosted by the unprecedented growth of interna-
tional trade and finance. These countries each approached international 
integration and export development in a different way, however. To 
generalize, some gave priority to developing industrial capacities in the 
domestic market and then, after achieving some threshold of competitive 
strength, ventured more aggressively into international export markets. 
This approach was more feasible for countries with large domestic mar-
kets. Other catch-up countries, with very small domestic markets, pro-
actively upgraded their economies, exports, and growth, all while being 
very integrated with international markets from the start. Still others 
mixed the two approaches, exporting existing comparative advantages 
but also at the same time proactively working to provide conditions for 
the birth of new sectors and activities in the domestic market that were 
eventually encouraged (often quite quickly) to become internationally 
competitive and contribute to export development. 
Today private markets and firms dominate world economic activity. 
If firms are to have the necessary capacities to be agents of economic 
transformation and growth, many requirements and conditions must 
be met. In addition to an enabling macroeconomic environment, firms 
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need, among other things, access to information about markets and 
probable future trends; incentives to search for and invest in new, sophis-
ticated, and risky activities; the ability to innovate through imitation or 
creative adaptation of technologies for commercial application; access 
to credit; an educational system that generates a supply of appropriately 
skilled labor; availability of essential public goods; a facilitating business 
environment; sectoral coordination and development of networks and 
clusters; and techniques of marketing and product differentiation. 
Market forces do not necessarily spontaneously generate effective 
responses to all these challenges, especially in developing countries where 
markets and institutions are seriously incomplete. In Latin America in 
particular, all these ingredients, coupled with government failures, have 
been binding constraints on growth to one degree or another, depending 
on the country and circumstances. 
The last 25 years of public policy in Latin America have been domi-
nated by Washington Consensus–type adjustments focused on consoli-
dation of macroeconomic balances and market-oriented institutional 
reforms that strongly discouraged state interventions in productive activ-
ities. Now, however, given disillusionment with the consensus (where 
government became a kind of inferior good), Latin America is showing 
an emerging interest in more systemic, proactive public interventions 
that can assist the private sector in overcoming structural constraints 
on innovation, productive transformation, and export development. 
In principle, the shift toward acceptance of a more proactive state—
augmented by the response to the great world economic recession of 
2008–09—is a useful step toward pragmatism in public policy. Indeed, 
a more proactive public policy would seem to be a reasonable objective 
for Latin America, because the “visible hand” of public interventions 
can be seen in many success stories in Asia, Oceania, Europe, and even 
North America. So modern precedents exist for more proactive public 
policy in Latin America aimed at supporting economic transformation 
and growth. The question now is what type of government intervention 
will be successful and how will it be achieved effectively. 
In the interwar years and again in the early post–World War II period, 
governments in Latin America actively intervened in the economy. That 
intervention involved a top-down, government-dominated approach 
geared toward inward-looking import substitution industrialization with 
public enterprises playing a big role. Efficiency and growth-effective inter-
national integration were not primary objectives in the region as they are 
today. This era of import substitution industrialization has been unfairly 
demonized; important advances were made in development, some of which 
were unfortunately dismantled by the Washington Consensus reforms 
(Ocampo 2006). Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, the region’s post-
1950 economic growth performance was undistinguished. We think that 
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this traditional approach to state intervention must not be resurrected in 
the current era of renewed interest in a proactive state. 
An extensive theoretical and case-based literature supports state inter-
ventions that promote productive transformation and export develop-
ment. In recent years thinking by those receptive to this type of selective 
state intervention has evolved into what some term a “modern” indus-
trial policy. This approach stresses that the most successful strategies and 
interventions emerge out of a social process of close alliance between 
the public and private sectors (the scope of the latter varying depending 
on the relevance of different categories of stakeholders to the objectives 
to be met). In the fast-changing and competitive world of globalization, 
each party has (or potentially could generate) some of the information 
necessary to identify market, institutional, and attitudinal constraints 
that should be addressed by support strategies but also less insight than 
can be generated by joining forces and undertaking a coordinated effort. 
Moreover, the governance of the alliance must function to preserve the 
public welfare, meaning that while the state should closely collaborate 
with the private sector, it must be subject to procedures and mechanisms 
to avoid being captured by special interests. 
Ideas abound about what constitutes sound industrial policies and 
so-called best-practice support programs. But the literature has not yet 
developed the more detailed picture of the “how” of industrial polices—
the organization of the social process of an alliance and the internal 
organization of the government for leading that process and formulating 
and implementing public strategies to support productive transforma-
tion. That “how” is critical. Yes, attention to good policy is important. 
But attention to the social process and organization necessary for arriv-
ing at a strategy and making it effectively operational—as well as being 
alert to the need for midstream corrections—is equally or more impor-
tant to produce successful outcomes. 
This book will examine the “how” of 10 countries outside Latin Amer-
ica that have experienced contemporary processes of sustained catch-up 
or that have done better than Latin America countries with a similar 
endowment of resources.1 Although they differ in many ways in their his-
tory, culture, political system, economic structure, level of development, 
and geographic location, these 10 countries share a common element: the 
authorities have actively applied a medium- to long-term development 
strategy (either with an economy-wide focus or with a more limited focus 
on specific sectors or activities). These strategies, although differing in 
scope, specificity, and depth of content, have increasingly been based on 
a vision that goes well beyond the macroeconomic adjustment and liber-
alization issues that were the focus of much of the Washington Consensus 
era. Most of these countries have been working proactively to forge a 
forward-looking vision that can guide medium- and long-term strategies 
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with specific goals supported by public microeconomic incentives that 
directly stimulate structural change and productivity growth. 
These strategies are generally not a creation of the central government 
alone but instead arise out of public-private alliances involving elements 
of political leadership, civil society participation, and consensus building 
or, at the least, public understanding. This process has taken different 
forms from one country to another with different degrees of effective-
ness. While the success of these strategies hinges on politics and techni-
cal design, no less important is the existence of an appropriate public 
institutional framework capable of execution. Rather than emphasizing 
efficiency in all aspects, such a framework focuses on coherence and 
effectiveness in achieving established goals, the possibility of experi-
menting with incentives, flexibility, error correction, and the strategy’s 
ability to transcend the bounds of political cycles. 
This book does not aim to demonstrate a causal relationship between 
the strategies and their content, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
outcomes in these countries as they affect structural change and eco-
nomic growth. We do think, however, that the association between the 
two that is evident in our success cases (and in others), coupled with the 
awkwardness of negative critiques, is a persuasive argument for Latin 
America to experiment more systematically with medium- to long-term 
development strategies supported by modern industrial policy. In any 
event, our fundamental aim is simply to report on and gain insights from 
our extraregional success cases concerning the “what” and, most of all, 
the “how” of formulating and implementing successful strategies and the 
associated public institutional structures supporting them. The focus on 
the illustration of the “how” is one of the novelties of our study.
Methodologically speaking, we are fully aware that Latin America 
should not try to replicate the strategies, institutions, or processes of our 
extraregional success cases. Clearly, there are too many cultural, political, 
economic, and historical specificities for that to be possible or wise. None-
theless, when reduced to its bare substance, the organizational operation 
of the public sector and the alliances, albeit quite different in form, is quite 
similar in the most successful countries. Hence, raising the specific experi-
ences of institutional organization and operational processes—particularly 
in terms of the “how”—to a perspective with more abstract dimensions 
allows us to detect generic operational principles on organizational issues. 
Part 1 presents 11 principles inductively developed from our extraregional 
case studies. Moreover, we concretely illustrate the principles by drawing 
on the different ways that our success cases followed them.
Our analysis was supported by 10 background case studies of our suc-
cessful countries that we commissioned in 2007. Although the principles 
hold through time, these studies are largely a snapshot of the “how” in 
countries where the “how” is in continous institutional evolution.2 The 
major methodological stress was on digging deep into the institutionally 
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driven “how” of effectively organizing the public sector for formulating 
development strategies, better governing alliances, and executing related 
support policies and programs. To maintain a manageable focus, we lim-
ited the analysis of strategies and organization primarily to those dealing 
with export development and the associated public agents and processes 
for attracting foreign direct investment, making small and medium enter-
prises competitive in world markets and supporting export promotion 
and innovation. While circumscribed, our focus on export development 
nevertheless has the benefit of aiming at a central dimension of the coun-
tries’ strategy for economic transformation.3 
After examining the “how” of the extraregional success cases through 
the prisim of our 11 principles, we then examine, in part 2 of the book, 
how well nine Latin American and Caribbean countries fare measured 
against these principles.
As for the specific structure of the book, chapter 1 reviews the cur-
rent situation of Latin America, which historically has been a laggard 
in economic performance. Chapter 2 introduces the first principle: the 
urgency of developing a medium- to long-term strategy for productive 
transformation based on industrial policies. The chapter examines the 
debate about industrial policies and outlines why we think that modern 
arguments for industrial policies are compelling for Latin America. 
With this motivation in mind, the chapter then examines the nature of 
the strategies deployed over the decades by our 10 extraregional suc-
cess cases.
Chapter 3 focuses on the principle that strategies for productive 
transformation with modern industrial policies should rest on effective, 
locally grown public-private alliances. The chapter creates a typology of 
the alliances in our success cases, analyzing and illustrating them in some 
detail. Chapter 4 introduces and illustrates principles 3–6, which focus 
on the “how” of public sector leadership in the public-private alliance 
and the fomulation and execution of strategies. Chapter 5 presents and 
illustrates principles 7–11, which are concerned with the public sector 
management of support programs and incentives.
Chapter 6 shifts the focus to Latin America. It reviews the past and 
current nature of development strategies in the region, pointing to their 
strengths and weaknesses as tools for guiding productive transforma-
tion. Using concepts developed in part 1, the chapter then critically 
examines the role and nature of emerging public-private alliances that 
support the contemporary strategies. In chapter 7 we follow the path of 
principles 3–11 to critically evaluate the nature of public sector leader-
ship in strategy execution and the modes for managing programs and 
incentives. Finally, chapter 8 presents our central conclusions, which 
suggest that while some countries in Latin America have been planting 
the seeds of these 11 principles gleaned from our extraregional success 
cases, they still have considerable work to do.
6 breeding latin american tigers
Notes
 1. Seven of our country cases—Finland, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, and the Czech Republic (the last as a recent market 
economy)—achieved catch-up after 1960. Sweden caught up with the richer 
countries well before 1950. Australia and New Zealand also became relatively 
rich early on, but in recent decades these two countries have lagged significantly 
behind other advanced countries, although they have generally done better than 
South American countries also rich in natural resources. We also examined two 
subnational cases, one of an alliance in one of Spain’s autonomous communities 
and another of innovation in hydrocarbon sector in Alberta, Canada (see annexes 
4A and 4B).
 2. Hence the illustrations of the organizational principles in the book, includ-
ing those for Latin America, are time bound at 2007–08, with only selective 
updates.
 3. Digging into the “how” was not easy because the authors of our back-
ground papers were more accustomed, as is usually the case in social sciences, to 
analyzing the “what.” 
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The Latin American Laggards
Development is often described as a process by which a country’s per cap-
ita income grows to “catch up” with that of “leading” rich countries. A 
corollary is that over any long period of time the more backward a coun-
try is when it starts the development process, the greater the potential for 
rapid advance that can close the income gap with lead countries.1 History 
has exhibited many instances of catch-up, one of the most notable being 
the United States, which caught up with and then overtook Britain in the 
income ranks during the 19th century. Modern examples of catch-up also 
exist—but not in Latin America, where falling further behind lead coun-
tries in per capita income, and even being leapfrogged by poorer countries, 
has almost become a way of life.
The Elusive Path to Convergence 
Economic development in Latin America began more than 500 years ago. 
By the early 16th century Spanish and Portuguese colonization of Mexico, 
Central and South America, and parts of the Caribbean was well under 
way. The British colonization of North America started 100 years later. 
Notwithstanding the late start, over the next 300 years the British colonies 
and later their successor, the United States, would catch up with Latin 
American in income and then surpass it. By 1900 per capita income in the 
United States (in purchasing power parity) was some four times the mean 
of the eight largest Latin America economies. As Coatsworth (1998, 26) 
observed, “Latin America became an underdeveloped region between the 
early eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries.” He attributed much of this 
lag to the inferior institutional setting and the slowness of Latin American 
governments to adopt reforms after winning independence in the early 
19th century.2
10 operational principles for effective public management
More broadly, according to per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
data collected by Maddison (2006), since 1500 Latin America has been 
falling behind what today constitutes the world’s developed economies 
(defined as those that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), with only a partial recovery in the 
export-led-growth era of 1870–1913 and during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. The region has done somewhat better when measured against 
the GDP per capita of the world—especially in the interwar period3—but 
at the end of the 20th century the region was not better positioned than it 
was in the early 19th century (table 1.1) Even during the great commod-
ity boom of the early 2000s, Latin America, while growing at its fastest 
rate in at least 40 years (ECLAC 2008a), ranked last in the growth tables 
of developing-country regions (Devlin and Moguillansky 2009).
Perhaps the greatest contemporary embarrassment has been with 
regard to the countries of Asia. Beginning in the early decades of the 20th 
century Latin America engaged in import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) behind external protective barriers, a process that intensified dur-
ing the Great Depression.4 In the 1950s East Asian countries were much 
poorer than Latin America. Observing Latin America’s relative success 
in the interwar period, and the emergence of major development theories 
suggesting that state promotion of import substitution industrialization 
could lead to growth,5 they too pursued forms of state-led ISI. However, 
in the 1960s, in the face of liberalization of interwar restrictions in the 
industrial countries and expansion of globalization and world trade at 
an unprecedented pace (Crafts 2000), a number of these countries prag-
matically combined ISI with an export-led strategy for growth.6 Latin 
America, in contrast, perhaps a victim of path dependency derived from 
its own earlier success, pursued a relatively more doctrinaire deepening 
of classic ISI. Only in the second half of the 1980s, during the era of the 
historic debt crisis and adoption of liberalizing structural reforms under 
the watchful eye of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and 
U.S. Treasury, did Latin America begin a deliberate foray into the inter-
nationalization of its economies.7
In any event, between the 1960s and the 1990s one Asian economy 
after another leapfrogged Latin America in the growth rankings. This 
happened in waves, with the early economies being the Republic of 
Korea; Singapore; Taiwan, China; Malaysia; Thailand; and Indone-
sia. The latest round included China, India, and Vietnam (figure 1.1).8 
If performance involved only growth rankings, the issue would be 
one of relative positions. But those Asian economies that leapfrogged 
Latin America have been able to sharply reduce poverty in a sustained 
fashion, while Latin America has not (Devlin, Estevadeordal, and 
Rodríguez-Clare 2006). 
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 Region 1820 1870 1913 1929 1950 1965 1973 1980 1990 2000
Per capita GDP by region (dollars)
Western Europe 1,232 1,974 3,473 4,111 4,579 8,441 11,416 13,197 15,966 19,002
United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada 1,202 2,419 5,223 6,673 9,268 12,967 16,179 18,060 22,345 27,065
Japan 669 737 1,387 2,026 1,921 5,934 11,434 13,428 18,789 21,069
Asia (excluding Japan) 577 550 658 — 634 936 1,226 1,494 2,117 3,189
Latin America 692 681 1,481 2,034 2,506 3,439 4,504 5,412 5,053 5,838
Eastern Europe and former USSR 688 941 1,558 1,570 2,602 4,333 5,731 6,231 6,455 4,778
Africa 420 500 637 — 894 1,164 1,410 1,536 1,444 1,464
World 667 875 1,525 — 2,111 3,233 4,091 4,520 5,157 6,012
Interregional disparities (percentages)
Latin America/United States 55.1 27.9 27.9 29.5 26.2 25.6 27 29.1 21.8 20.8
Latin America/World 103.7 77.8 97.1 — 118.7 106.4 110.1 119.7 98.0 97.1
Latin America/Africa 164.8 136.2 232.5 — 280.3 295.4 319.4 352.3 349.9 398.8
Latin America/Asia (excluding 
Japan) 119.9 123.8 225.1 — 395.3 367.4 367.4 362.2 238.7 183.1
Latin America’s share in  world 
production 2.2 2.5 4.4 — 7.8 8 8.7 9.8 8.3 8.4
Source: Ocampo 2006.
Note: — = Not available.
Table 1.1 Latin America in the World Economy
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With very few exceptions, individual Latin American countries have 
been laggards in convergence since 1960. A decade-by-decade comparison 
of GDP per capita as a percentage of the average GDP per capita of the 
rich OECD countries (not including Mexico and Korea) shows a lacklus-
ter performance. Bar graphs for GDP per capita for most of the region’s 
countries fail to image “a stairway to heaven”; on the contrary, while 
maybe not “a stairway to hell,” the image is one of stepping further down 
from the upper reaches of the world economy (figure 1.2).
The pattern is quite remarkable. Only Chile has shown a steady clos-
ing of the gap since the late 1980s, and even then, its income per capita 
compared with the OECD average income per capita was only margin-
ally higher than it was in 1960. Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru managed 
to halt the widening of the gap in income in the initial years of the 
21st century.9
In the years preceding the world crisis of 2008, an exceptionally 
favorable external environment, especially record levels of commodity 
prices, contributed importantly to strong growth in the region (IDB 
2008).10 As the world economy recovered in 2010–11, commodity-
producing countries in Latin America are outperforming many of 
their richer OECD counterparts, which are troubled by debt over-
hangs. But this better performance, while partly related to prudent 
macroeconomic management, again is related more to an exogenous 
factor—China’s successful stimulus package and Asian demand for 
South America’s commodities—than dynamic productive transforma-
tions at home (ECLAC 2010).
The Latin American Reformers: Did the Washington 
Consensus Help or Hamper Growth?
When viewed in a contemporary setting, the lagging growth performance 
and sluggish endogenous dynamics may be perplexing to some. After all, 
Latin America countries were some of the best students of the Washing-
ton Consensus—the gold standard, for many in the 1990s, on which to 
judge policy reform and prospects for achieving and sustaining growth.11 
The reforms focused first on fiscal discipline and liberalization and then 
on institutional strengthening (Rodrik 2006). As Rodrik (1996, 10, 18) 
points out: “The reforms were strongest and most sustained in Latin 
America. . . . It is striking how many Latin American countries have come 
within reaching distance of completing the items on the Washington Con-
sensus.” Indeed, the initial systematic evaluation of the performance under 
the consensus reflected that effort (Williamson 1990), and Latin America’s 
reforms continued for some time. Most indexes of the reform process are 
suggestive of considerable effort from the mid-1980s to 2000 (Morley, 
Madrazo, and Pettinato 1999; Lora 2001).
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Figure 1.2 GDP per Capita as a Percent of OECD Average: 
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Nevertheless, standards are elastic. One could argue, as some have 
done (Krueger 2004; Singh and others 2005), that the disappointing con-
temporary growth experience in Latin America came about because the 
countries just did not go far enough with the reforms. The reform effort 
did indeed slacken after 2000. An alternative reason, however, has been 
raised by others who suggest that the concept underlying the reforms was 
seriously flawed.12 We share that perspective.
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On the one hand, the initial reform push lumped essential macroeco-
nomic stabilization policy concerns with doctrinaire liberalization to the 
exclusion of “illiberal tools,” such as a proactive state with market inter-
ventions, which other countries, such as those in East Asia, have used to 
overcome market and nonmarket constraints on structural change and 
promote microeconomic industrial transformation and sustained high 
rates of growth (Rodrik 1996). On the other hand, a second wave of 
reforms pushed from Washington focused on a long list of best-practice 
institutions colored by what Rodrik (2006, 979) and others called “insti-
tutional fundamentalism,” which improperly confused institutional form 
with function. In essence there was little tolerance of the historical reality 
that a multiplicity of institutional forms can serve a market objective, even 
in advanced capitalist economies (Jung-en Woo 1999; Hall and Soskice 
2001). In sum, the Washington Consensus leaned on an expectation that 
a set of “correct prices” and “correct institutions” alone would spontane-
ously drive stabilization, economic transformation, and growth.
Rodrik (2006, 974) also has observed that “nobody believes in the 
Washington Consensus anymore.” British prime minister Gordon Brown 
in the April 2009 meeting of the Group of 20 declared that “the old Wash-
ington Consensus is over.”13 That is only partially true, however. 
In Latin America the legacy of the Washington Consensus, a moni-
ker that for better or worse defined the high period of reforms, has had 
some positive dimensions in instilling a critical awareness of the role of 
macroeconomic stability in growth—a traditional vulnerability in Latin 
American policy making. The region has progressively strengthened its fis-
cal balances, raised care for public indebtedness, warded off its traditional 
bouts with hyperinflation, guarded against negative real interest rates, and 
progressively strengthened systemic public regulation. The region has also 
paid a great deal more attention to international integration, export devel-
opment, and the wisdom of creating an adequate cushion of international 
reserves to face external contingencies. Human capital development and 
social protection also have taken a higher place on the policy agenda of 
many countries (ECLAC 2006). As a result most Latin American econo-
mies are now more resilient. Indeed, the region’s economies weathered the 
great world recession of 2008–09 better than they would have in the past. 
Moreover, even with the emergence in recent years of governments that 
typically would be classified as “on the left” of the political spectrum, the 
primacy of macroeconomic balance and international integration has not 
been seriously questioned. And as long as the world economy avoids an 
economic depression, few governments would likely question the basic 
tenet that benefits can be derived from internationalization of the econ-
omy. So the Washington Consensus is not totally bereft of contributions 
to a better Latin America.14
However, the legacy of the consensus, at least in popularized interpreta-
tions, is less robust in other areas that have also been shown to be critical 
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for high and sustained rates of growth.15 On the march toward the con-
sensus policy framework, there was less agreement among advocates on 
policy design, leading to a critical mass of support for what had already 
been proven to be highly risky adventures in economics—liberalized, but 
exorbitantly high, real interest rates; exchange rate anchors without exit 
strategies; and simultaneous capital- and current-account openings. As 
Ffrench-Davis (2005) reminds, permissive oversight of these phenom-
ena created “wrong” outlier macro prices that actually promoted “short-
termism” and an “unfriendly” market environment for the medium- and 
long-term drive to achieve development through investment, productive 
transformation, and sustained growth. The macroeconomic policy design 
certainly did create vulnerability to crisis, with real manifestations of this 
in Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2002).16 Meanwhile, 
the extent of local capacities for developing and managing instruments 
was underestimated as were the possibilities for eclectic institutional and 
policy design. In addition, these miscalculations were coupled with an 
underestimation of the importance of market failures and other restric-
tions that undercut transformative microeconomic incentives, of the role 
of building capacity in enabling a proactive state to address and assist in 
overcoming the restrictions, and of the appropriateness (sometimes inevi-
tability) of selectivity in application of policy instruments. Finally, short 
shrift was given to the gradualism and intermediate institutional and pol-
icy stances that have been used by many catch-up countries, most recently 
China (Devlin 2008). Hence, while some dimensions of the Washington 
Consensus may not be completely irrelevant today, as some claim, in Latin 
America the consensus is in many of its dimensions a mostly distant, and 
not entirely appreciated, memory.17
Characteristics Underpinning Latin American Growth: 
A Brief Overview of the Stylized Facts
The underperformance of Latin America is not surprising given many 
of the characteristics of growth that the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC; CEPAL in 
Spanish) has repeatedly noted. Many of these characteristics were not 
directly addressed by the Washington Consensus, perhaps because of 
assumptions of automatic market responses to the “right” prices and 
institutions. Some of the characteristics can be outlined here.18
Volatile Growth Rates. Latin America’s growth has been highly vola-
tile (figure 1.3). The volatility was caused by repeated external shocks 
(demand, financial, terms of trade, and international policy manage-
ment),19 but aggravated by endogenous policy decisions such as fixed, over-
valued exchange rates; procyclical fiscal and monetary policy; regulatory 
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lags; and questionable sequencing of reforms such as between current- 
and capital-account opening (ECLAC 1995). This high volatility affects 
future expectations in a way that encourages short-term perspectives and 
discourages medium- or long-term commitment to risk taking and invest-
ment. And of course it also wastes financial and human resources.
Mediocre Investment Levels and Productivity. Meanwhile, over the years 
savings and investment rates have been mediocre. The best average gross 
fixed investment ratios have barely exceeded 20 percent (table 1.2). Low 
investment levels handicap learning and the incorporation of technological 
progress. Moreover, the investment that took place was concentrated in the 
export sector; high sustained rates of growth require a more broadly based 
investment pattern. Not only has investment been less than robust, but the 
contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to growth has been modest, 
especially compared with the East Asian tigers. Over 1960–90, TFP con-
tributed 20–30 percent of growth in the East Asian Tigers, but only 5 per-
cent in Latin America (Crafts 2000). Moreover, the region’s poorest 
postwar performance in TPF was during the reform period (table 1.3). 
This low contribution likely explains why capital-to-output ratios have 
tended to rise over a number of decades: the ratio averaged 3.8 percent in 
1950–80, but 6.7 percent in 1990–2002.
Declining Share of Manufacturing. Another salient feature is that manu-
facturing’s share of total output has declined in many Latin American 
countries, perhaps prematurely according to ECLAC (figure 1.4). This is a 
significant consideration because manufacturing typically is a handmaiden 
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Source: ECLAC 2008b. 
Note: Five-year-centered moving averages.
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2007 1980–89 1990–2007 1980 2007 1980–89 1990–2007 1980–89  1990–2007 1980–89 1990–2007
Mexico  1,943,950 105.3 0.1 1.7  5,114  6,533 25.7 20.5 1.2 2.5 20.2 19.5
Costa Rica  51,060 4.5 –0.5 2.8  3,184  5,022 17.1 14.5 1.5 3.6 20.0 19.1
El Salvador  20,720 6.9 –3.0 2.2  1,898  2,326 6.9 13.0 0.3 1.9 12.8 16.7
Dominican 
Republic  48,380 9.8 1.6 3.3  1,477  2,881 14.9 20.3 1.0 3.4 22.0 22.1
Panama  74,430 3.3 –1.3 3.6  3,176  5,190 28.6 23.2 0.0 5.9 17.6 18.9
Colombia  1,109,500 46.1 1.3 1.8  1,621  2,461 20.3 16.3 1.3 2.7 17.4 18.5
Peru  1,280,000 27.9 –2.0 2.5  2,256  2,751 25.8 20.8 0.1 3.0 23.6 19.8
Chile  748,800 16.6 2.7 4.0  2,520  6,153 19.0 22.5 2.0 5.4 17.2 22.7
Argentina  2,736,690 39.5 –2.2 2.9  7,551  9,357 22.4 17.5 0.7 2.5 18.5
Uruguay  175,020 3.3 0.1 2.5  5,282  7,497 16.8 13.3 0.5 1.8 14.1 13.3
Brazil  8,459,420 191.6 0.8 0.9  3,557  4,212 23.4 16.3 0.7 2.1 21.0 17.4
Venezuela, 
R.B. de  882,050 27.5 –2.9 1.5  5,820  5,787 25.0 28.5 0.2 2.3 20.8 20.4





20,156,480 562.8 –0.3 1.6  3,652  4,528 23.0 18.7 0.8 2.5 20.1 18.7
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; Comtrade, based on Lall classification. 
a. Data for Barbados are for 2002. 
b. Data for Barbados up to 2005.
c. Data unavailable for Argentina between 1980 and 1992; data for Colombia up to 1999 and for Barbados up to 2005.







(annual %) constant 
US$2000e
Medium technology 
exports (% of 
manufacturing exports)f
High technology exports 
(% of manufacturing 
exports)f
Imports and 
exports (% of GDP)g
Country 1996–2005 1980–89 1990–2007 1986–89 1990–2007 1986–89 1990–2007 1986–89 1990–2007
Mexico 0.41 9.7 9.8 25.4 37.1 5.6 22.2 19.5 51.6
Costa Rica 0.33 5.7 9.2 5.5 11.2 3.1 18.1 48.0 85.5
El Salvador 0.08 –6.6 10.2 6.6 13.1 3.5 5.6 32.5 59.9
Dominican Republic — –1.6 6.4 18.5 5.1 0.5 77.3 89.8
Panama 0.32 –0.1 5.1 2.0 2.2 1.6 2.2 159.0 156.2
Colombia 0.22 5.3 6.3 6.1 12.1 0.5 1.9 24.8 36.1
Peru 0.11 –0.8 7.9 3.4 2.4 0.4 0.5 21.6 33.6
Chile 0.57 6.9 8.2 2.6 5.1 0.4 0.5 39.1 59.9
Argentina 0.43 3.2 7.6 11.3 16.0 2.2 2.3 10.0 19.9
Uruguay 0.27 3.7 6.6 25.3 9.8 0.7 1.5 23.0 37.3
Brazil 0.87 10.5 7.2 25.3 26.3 4.2 6.6 10.7 20.6
Venezuela, R.B. de 0.37 –0.2 1.0 3.2 6.0 0.1 0.4 38.5 46.5
Barbados — — 1.8 20.8 18.9 15.2 9.9 — 105.3
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 0.56 4.2 7.2 15.8 23.8 3.0 11.4 19.6 37.6
d.  Data availability: Costa Rica, no data 2001–02; Brazil, 1996–2005 (no data 1997–99); El Salvador, 1998; Colombia, 1996–2001; Peru, 
1997–2004; Chile, 1996–2004; Argentina, 1996–2006; Uruguay, 1996–2002 (no data 2001), and LAC 1996–2005 (no data 1997–99)
e. Data for Barbados up to 2003.
 f.  Data for República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Costa Rica up to 2006; for Dominican 
Republic up to 2001.
g. Data for Barbados from 1991 to 2002.
— = Not available. 
Table 1.2 Selected Indicators of the Latin American Economy (continued)
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Table 1.3 Latin America’s Growth and Productivity, 1950–2002
percent
Indicator 1950–80 1980–90 1990–2002
GDP growth    
 Weighted average 5.5 1.1 2.6
 Simple average 4.8 1.0 2.9
GDP per capita    
 Weighted average 2.7 –0.9 1.0
 Simple average 2.1 –1.2 0.9
GDP per worker    
 Weighted average 2.7 –1.7 0.1
 Simple average 2.4 –1.9 0
Total factor productivitya    
 Weighted average 2.0 –1.4 0.2
 Simple average 1.9 –1.4 0.6
Source: Ocampo 2006.
a.  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 



























































































Figure 1.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: Manufacturing 
Sector Share of Total Value Added






































Source:  ECLAC 2008b.
Figure 1.5 Share of Engineering-Intensive Industries in 
Manufacturing Output Compared with World Average
undoubtedly partially represents rationalization of the allocation of 
resources in the face of change in relative prices stemming from liberaliza-
tion and the intensifying emergence of low-wage exporters in Asia.
However, notwithstanding this rationalization, the phenomenon may 
have been magnified by the result of the fast and relatively indiscriminate 
trade liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s, coupled with bouts 
of exchange rate overvaluation, which contributed to destruction of some 
activities of the ISI era that might have had the potential to compete and 
survive. As a result, economies were pushed further toward their static 
comparative advantage in natural resources.
Declining Participation in Engineering-Intensive Industries and Low 
R&D. Not only did manufacturing lose its position in many economies, 
but the participation of engineering-intensive manufacturing industries also 
declined in almost all countries between the early 1970s and the early 2000s. 
Moreover, engineering-intensive manufacturing is below the world average 
(figure 1.5). Even compared with other natural-resource-based economies 
like Australia and New Zealand, Latin America’s engineering-based activi-
ties fare badly. This finding is troublesome because countries that have di-
versified from natural resources to higher value-added industries have used 
returns from the former to strengthen engineering- and scientific-intensive 
sectors as well as the knowledge content of natural resource sector activi-
ties themselves (Stijns 2001). Meanwhile, the extremely low investment in 
research and development in all Latin American countries (except Brazil) is 
a proxy for a low level of innovation in the region (see table 1.2).
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Insufficient Export Growth. In the era of liberalization (mid-1980s–1990s), 
the region’s average growth in volume of exports was strong and rising, run-
ning at an average of 7.5–8.0 percent a year (compared with 4.0–5.0 percent 
in previous decades). In value terms, however, the performance has been less 
robust, in part because of reliance on commodities in most countries, which 
until the boom of the early 2000s encountered relatively depressed prices 
(World Bank 2008). Moreover, imports rose faster than exports, reflecting a 
high-income demand elasticity and low price elasticity. Hence, the region did 
not escape its traditional external constraint on growth until the commodity 
boom. It would appear that most of Latin America needs sustained rates of 
export expansion closer to those of the Asian tigers if the region is to realize 
growth sufficient to converge with rich countries (tables 1.2 and 1.4).
The era of liberalization saw Latin America increase its share of world 
trade to around 5 percent in the mid-2000s, from a little over 4 percent 
in 1990. This expansion was not enough to recover 1960 levels, however, 
which closed in on 6 percent. Moreover, the expansion was largely attrib-
utable to Mexico, which experienced a great export expansion under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In contrast, the value 
of exports in East Asia has been on a steady rise, from 1 percent of world 
trade in 1960 to nearly 6 percent in the mid-2000s.
Table 1.4 Growth of Value of Exports: Selected Latin American 
and Asian Countries
percent
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
China .. 22.5 6.1 11.9 24.4
Korea, Rep. 30.1 22.8 11.5 14.2 12.2
Malaysia 6.0 8.2 9.2 12.7 7.0
Singapore .. .. 12 9.4 8.4
Thailand 10.3 10.4 13.6 10.4 7.7
Argentina 7.3 6.3 3.2 8.4 6.2
Brazil 6.7 8.6 10.5 5.3 9.3
Chile 3.8 10.0 6.9 9.7 6.2
Colombia 3.5 5.7 5.3 7.1 4.4
Costa Rica 10.1 8.0 5.7 11.9 6.2
Mexico 6.0 10.1 9.7 12.5 6.4
Latin America 5.3 5.0 4.2 7.9 6.3
Source: UN Comtrade. 
Note: .. = Negligible.
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Poor Export Market Positioning. ECLAC has developed a competitive-
ness matrix for exports with four categories:
• Rising Stars: a country exports dynamic products, where growth in 
world demand is faster than the average and increases its market 
share.
• Lost Opportunity: a country exports dynamic products but loses 
market share.
• Falling Stars: A country exports products for which demand is grow-
ing at less than the world average, but nonetheless increases its 
market share.
• Retreat: a country exports products for which demand is growing at 
less than the world average, and is losing market share.
The majority of Latin American exports are in products that are los-
ing market share. In 1985–95, 60 percent of exports were in this cat-
egory. This share fell slightly for the region as a whole in 1995–2004, 
thanks in part to Brazil, but mostly because of Mexico’s strong increase 
in dynamic exports under NAFTA. Brazil increased its dynamic segment 
from about 30 percent to over 60 percent, while Mexico increased it 
from slightly more than 30 percent to over 50 percent. Both countries, 
but especially Mexico, achieved this growth through “rising stars.” The 
Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and República de 
Bolivariana Venezuela) and Chile lost shares in dynamic markets; Chile, 
however, sharply increased its presence in “falling star” markets. Mean-
while in both periods Central America increased its market share in the 
less dynamic export products.
Lagging in Diversification. Although results are mixed, empirical work 
shows a link between trade and productivity growth (Pagés 2010). Recent 
empirical work also shows that as countries rise in income from low levels 
they evolve from a concentrated production and export base to greater 
degrees of diversification. As countries with a relatively high level of in-
come approach the technology frontier, specialization takes hold again in 
the activities in which they excel. This empirical pattern appears in the 
form of an inverted U (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003; Klinger and Lederman 
2006) and suggests that, to develop, countries initially have to diversify 
their capacities to produce and export through imitation and adaptation 
behind the technological frontier. In sum, scholarly work strongly suggests 
that countries at Latin America’s level of development need to succeed not 
only in export growth but also in export diversification if they are to scale 
the hierarchy of world production and income. 
Diversification of production and exports has two major practical 
advantages for economic growth. On the one hand, a “portfolio effect” 
reduces vulnerability to swings in external demand and prices. On the 
24 operational principles for effective public management
other, a dynamic effect of investment and “learning by doing” through 
pursuit of new activities can have spillover effects for the whole economy 
(Agosin 2009).
Latin America as a whole has progressed in export diversification 
(figure 1.6). The most diversified countries are Brazil and Mexico, and 
the least diversified are in the Andean area, which were further caught 
up in the commodity boom preceding the global recession in 2008. Nev-
ertheless, diversification of the majority of the countries lags behind 
emerging Asia and what would be expected given their income levels 
(CAF 2006).





















































Figure 1.6 Export Concentration Measured by Herfindhal-
Hirshman Index, 1984–85 to 2005–06
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Technological Content of Exports. As a general proposition one can 
argue that the export of high- and medium-tech products involves more 
physical and human capital as well as innovation than do low-tech exports 
and many natural-resource-based exports.20 High-tech products also may 
integrate better into global production networks with opportunities to 
scale up value chains. These types of products also tend to have relatively 
more dynamic demand growth. Hence aspiring to diversify into these 
products can be a way to stimulate economic growth.
Mexico and Central America have shown a very significant diversifica-
tion in this direction thanks to creation of special export processing zones, 
efforts to attract foreign direct investment, and the granting of trade pref-
erence regimes by the United States. Argentina also has gained in medium-
tech manufactured exports (see table 1.2).
However, in Mexico and Central America the value of medium- and 
high-tech exports as a percentage of total export value is considerably 
higher than their value added as a percentage of total export value added. 
Mexico is a good example (figure 1.7). This reflects the reality that exports 
of many high- and medium-tech products are the end result of processing 
imported parts and components where the main value added is cheap 
labor. Manufactures export processing has accounted for 50–60 percent 
and 70–80 percent of exports for Central America and the Dominican 
Republic and for Mexico, respectively. While export processing has been 
an initial platform for progressively adding value in many East Asian coun-
tries, that phenomenon has been slower to develop in Latin America.21 
Source:  ECLAC 2008b.
Figure 1.7 Mexico: Participation in Exports and Value 
Added, by Type of Export, 1990–2002
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Data suggest that in recent years valued added in export processing in 
Mexico and Central America and the Dominican Republic has been 
relatively stable at 22–24 percent of the total value of these exports. 
The major local component is labor. In the mid-2000s export processing 
employed nearly 2.5 million people in Mexico and more than 600,000 in 
Central America and the Dominican Republic.
Inequality. Latin America has suffered from severe inequality since its 
colonial days (Coatsworth 1998). In the past few years some countries, 
such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, have made modest progress in 
addressing the problem, but the countries of the region nonetheless remain 
among the most inequitable in the world. Aside from normative consid-
erations, inequality certainly undermines the tapping of the full potential 
of a country’s human capital and has been an underlying source of social 
unrest as well as political uncertainty, both of which can affect investment 
and risk taking. Indeed, inequality is often viewed as one of the main 
constraints on Latin American growth, economic transformation, and 
ability to converge with rich countries (Thorp 1998; Dominguez 2008; 
Fukuyama 2008).
Competitiveness. While competitiveness indexes always have their 
shortcomings, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World  Economic 
 Forum (2008) is revealing of the region’s plight.22 The only Latin  American 
countries in the top 50, out of 131 countries, are Chile and  Barbados. 
Table 1.5 Latin America in the Global Competitiveness Index 
Rankings: 2007–08
Rankings
1–25 26–50 51–75 75–100 100–131
None Chile Mexico Jamaica Ecuador
Barbados Panama Honduras Bolivia
Costa Rica Trinidad and 
Tobago
Nicaragua






Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2007–2008.
Note: Chile is the one Latin American country that has a higher ranking 
than China.
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Chile is also the only Latin American country that outranked China 
(table 1.5). Even so Chile performs poorly in key indicators of competitive 
dynamism such as education and innovation. Major Latin American coun-
tries, even the relatively more competitive ones, also score poorly in the 
OECD’s PISA international reading and math tests. This shortcoming indi-
cates that, notwithstanding achievements in expanding school enrollments, 
the region’s educational systems have severe quality deficiencies. And the 
region’s poor infrastructure explains a significant part of its high transport 
costs compared with the United States and Europe (Mesquita Moreira, 
Volpe, and Blyde 2008).
In conclusion, it is clear from this brief overview that Latin America’s 
“falling behind” is no accident. The list of shortcomings constructs a tree 
with dense foliage (figure 1.8). The reforms of the era of the Washington 
Consensus contributed positively in some dimensions of economic policy, 

































Figure 1.8 Factors Conditioning Latin American Growth
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Notes
 1. The catch-up is possible in principle because the laggard can potentially 
access new capital on the technological frontier to replace technologically out-
moded capital, thereby boosting productivity levels. The leader cannot leverage 
its economy in a similar way because it is already on the technological frontier 
(Abramovitz 1986). Very backward countries also can leverage growth through 
the availability of elastic labor supplies (Lewis 1955), which in conjunction with 
industrialization allows movement from low productivity subsistence agriculture 
to higher productivity activities. 
 2. It is commonly recognized that European colonization had long-term 
effects on the nature of underdevelopment. Inferior institutions and legal systems 
are often blamed for the lagging performance of former Spanish, Portuguese, and 
French colonies. But even within a given set of colonies, the local administrators’ 
choices of types and intensity of investments could have long-term effects (Huillery 
2009). In any event, a more complete picture of Latin America’s path dependency 
can be drawn from Furtado (1970) and Thorp (1998), who cite as factors the 
interaction of initial colonial conditions with the nature of export products and 
their impact on local markets, access to technological progress, public policies, and 
external factors including foreign capital and government interventions.
 3. During the Great Depression Latin America sharply increased external 
protection through tariffs, nontariff barriers, and devaluation. It also defaulted on 
foreign bondholders with little retaliation from the latter because of their difficul-
ties in organizing a coordinated response (Devlin 1989). The protection, coupled 
with a positive transfer of resources arising from the default, and a proactive 
expansionary government budget, stimulated one of the best growth performances 
in this difficult era (Ocampo 2006). Indeed, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) captured the 
times when he remarked that the doom and gloom on Wall Street was in contrast 
to mills in São Paulo that were humming.
 4. The intensification was a response to the collapse of international markets 
and a flurry of international protectionism.
 5. See, for example, Prebisch (1949), Rodenstein-Rodan (1943), Lewis (1955), 
Nurske (1967), and Hirschman (1958).
 6. For the case of the Republic of Korea, see Hong (2008).
 7. Chile was the exception. Internationalization began in the mid-1970s under 
the Pinochet regime.
 8. As can be seen in the figure, the East Asian countries and Latin America 
began to converge in growth rates toward the end of the 1990s. This convergence 
resulted largely from the exogenous effects of the financial crisis and contagion in 
the East Asian countries at the end of the 1990s and the unusually high growth 
rates for Latin America attributable to high commodity prices in the six years pre-
ceding the world economic crisis of 2008.
 9. An alternative indicator of well-being, the Human Development Index, 
shows Latin America faring better. This index shows that the region substantially 
converged and narrowed the gap with OECD countries between 1950 and the end 
of the century. This finding is not surprising, because the index discounts income 
and gives significant weight to mortality rates, which tend to fall secularly as a 
result of global trends in technology and public health (Crafts 2000).
 10. This growth was concentrated in South America, abundant in natural 
resources.
 11. To clarify, the moniker “Washington Consensus” was coined in a study 
organized by Williamson (1990). The consensus was explained as a consensus 
among the Washington-based technocrats, policy makers, politicians, and others 
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working in the U.S. government, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund, think tanks, and the like on what constituted 
good structural reform policy. Leaving aside whether there was really a true con-
sensus in Washington (there was not, although those close to power generally 
paid little attention to dissent), the study was an effort to discern how much 
Latin American governments shared that perspective and followed its guidelines 
as they navigated the crisis and adjustments of the 1980s. The label “Washington 
 Consensus” was hung on views of those who strongly identified with the liberal-
izing reform agenda of the era, some of whom were far more ideological in tone 
and substance than the version originally set out by Williamson.
 12. For just a few examples of this enormous literature, see Ffrench-Davis 
(2005), Rodrik (2006), Stiglitz (2003a; 2003b), Ocampo (1998; 2001), Jung-En 
Woo (1999), and Ibarra (2004).
 13. John Weisman and Alister MacDonald, “Obama, Brown Strike Simi-
lar Notes on the Economy,” April 3, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123871661163384723.html.
 14. In a recent work, Birdsall, de la Torre, and Caicedo (2010) distinguish in a 
very balanced way the pros and cons of the consensus for Latin America.
 15. Williamson (2009, 1) recently commented on the many critiques of the 
Washington Consensus: “First, as originally conceived the Washington Consensus 
advised not simply the microeconomic liberalization …, but also macroeconomic 
discipline and opening up (globalization). . . . Second, according to the alternative 
version espoused by Joe Stiglitz . . . the Washington Consensus was a neoliberal 
manifesto. But neoliberalism is normally considered to embrace such doctrines as 
monetarism, reduction of the progressive thrust of taxation, opposition to state 
action to redistribute income, and minimization of the role of the state, rather than 
just the reasonable liberalizing (micro) reforms. . . . These additional doctrines 
never did commend a consensus in Washington so I do not consider they constitute 
a Washington Consensus.”
 16. These adventures were most conspicuously undertaken by the consensus’s 
poster child, Argentina. That is ironic, since there was a certain consensus in the 
academic literature that the big economic crisis of the Southern Cone countries in 
the late 1970s was linked to these very types of policy design. For a review of policy 
problems of that era, see ECLAC (1995).
 17. Chile, the best Latin American performer, might be pointed to as the real 
poster child of the Washington Consensus. However, especially since the demo-
cratic transition, it has been more eclectic than has generally been recognized. One 
example was the extensive and then controversial use of short-term capital con-
trols, much criticized in Washington circles (but now receiving more acceptance). 
More recently, it has an ambitious strategy to promote innovation in selected real 
or potential clusters. And some of the Pinochet-era export successes (such as for-
estry) were built on public programs that preceded the coup d’etat. Ffrench-Davis 
(2005) probably has one of the most complete analyses of what a more effective 
reform process would look like. Also see Ocampo (2005).
 18. In many cases space limitations force the use of averages. However, in 
recent decades only Chile systematically breaks out of the pack. Unless otherwise 
indicated, this overview material is drawn from ECLAC (2008b) with updates and 
refinements introduced by the authors.
 19. An enormously important exogenous policy shock was the cartel of com-
mercial banks, multilateral lenders, and creditor governments that designed rescue 
packages in the face of the region’s inability to service external foreign debt in the 
1980s. The rescue was aimed more at the commercial banks than at Latin America. 
Indeed, the packages “squeezed” a historically unprecedented transfer of 
resources from Latin America to the banks for most of the 1980s, saving them 
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from bankruptcies. However, the transfer was a major contributor to the lost decade 
of growth. Moreover, some of the adjustments pushed by the cartel also weakened 
rather than strengthened the medium-term prospects for the region’s growth. For 
details, see Devlin (1989) and Ramos (2007).
 20. Nevertheless it is possible to add knowledge and value to natural resource 
exports through innovation. An example is Australia and New Zealand, two coun-
tries that have achieved developed-country income status on a natural resource 
export base.
 21. A World Bank (2006) report on China pointed out that China’s trade bas-
ket continues to rapidly diversify and move up-market. New product varieties are 
emerging every year, with an expanding private sector leading the drive. Moreover, 
import substitution is deepening domestic supply chains, with export processing 
steadily falling as a percent of total exports to 50 percent, according to the Bank. 
Preeg (2006) reports that high-tech information and telecommunication equip-
ment is a leading driver of exports, and he observes that Chinese valued added for 
information technology exports will soon reach 70 percent.
 22. The index covers 12 “pillars,” each with many subindicators: institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher edu-
cation and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial mar-
ket sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, 
and innovation.
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The First Principle: Medium- 
to Long-Term Development 
Strategies Supported by Industrial 
Policies Can Foster Economic 
Catch-Up
Overtly or tacitly, governments usually have a development strategy. A 
strategy is a template for action, or a formal plan, to attain particular 
goals. Development strategies can have very different characteristics, how-
ever. Simplifying for the purpose of illustration, in market economies strat-
egies may be said to be differentiated chiefly by the assumptions about the 
pace of economic transformation brought about by natural market forces. 
These assumptions in turn affect the nature of the primary goals set and 
the pattern (scope, types, and amount) of public interventions in pursuit 
of those goals.
The Character of Development Strategies: 
An Initial Snapshot
On the one hand are the strategies that primarily focus on public sector 
interventions designed to set free and strengthen the autonomous action 
of market forces, examples being adjustment and liberalization policies, 
coupled with regulatory frameworks, oriented toward macroeconomic 
stability; protection of property rights and the legal institutions under-
pinning them; liberalization of external trade and investment; and provi-
sion of certain basic public goods such as security, education, and basic 
infrastructure. This “custodian” approach to state intervention, a term 
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used by Evans (1995), bespeaks of confidence that the relatively free play 
of market forces will promote, on the whole, an adequate pace of eco-
nomic transformation. Hence the state’s role is primarily that of oversee-
ing market-based rules and providing a “sound” macroeconomic enabling 
environment. That in turn will support market-based price incentives 
for businesses themselves to lead a process of economic transformation 
based on the country’s international comparative advantage. Moreover, 
even when recognizing that market prices might diverge from social valu-
ations (so-called market failures), the belief in both the limited nature of 
the scope of these failures, as well as the limited capacity of government 
to effectively deal with them (stemming from identification problems, or 
the political economy risks of rent seeking, for example) counsels against 
proactive public sector interventions of the type associated with so-called 
industrial policy (IP) (see, for example, Krueger 1990; Noland and Pack 
2002; and Pack and Saggi 2006).1 
As a consequence, in this perspective, the goals and scope of public 
interventions should be relatively limited and kept at “arm’s length” from 
the workings of market forces. The bottom line of the “benevolent market 
forces” school of thought is that an ambitious scheme of public interven-
tions, even in the face of possible market failures, is likely only to create 
distortions that will inhibit full exploitation of international comparative 
advantage and handicap growth and development. Pack and Saggi (2006, 
293) illustrate this point of view in reference to industrial policies when 
they suggest that “hewing to the main tenets of the Washington Consen-
sus (while recognizing its weaknesses) might prove a better investment of 
limited government competence and legitimacy than the extraordinarily 
complex strategies required by either the new or old industrial policy.” 
In contrast, proponents of industrial policies are mistrustful of certain 
market signals. In effect, this approach believes that market price signals 
may in certain circumstances be very unreliable guides for the allocation 
of resources in support of economic transformation, because they will 
encourage underexploitation of opportunities to upgrade economic activ-
ity and may even lock economies into a low-wage comparative advantage 
(Cimoli and others 2006).2 The grounds for this perspective are, on the 
one hand, the belief, with some evidence, that market failures exist and are 
in fact quite significant, especially in developing countries (Harrison and 
Rodriguez-Clare 2009; Fernandez-Arias 2010).3 On the other hand, the 
perspective can be extended beyond market failures, which theoretically 
have a static general equilibrium point of reference, to a more real world 
framework that emphasizes medium- to long-term dynamic factors related 
to learning, capacity building, adaptation, and innovation, and their criti-
cal roles in economic transformation. Moreover, some technologically 
specific platforms in particular sectors or activities push these dynamic 
factors to their fullest potential better than others, but serious obstacles 
of both an economic and noneconomic nature mean that access to these 
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platforms is not spontaneous (see, among others, Fajnzylber 1990; Katz 
and Kosacoff 1998; Lall 2000; Cimoli and others 2006; Hausmann and 
Klinger 2006; and Peres and Primi 2009). 
The bottom line here is that public sector interventions must be pro-
active and emerge out of a medium- to long-term strategy that identifies 
and tackles obstacles to economic transformation on an array of fronts 
(micro, meso, and macro) using intelligent horizontal and vertical policy 
interventions adapted to the opportunities and risks at play. The public 
interventions should be directed at rectifying serious market failures or 
at addressing the broader institutional and cultural obstacles to accessing 
dynamic production processes and technology, such as the failure of the 
private sector to spontaneously lead structural change because of aversion 
to risk and the inertia derived from the comforts of incremental change. 
Moreover, there is a degree of specificity to these dynamic processes and 
technological applications with which public interventions must align 
themselves (Wade 1990; Chang 1994; Peres and Primi 2009; Cimoli and 
others 2006). Hence, inevitably there is a need to be selective in the design 
and application of at least part of the policy package; as Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2006) state in the title of a paper, governments are “doomed to 
choose.” In any event, the goal of industrial policy is to accelerate eco-
nomic transformation and convergence with rich countries beyond what 
unfettered market forces would offer. 
Proponents of industrial policies fully recognize that they encounter 
challenges regarding available public sector skills, agency problems, iner-
tia in policy sets, sectoral interests, and corruption (Nelson 1987; Pérez 
1992; Kosacoff and Ramos 1999; Lall 2000). However, they believe that 
effectively identifying and acting on areas for policy interventions is less 
daunting than often presumed. They also believe that selectivity is less 
dangerous than typically presumed. Indeed, as Rodrik (2008) points out, 
even in the context of the Washington Consensus agenda, governments 
were encouraged to identify interventions for provision of public goods in 
social areas that were not necessarily less complex than those of industrial 
policy. Moreover, governments have been selective in their allocation of 
resources and development of programs for these purposes. Meanwhile, 
Rodrik (2004) also points out that dysfunctional rent seeking and corrup-
tion are risks not only in industrial policy but in any area of public policy. 
And these problems can be constrained through design of the institutional 
framework and the modalities of industrial policy (Wade 2004; Todesca, 
Larghi, and Besmedrisnik 2006; Amsden 2007; Devlin and Moguillansky 
2009). Hence, while not underestimating the challenges of pursuing IP 
effectively, its proponents believe that “yes governments can,” to differ-
ent degrees according to their circumstances, be more strategic in policy 
formulation than market fundamentalists would likely admit.
There are three potential patterns of state action in this more proactive 
framework, which Evans (1995) has laid out nicely. One is the pattern 
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of “demiurge,” or the state as a producer. Although all states produce 
things, a pattern of state action in the spirit of a demiurge is underpinned 
by a broad assumption that the private sector is incapable of undertak-
ing a strategic economic activity. A second pattern is “midwifery,” where 
doubts about the private sector’s capacity are balanced by an estimation 
that the capacity can be built; in this case, the state assists the private 
sector in acquiring that capacity instead of directly undertaking the new 
challenging activity. Third is a pattern of “husbandry,” where the pri-
vate sector is quite capable of undertaking new complex activities, but 
the state. when needed, assists it in navigating the challenging waters of 
globalization and technological change. These patterns can coexist in the 
state’s policy matrix, but one or more may dominate at any time and stage 
of development, as we show later in this chapter. As for the instruments of 
IP, the classic has been tariff protection, but in fact horizontal and vertical 
instruments are many and varied, with new ones emerging all the time.4 
Some of the instruments actually used for export development are high-
lighted in later chapters.
Finally, in point of fact, most countries’ strategies have not strictly fol-
lowed either of the two stylized approaches described here but contain 
elements of both (Evans 1995; Ul Haque 2007). What is at issue, rather, 
are the mechanisms used and the dominant approach in the orientation 
of public policies. 
A debate still rages over these two stylized approaches to development 
strategy—one that extends back to the early days of capitalism.5 In the 
contemporary era the proponents of the first policy alternative, known 
as “monetarists” in the 1960s, are today called “neoclassicals” or “neo-
liberals,” while the second were formerly called “structuralist” or “diri-
giste” and now are known as advocates of “neostructuralism,” “political 
economy,” or “developmentalism.” The contemporary debate originated 
with the famous disagreement in development economics between mon-
etarists and structuralists in the pre-1980 import substitution industrial-
ization period—for which Latin America was a major prop (de Oliviera 
Campos 1964). In those days the structuralists held sway in the devel-
opment debate. The emergence of the Reagan-Thatcher antigovern-
ment ideology of the 1980s, coupled with the severe debt crisis in Latin 
America and other developing countries, delegitimized structuralist proac-
tive public policy and contributed to the pendulum swinging hard to the 
so-called neoliberal approach, as expressed in the influential Washington 
Consensus discussed in chapter 1. However, faced with the poor, lagging, 
or flagging performance of the best students of the consensus, the much 
better performance in a number of countries with more proactive govern-
ment policies, and the manifest crisis in the North caused by unreserved 
faith in the efficiency of markets, industrial policy “is back.”6 Indeed, as 
we discuss in later chapters, interest is growing in Latin America about 
development strategies underpinned by industrial policies.7 Moreover, 
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contemporary proponents of neostructuralism have brought a great deal 
of “value added” to industrial policy vis-à-vis its earlier formulations, an 
issue we highlight momentarily.
Opting for the Industrial Policy Approach: The Power 
of Association 
Industrial polices have a long history. Indeed, in recent centuries few 
countries have become rich without passing through a period in which 
industrial policy, most notably infant industry protection, among other 
instruments, has not been deployed before reaching a state of a “liberal” 
economy (Bairoch 1993; Chang 2003; Fajnzylber 1988, 1990; Reinert 
2004, 2009; Lin and Monga 2010).8 Many studies of the effects on devel-
opment of industrial policy have been conducted by its advocates and crit-
ics. But the studies have not silenced the debate. Wade (2004, 345) nicely 
captures part of the dynamic:
The debate about the role of the state in economic development 
demonstrates the power of infinite repetition as a weapon of modern 
scholarship. The issue is normally posed in terms of the “amount” of 
state intervention or the “size” of government. The neoclassical side 
says that more successful cases show relatively little intervention in 
the market, while less successful cases show a lot (Brazil and Mexico 
compared to East Asia; or sub-Saharan Africa at the bottom). It uses 
this evidence to urge governments to shrink the size of the state and 
remove many of the interventions from the market. The political 
economy side says that the neoclassicals have their facts wrong; 
the most successful cases show “heavy” or “active” intervention. 
It concludes from this evidence that governments can [author’s em-
phasis], in some circumstances, guide the market to better industrial 
performance than a free market, even in the absence of neoclassical-
type market failure. But neither side has been noticeably enthusiastic 
to specify just what evidence would be consistent with its position 
and what would not. Both have exercised a selective inattention to 
data that would upset their way of looking at things. So the debate 
about the role of the state is less a debate than a case of paradigms 
(“parrot-times”) talking past each other.
Part of the problem here, aside from faith in certain paradigms, is the 
real difficulty of precise measurement of the impacts of industrial policy. 
The more rigorous mainstream contemporary analysis has focused pri-
marily on East Asia where most analysts at least do agree that govern-
ments have been proactive interventionists in markets. Three issues are 
usually addressed: whether targeted industries received significant finan-
cial support, whether industrial structure differed from that predicted 
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by an economy’s income and population, and whether the strategically 
supported industries’ productivity performance proved better than that in 
nonstrategic sectors (Weiss 2005; Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2009). 
However, there are many problems in assessing results. The precise 
dynamic transmission mechanisms of industrial policies can be extremely 
complex and hard to fully understand, let alone model. Indeed, rigorous 
evaluation of the impact of a single, sectorally focused incentive program 
on, say, productivity, is extremely challenging (Hughes 2007), not to men-
tion more aggregated perspectives. Developing robust counterfactuals to 
determine how performance would have been without industrial policy is 
very difficult, particularly when examining very robust economic perfor-
mances. In addition, data problems (such as measuring capital stock) in 
and between countries can be serious, and in data sets the instrumentation 
of industrial policy can often be difficult to isolate from other political 
economy motivations (McClelland 1975). Then there is the troublesome 
issue of endogeneity in assessing the causality of correlations. Results of 
statistical modeling are also very sensitive to the time periods selected, 
for example in growth accounting, as Sarel (1996) demonstrates for the 
East Asia debate. And some interventions such as administrative guidance 
and “moral suasion” are not easily quantifiable for purposes of modeling. 
Finally, there is a large body of comprehensive case studies on the Asian 
tigers. Many arrive at positive conclusions about the effectiveness of indus-
trial policy on investment incentives, learning, technological adaptation, 
and industrial and export development. However, some case studies are less 
favorable in their conclusions. And, of course, for many economists case 
study work lacks sufficient generality to be persuasive. Hence, examination 
of the overall results of the many studies undertaken often leads to conclu-
sions like “mixed results,” “inconclusiveness,” or “agnosticism” regarding 
the effects of industrial policy (Wade 1986, 1990; Weiss 2005; Rodrik 
2008; Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2009; Sarle 1996).
The lack of conclusive empirical evidence leaves development econo-
mists in the dilemma of having to make a choice in uncertainty about a 
recommended policy thrust for growth and economic transformation. 
One could rely on an “association” argument that medium- and long-
term strategies with industrial policy have been present in virtually all 
successful cases of catch-up and thus risk what Wade (2004, 348) calls 
the “Darwinian fallacy,” that is, “the assumption that because something 
exists it must be vital to the survival of the organism or society in which 
it exists.” Or one could risk Wade’s “Ptolemaic fallacy” and assume that 
only policies consistent with the neoliberal paradigm could have been the 
factor behind successful growth experiences.
As mentioned, history shows few instances of catch-up without the 
presence of industrial policies. The contemporary catch-up of developing 
countries with rich ones involves a relatively select club. Since 1960, 15 
countries (out of a universe of 106 with available data) have closed the 
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income gap with the United States by 10 percentage points or more (mea-
sured by gross domestic product, or GDP, per capita) (table 2.1). Of these, 
only Hong Kong SAR, China, would clearly approximate the neoliberal 
paradigm on government interventions. Conversely, more than half of 
these countries use, or have used, formal strategic national development 
plans to guide policy. Other developing countries, such as Malaysia, the 
Czech Republic, and China,9 have not met the outlined threshold but 
have achieved considerable catch-up using strategic industrial policies. 
Of course, many countries that have used industrial policies of one sort 
or another have been unsuccessful or had only mediocre economic per-
formance. The source of the problem can usually be readily identified, 
however, as stemming not from industrial policy per se but from flawed 
design or implementation or from exogenous shocks. Hence, as develop-
ment economists, we have decided on these grounds, coupled with the 
significant number of comprehensive case studies showing a favorable 
impact of IP on success stories, to risk (with due caution) the Darwin-
ian fallacy and promote in this book the idea that it is a good “bet” for 
Latin America to deepen a commitment to, and cultivate a capacity for, 
an explicit medium- to long-term development strategy supported by a 
modern industrial policy. 
More on Why We Think Medium- to Long-Term 
Development Strategies with Industrial Policies Are 
Important for Latin America 
The literature on industrial polices is vast. We do not review it here; 
interested readers can consult elsewhere for a review (for example, Peres 
and Primi 2009; Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2009; Noland and Pack 
2002). What we do highlight are the areas of the industrial policy defense 
that we find especially compelling for Latin America and that, in our view, 
make an intelligent bet on industrial policies well worth the risks involved.
Generally speaking, the mindsets, or intellectual cultures, of the skep-
tics and advocates of industrial policy are very different, and that differ-
ence also influences thinking about development processes.10 We believe 
that the proponents of IP promote a thought process that is more relevant 
for Latin American policy makers if they want to successfully navigate 
the dynamic and increasingly competitive world of globalization for the 
purposes of more economic transformation, growth. and catch-up. The 
dimensions of this mindset that we find especially compelling are:
A Dynamic Industrial Production Bias Based on a Notion of Efficacy. 
Many skeptics of IP operate in a static, neoclassical Pareto-like efficiency 
framework that is especially protective of consumer welfare and often 
looks askance at even temporary consumption losses arising from the 
“distortions” induced by industrial policy.11 Aside from the fact that on 
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its own terms Pareto optimality per se does not guarantee maximization 
of welfare, the more modern interpretations of industrial policy stress 
that economic transformation is based on the “efficacy” of promoting 
processes of investment and deepening industrialization that, in a continu-
ous and cumulative way, facilitate access to codified and tacit knowledge 
that supports new production and technological capacities.12 In this view, 
efficacy can trump efficiency in certain circumstances of learning, as noted 
by Cimoli and others (2006).
A Forward-Looking Medium- to Long-Term Strategy. As Montaigne 
pointed out long ago, “No wind works for the man who has no port of des-
tination.”13 By its very nature a commitment to IP encourages countries to 
strategically organize and prioritize medium- and long-term-oriented goals 
that mobilize a nation’s attention and efforts toward building capacities that 
accelerate the economic transformation of an economy.14 The scope of IP 
can vary. Using the language of Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel (2008), it 
Table 2.1 Catch-Up 1960–2007: Countries That Closed the Income 
Gap with the United States by 10 Percentage Points or More
GDP per capita as % of U.S. GDP per capita
Economy 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–07
Austria 55.2 66.6 69.0 70.3 69.6
Finland 54.0 64.4 69.9 65.0 71.1
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 27.5 40.6 61.0 76.8 78.9
Iceland 74.2 86.8 98.9 88.8 93.8
Ireland 37.0 41.7 44.3 57.1 80.1
Japan 66.0 99.8 108.7 117.1 106.0
Korea, Rep. 8.3 12.3 17.8 28.4 34.9
Luxembourg 93.1 95.2 97.5 122.8 141.0
Malta 7.9 13.8 20.8 26.6 27.9
Norway 78.5 88.5 100.5 105.8 109.8
Omana 9.6 21.5 24.7 25.2 26.0
Portugal 18.9 26.6 27.3 31.0 31.0
Singapore 17.7 31.2 44.4 60.4 69.4
Spain 31.9 40.0 38.0 40.5 42.6
Taiwan, China 12.8 21.0 32.7 49.9 56.4
Source: The authors on the basis of World Bank database.
Note: The amounts shown refer to constant 2000 dollars.
a. Data are available only until 2006.
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can be “in the small,” that is, focused on public inputs to improve the 
productivity of existing activities; or “in the large,” that is, focused on 
efforts to establish new industries. Because the region has largely mastered 
the art of macroeconomic balance, we think economic growth and devel-
opment in Latin America would benefit if government strategy moved 
more decisively and coherently beyond the relatively consolidated short-
term macroeconomic management that so heavily weighs on policy, com-
bining this focus with a progressively stronger, goal-driven, medium- and 
long-term strategy for economic transformation. 
Ambition.  As Evans (1995) observes, the IP approach magnifies concern 
with a country’s ranking in the global economic hierarchy, on the assump-
tion that the ranking is not irremediably fixed by the existing structure of 
static comparative advantages, but that public interventions can assist in 
scaling up the economy or accelerating the process. In other words, com-
parative advantages are “man-made” (Fajnzylber 1983, 1990; Adelman 
2000). Hence, IP instills a culture that replaces complacency about “god-
given” endowments and static comparative advantage, even in the face of 
respectable economic performance, for another stressing experimentation 
underpinned by the notion that “we can learn and do better.” This ambi-
tious culture is especially important in much of Latin America where natu-
ral resource rents, or political economy rents such as rich country trade 
preferences, can and do instill complacency that ultimately contribute to 
underperformance and economic vulnerability (ECLAC 2008).
Emulation. Modern IP thinking is underpinned by attention to activities 
in the richer, more advanced countries and, as an expression of ambition, 
aims in different ways over time to strategically emulate them in order 
to learn and build new and upgraded capacities (Reinert 2009). As men-
tioned in chapter 1, it has been empirically observed that as countries rise 
in income, their economies evolve from a high degree of specialization in 
production and export to a stage of diversification, only to begin again 
to specialize at relatively high levels of income and closer proximity to 
technological frontiers (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003; Klinger and Lederman 
2006). This suggests that development policy should strongly promote 
diversification because it enables new activities that generate learning 
and new capacities that support economic transformation and growth 
(Fajnzylber 1988; ECLAC 1990; Lall 1997; Rodrik 2004). On this criteria 
Latin America clearly lags in diversification (CAF 2006; ECLAC 2008; 
Agosin 2009).
Not all activities are equal, however. On the one hand, certain prod-
ucts entail specific skills and capacities that have some similarities with 
other production processes and facilitate migration to new activities, 
while other products are so skill specific that they are isolated, making 
migration difficult (Hausmann and Rodrik 2006).15 The more isolated a 
country’s skill set in production, the more critical is industrial policy to 
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push diversification because market forces will not generate easily assess-
able bridges to new activities. On the other hand, links among production 
activities are in technological hierarchies where certain core technologies 
are located that are specific to industries or activities that are exceptionally 
dynamic in fostering learning, productivity, and the “making” of new and 
upgraded comparative advantages (Cimoli and others 2006; Lall 1993; 
Perez 2001). These technologies emerge along the technological frontier 
and diffuse. Because what a country produces today determines the accu-
mulation of knowledge, skill, and comparative advantage of tomorrow, 
it is important to focus on progressive development of national capacities 
that permit, through imitation or innovation, entrance into production 
and activities that embody these dynamic technologies.16 This type of 
development will not necessary happen spontaneously through market 
forces; indeed, markets that support certain strategic activities may not 
be complete or exist at all in the local economy.
Strategic Alertness to Interdependence and Spillovers. Proponents of IP 
disagree among themselves about the relevance of focusing exclusively on 
so-called market failures as opposed to focusing on the more comprehen-
sive issue of capabilities and knowledge accumulation through selective 
promotion of certain production processes and activities.17 However, if 
one abstracts from a static equilibrium notion of misalignment of social 
and market prices, few would probably dispute the potential importance 
of interdependencies and spillovers arising from actions of market agents. 
The neoliberal paradigm culturally pays much less attention to this issue 
because of core assumptions of independence among economic agents.
Many spillovers can be relevant to success in growth and economic 
transformation of an economy (Chang 1994; Noland and Pack 2002; 
Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2009). Some seem exceptionally important 
for Latin America. IP is  traditionally very alert to “infant industries” with 
intra- and interindustry scale economies that arise from production links 
and knowledge spillovers, because scale can raise productivity and lower 
costs for new activities and hence enhance their competitiveness enough to 
create a comparative advantage. These spillovers  highlight coordination 
problems that IP should assess and address. 
A second relevant type of spillover is informational spillover aris-
ing from undertaking new activities. A successful new activity in a local 
economy generates new information that will spill over and encourage 
new entrants that will imitate and expand the country’s learning process. 
Recently, Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) cautioned that this type of infor-
mational spillover—in principle, good for an economy—may discourage 
the initial investment in discovery of a profitable new activity. That is 
because the “first mover” anticipates that if the investment is successful, 
copycats will erode rents, whereas if it fails, the new entrant bears all the 
costs. The prescription for this problem is public support policies and 
programs to encourage discovery. Other economists, however, have shown 
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that the first mover is not necessarily at a disadvantage (Newfarmer, Shaw, 
and Walkenhorst 2009).18 Nevertheless, it is safe to say that information 
itself is a major bottleneck and hence public interventions to intensify 
access to information that facilitates discovery and investment in new 
activities is a valuable role for industrial policy. 
Evolutionary Thinking. IP is, for the most part, not bound in a static 
paradigm that is good for all times and places. Rather, thinking is rooted in 
the real evolution of national and world economies. Hence, one observes 
a constant progression of thinking in line with real events. 
For example, in recent years industrial organization has undergone 
major changes. Advances in transport, information, and other technolo-
gies have led firms and industries in the global marketplace to increas-
ingly decentralize their production systems. While knowledge (often 
tacitly embodied in organizations and activities) and new capacities are 
still importantly generated in closed units of firms and industrial sectors, 
there has been an explosive rise of national and international, relatively 
mobile, collaborative networks underpinning production and technologi-
cal activities that provide knowledge, develop capacities, and stimulate 
innovation in dynamic activities (Cimoli and others 2006). Hence, catch-
up strategies must place increasing emphasis on developing more oppor-
tunistic institutional and policy instruments to assist the private sector 
in developing capacities for identifying, accessing, and exploiting oppor-
tunities that do not necessarily emerge lineally from current activities. 
This approach is what Sabel (2009a and b) calls the new “open indus-
trial policy,” which leans toward relatively more horizontal interventions 
that can support multiple potential new activities and thereby minimize 
risks associated with a focus on one particular sector. While we do not 
think that the concept of open industrial policy negates the usefulness of 
more vertical approaches, it certainly should be incorporated into strategic 
thinking. As another example, the establishment of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) under the Uruguay Round has made it more difficult to 
use certain more traditional forms of IP. However, IP not only encourages 
pragmatic exploration of real world loopholes in WTO rules, but it also 
has increasingly stressed investment strategies in supply-side issues and 
innovation where those rules are much less comprehensive (Bora, Lloyd, 
and Pangestu 2000; DiCaprio and Gallagher 2006; Weiss 2005).
Finally, perhaps the most important evolution in thinking about IP is 
the critical role of public-private alliances in strategy development and 
implementation, a subject discussed in detail in chapter 3.
Integrated Perspective for Policy. The neoliberal culture tends to focus on 
micro- and macroeconomic polices in separate compartments. IP stresses 
the need for full alignment of the two in thought and action. Hence, the IP 
frame of mind would try to ensure that short-term macroeconomic man-
agement and adjustments are consistent with the medium- to long-term 
strategy of productive transformation. IP “red lights” would be very high 
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situations to emerge such as real domestic interest rates, a sharp influx of 
volatile short-term capital together with overvalued exchange rates, a fis-
cally starved public sector, or cutbacks in strategic investments that sustain 
national capacity building. The neoliberal mental paradigm of faith in 
market forces tends to allow more permissiveness in this regard because 
“the market knows best.”19 This point is important for Latin America, 
which has made major macroeconomic adjustments during the reform 
era and during the great world economic recession of 2008–09 without 
always fully accounting for the longer-term consequences for economic 
transformation.
Development Strategies in Practice
As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis in part 1 of the issue of 
development strategies, coupled with the “how” of their formulation and 
implementation, involves 10 countries that we term “success cases,” either 
because they have sustained a process of economic convergence with rich 
countries or because they have performed better than Latin America coun-
tries with a similar endowment of resources. Moreover, our focus through-
out this chapter and the rest of part 1 is largely on that segment of national 
strategy that focuses on export development.20 We use this narrow focus for 
two reasons. First, it gives us a manageable vehicle to illustrate the “how” of 
development strategies, which usually encompass many areas. The second is 
that export development has been a core objective, guiding and stimulating 
growth and economic transformation in the success cases studied.
Ten Extraregional Success Cases 
Before fully entering into the analysis of strategies, we briefly outline some 
general indicators that describe the countries studied in this chapter. Most 
of our success cases are small economies, both in terms of population 
and size of territory (table 2.2). The exceptions are Australia, Malaysia, 
the Republic of Korea, and Spain, middle-sized countries with between 
20 million and 50 million inhabitants. Six of these economies—Finland, 
Ireland, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Spain—were notably poor in 
the 1950s. The table also shows that the growth rate of almost all these 
countries has been higher in the past 25 years than that of the average of 
high-income members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). In marked contrast with the Latin American 
region, this growth has led to sustained processes of economic conver-
gence with rich countries (figures 2.1 and 2.2).21 The major exceptions are 
Australia and New Zealand, which had a diverging trend; however, they 
managed to reach and maintain rich country status on an export platform 
of natural resources. As for Sweden, its income has been one of the highest 
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(2007) 1980–89 1990–2007 1980 2007 1980–89 1990–2007 1980–89  1990–2007 1980–89 1990–2007
Australia 7,682 21.0 1.8 2.1 14, 291 24,142 25.3 23.3 1.8 2.2 26.8 24.2
Czech Republic 78 10.3 — 2.0 — 7,408 — 27.7 — 5.6 — 27.3
Finland 304 5.3 3.1 2.0 15,576 28,755 27.3 25.6 0.3 2.8 26.1 19.2
Ireland 68 4.4 2.7 5.2 9,957 31,636 18.8 33.2 0.6 6.3 20.8 20.6
Korea, Rep. 99 48.5 6.4 5.0 3,221 14,540 30.9 34.4 0.3 0.7 29.6 32.9
Malaysia 330 26.5 3.1 4.0 1,848 4,715 30.2 41.7 3.2 4.6 29.5 30.2
New Zealand 270 4.2 1.1 1.6 10,265 15,033 23.2 22.6 3.1 3.6 23.6 21.0
Singapore 6,9 4.6 5.3 4.2 9,043 28,964 41.8 47.4 10.0 13.2 40.4 31.0
Spain 504 44.9 2.3 2.3 8,826 16,354 21.9 23.1 1.3 2.9 21.9 25.0
Sweden 449.9 9.1 2.0 1.8 19,330 31,764 21.7 23.4 0.4 4.8 20.5 17.3
OECD 
high-income 
countries —  — 2.3 1.8 17, 340 29, 805 22.2 20.9 0.6 1.9 22.3 20.8
Source: Authors elaboration based on the World Bank, World Development Indicators (online database) and OECD numbers.
a. Data for OECD, Ireland, and New Zealand only to 2006. 
b. Data for Czech Republic only from1993. 
— = Not available.
Table 2.2 General Indicators for 10 Success Cases
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Figure 2.1 GDP per Capita as Share of OECD Average for 

















Source: Authors, based on World Bank database. 
Figure 2.2 GDP per Capita as a Share of OECD Average: 
Three Asian Success Cases
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Table 2.2 also shows that all countries have had very respectable or 
high rates of saving in relation to GDP, with coefficients above 40 percent 
in Malaysia and Singapore. The same table also demonstrates the impor-
tance of foreign direct investment (FDI) for the learning process of some 
countries, in terms of both structural change and export development 
(especially in the Czech Republic, Spain, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Spain). In Korea and Finland (and Sweden), in contrast, FDI was dis-
couraged until rather late in their development processes when national 
capacities were well developed. 
The last column in table 2.3 shows the proportion of GDP accounted 
for by trade. Although this percentage differs considerably from country 
to country, it remains significant for all of them, with trade openness 
increasing over the past 15 years. These rates of trade as a share of GDP 
are consistent with the importance of export growth in all these countries, 
with rates in most of the success cases that are higher than those of the 
high-income OECD countries and more than twice as high as GDP growth 
rates. Within the export basket, medium- and high-technology products 
have increased significantly, except in countries endowed with abundant 
natural resources.22 
Research and development (R&D) efforts (which is part of a strategic 
approach toward a knowledge economy in most of these countries) tend 
to be much higher in the success cases than in Latin American countries 
(except in Malaysia), with a positive trend observed in recent years.
Finally, each of these countries has its unique historical story, which we 
do not elaborate on here. But we do highlight in broad terms their political 
dynamics in the postwar era. Australia, Ireland, Finland, New Zealand, and 
Sweden are full-fledged Western democracies. Spain and Korea were under 
authoritarian strongmen until transitions to democracy in the 1970s and 
1980s, respectively. Malaysia and Singapore were granted independence 
form Britain in the early 1960s and have had de facto one-party rule since 
then. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic was in the Soviet bloc until the 1990s.
The Strategies: Stylized Facts
Summary characterizations of the strategies applied by the selected coun-
tries are shown in annex table 2A, noting landmark events, or major 
inflection points, over time. (For additional details of the countries’ spe-
cific experiences, see annex 2A). An analysis of these strategies shows a 
number of common elements, as well as factors that differ for or are spe-
cific to a given country. The following sets out the stylized facts.
First, the strategies generally show increasing emphasis on proactive 
public policies designed to overcome obstacles (including market failures) 
that obstruct the creation of new comparative advantages. In all, the econ-
omies’ industrial policies were supported by fiscal stances that provided 
space for the proactive public policy.23
Table 2.3  Trade Indicators in the 10 Success Cases
 
Total R&D 
expenditure (% of 
GDP)a
Export growth 
(annual %, constant 
2000 US$)b
Medium-tech exports 
(% of manufacturing 
exports)c
High-tech exports 
(% of manufacturing 
exports)
Imports and exports 
(% of GDP)d
Country 1990-1999 2000–06 1980–89 1990–2007 1980–89 1990–2006 1980–89 1990–2006 1980–89 1990–2007
Australia 1.6 1.7 5.3 5.6 6.5 10.7 2.7 6.1 24.5 38.9
Czech Republic 1.1 1.3 — 9.8 — 38.6 — 12.8 — 118.8
Finland 2.8 3.4 3.4 7.5 26.9 26.8 6.0 20.8 43.8 67.6
Ireland 1.3 1.2 8.3 11.4 15.4 12.8 24.2 36.8 79.8 146.7
Korea, Rep. 2.4 2.7 11.5 13.3 30.7 36.1 14.7 29.6 36.9 70.5
Malaysia 0.3 0.6 9.2 10.1 9.3 17.2 19.4 42.5 110.6 195.8
New Zealand 1.1 1.2 3.6 4.9 6.2 9.8 2.2 4.2 45.3 66.5
Singaporee 1.7 2.2 — 13.9 21.8 19.3 28.1 50.7   
Spain 0.9 1.0 5.2 7.4 32.8 42.0 6.5 9.8 25.8 52.9
Sweden 3.6 3.9 4.1 6.6 40.9 36.2 13.1 20.6 49.8 76.7
OECD high-income
countries 2.3 2.4 4.7 6.0 — — — — 25.7 39.4
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) (online database) and OECD numbers.
a. WDI: Finland until 2007; Australia and Malaysia until 2004; New Zealand until 2005.
b. WDI: Ireland, New Zealand, and OECD until 2006.
c. Comtrade on Lall classification. Czech Republic from 1993.
d. OECD, New Zealand, Ireland until 2006.
e. Export average growth for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004–07 (www.singtat.gov.sg).
— = Not available.
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Second, strategies have been flexible and dynamic over time in response 
to changes in external or internal conditions, or both. Singapore has been 
one of the best practitioners in this regard, a fact noted by the country’s 
prime minister, Hsien Loong Lee (2003, 5), who has stated: “No system 
works forever. As the external environment changes, and as economies 
evolve, institutions and policies that used to work can become outdated 
or even dysfunctional. Countries will adjust incrementally over time 
to these changes, but eventually incremental change is not enough. 
Then it becomes necessary for countries to break the mold and remake 
themselves—a difficult but essential process.”24
Third, one general trend in the evolution of strategies reveals a com-
mon shift—taking place at a varying speed depending on the country— 
toward the strengthening of integration with the world economy.25 The 
focus on export development also is general. While the domestic market 
offers more opportunities for structural change within large countries, 
small and medium-size countries naturally focus their efforts on actions 
conducive to export development.26 Although these countries are all open 
economies now, they have differed considerably in the degree, content, 
and time line for trade and financial liberalization as well as in their open-
ness to FDI. In response to the great 2008–09 recession, most of the suc-
cess cases have provided short-term stimulus to their economies and are 
simultaneously reviewing their longer-term strategies in light of probable 
changes in the characteristics of the world economy (the so-called new 
normal).27 However, none is questioning the commitment to international 
integration.
Fourth, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, export 
development has been synonymous with ambition to progressively diver-
sify and upgrade production to be able to export increasingly more sophis-
ticated product lines. Two paradigmatic success cases, Ireland and Korea, 
are illustrated below in figure 2.3.
Fifth, in all 10 countries, these export development strategies are 
medium- or long-term strategies. Significant differences, however, exist 
in the scope, depth, and coherence of these strategies and in the degree 
of proactivity and structural orientation of their vision of the future. The 
scope of public actions to promote export development, as well as the 
degree of balance between horizontal and focused applications, varies 
between countries and from one priority area to another. Some coun-
tries have relied relatively more on highly specific policies that are clearly 
focused on particular sectors, branches of activity or clusters, whereas in 
others a mix of horizontal policies combined with more a limited selec-
tive approach to certain branches of activity has dominated. And in some 
countries intervention focuses on selected stakeholders—specific types of 
enterprises such as transnationals, whether generic or of a particular type; 
local small and medium enterprises, or SMEs; centers of excellence, and 
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Figure 2.3 Two Examples of Export Upgrading
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universities. In other countries, intervention is applied across the board 
and does not target any one actor in particular.
Sixth, all the strategies are underpinned by macroeconomic policies 
designed to maintain fundamental balances. The countries with the more 
ambitious policies for productive transformation have been careful, how-
ever, to align the commitment to macroeconomic balances with industrial 
policy objectives. All the countries have experienced episodes of instability 
at one time or another, but in recent decades a focus on fundamental mac-
roeconomic balances has been a constant. In our group of success cases, 
Ireland and Spain are examples of successful industrial policies and pros-
perity that have led to complacency, in both cases at that macroeconomic 
level where financial market and real estate property bubbles developed 
and burst, creating major economic crises.
Seventh, the capacity of an economy is only as good as the quality of the 
people working in it. In all 10 countries, a fundamental basis for strategy 
implementation is the strengthening of basic and secondary education, 
along with higher education, as these countries increasingly focused on 
moving up the world’s production hierarchy.28 Educational development 
is a generational issue, and efforts are therefore undertaken from an early 
stage of development with attention to increasing coverage and quality 
throughout the various phases involved.
Eighth, some strategies are linked to formal planning processes. In 
such cases, the structure and composition underlying those plans vary, of 
course, from country to country. Table 2.4 shows which countries (half 
Table 2.4 National Plans in Selected Countries 
Czech Republic (before 1990) Central planning
Czech Republic (after 1990) Three-year plans
Finland Three-year plans or guides
Ireland Seven-year plans
Korea, Rep. (up to 1993) Five-year plans
Korea, Rep. (1997 onward) N ational plans are dropped, but each 
ministry has indicative plans.
Malaysia I ndicative (complementary and 
interactive) plans that include 
a 30-year “vision,” a 10-year 
framework plan, and a budgeted 
5-year plan.
Source: Authors, based on official data.
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those studied) had national plans. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland 
and the Republic of Korea (before 1997), plans were created in a frame-
work that reflected not only goals and priorities, but also a multiyear 
commitment (indicative or hard) for allocation of funding.29 
We think the existence of formal indicative plans offers some advan-
tages for countries pursuing catch-up, particularly when they are accom-
panied by indicative resource allocations from finance ministries and 
reflect a degree of political consensus that provides relative continuity 
of successful initiatives over political cycles. First, formal plans con-
stitute a systematic national analysis that orders thinking beyond the 
day-to-day events by establishing forward-looking goals and priorities. 
Second, plans not only validate and motivate the actions of the public 
bodies responsible for the strategies (development agencies) and support 
their authority to implement programs and policies but also can serve 
as a sort of indirect coordination mechanism. (This institutional area is 
discussed in a later chapter.) The inclusion of goals for which multiyear 
funding commitments are in place can help to raise the credibility of 
the strategy in the mind of the private sector and reinforce executing 
agencies’ mandates. Last, even assuming flexibility, ex post the plan can 
serve as a public reference point for assessment of the effectiveness of 
the authorities’ converting words into deeds. That is clearly the case in 
Finland and Ireland. 
Ninth, some strategies, such as that of Australia, arise from a gov-
ernment’s political platform and are, in essence, very vulnerable to 
political cycles. The national strategy that was in force until the change 
of government administration in 2009 was, to a certain extent, simply 
a grouping, or framework, for government programs already under 
way. A recent strategy in New Zealand, which reflected the compo-
nents of the Clark administration’s political platform, combined the 
essence of the strategy implemented by a previous administration with 
a new, more structured approach for 10 years, starting from 2006. 
This “economic transformation” initiative reached the stage of defin-
ing goals, identifying opportunities and limitations, and formulating 
indicative plans of action; however, it remains to be seen what a con-
servative government elected in 2009 will do. On the other hand, the 
strategies of countries such as Spain and Sweden are not set out in 
documents; they are informal or tacit in nature, reflected implicitly in 
government programs.
Tenth, national strategies and their components often overlap with 
strategies at the subnational level, with varying degrees of linkage. In 
more politically centralized countries, regional strategies are coordinated 
with the national strategy. In other cases the links may be weaker, and 
strategies may even be somewhat independent, as can be seen in the case 
of Spain. Such a characteristic inevitably has implications for the strategy’s 
effectiveness.
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Four Strategic Orientations
Although, national strategies cover a wide range of development topics, 
two key components have invariably been export development and strate-
gic strengthening of integration with the world economy. In almost all of 
our case countries, strategies in pursuit of this goal include support for FDI 
attraction, the internationalization of local enterprises, export promotion, 
and innovation.30 
Strategic orientations in this area can be integrated within an overarch-
ing national strategy or can constitute relatively independent strategies. 
In the interest of organizing the analysis, only multiyear, formally docu-
mented strategies have been examined.
As may be seen from table 2.5, innovation is currently the most wide-
spread orientation in the selected countries and indeed in most cases 
is the lead strategy. Moreover, innovation’s emergence as a strategic 
pole of development is relatively recent in most of the countries. The 
emergence of central interest in innovation is driven in part by the stra-
tegic goal of accessing new and dynamic transversal technologies—such 
as biotech, ICT (information and communications technology), and 
nanotechnology—but also by the need to raise a country’s pro-
ductivity in goods and services sectors, as well as to upgrade them, in 
the face of competition from lower-wage countries. Another important 
Table 2.5 Four Strategic Orientations for Strengthening 








Czech Republic   
Finland 
Ireland    
Korea, Rep.   
Malaysia    
New Zealand   
Singapore    
Spain   a  
Sweden 
Source: Authors, based on official data.
Note: The  symbol indicates a formally drawn-up strategy that is in force.
a. Refers to autonomous communities.
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characteristic is that these orientations are generally well linked in the 
more organized strategies.
Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment. Attracting FDI has been of key 
importance in the strategies of countries initially exhibiting limited skill 
sets. In effect, they have sought to make rapid progress in industrialization 
and in export development by piggybacking on FDI. Such is the case for 
Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, and, more recently, the Czech Repub-
lic. As mentioned earlier, active attraction of FDI came late in the stage of 
development of Finland, Korea, and Sweden because these countries had 
the basis for relatively more autonomous national learning processes.31
In the countries that relied on FDI from the beginning to kick-start 
their economies, the first aim was usually to generate employment.32 But 
as they succeeded in attracting firms and established credibility as an over-
seas base for foreign firms’ exports, policies became more discretionary. 
Singapore, for example, redirected the incentives from FDI activities in 
low-wage production processes to sectors of higher value and skill (such 
as electronics) and more recently to activities at or near the technological 
frontier. That has required, in addition to monetary rewards to establish 
or upgrade FDI, a push in higher education and attraction of foreign tal-
ent, especially in science and technology. Meanwhile, those countries that 
began to attract FDI at a late stage of development often were motivated 
by pressure from trade partners to be more open to FDI, coupled with the 
desire to avoid restrictions on local firm investment overseas and the need 
to intensify integration with world production networks.
Internationalization of Businesses. The internationalization of busi-
nesses focuses mostly on encouraging local firms, particularly SMEs, to 
gain access to external markets. The strategies aim to link local businesses 
to international value and export chains either indirectly through supply-
ing locally based multinational corporations or directly as coproduction 
partners in an international value network. This approach generally in-
volves incentives and support programs for local firms in training, devel-
opment of business plans, and technological upgrading and in search and 
discovery of investment and export opportunities either in conjunction 
with local FDI or more independently. 
The promotion of domestic supply links with locally based FDI is a 
common strategy. Singapore was an early mover in this regard. The strat-
egy was seen as a vehicle to add value to local firm activities and encourage 
FDI to establish deeper roots in the local economy, thus discouraging the 
“footloose investor” practices that so plague export platforms in parts 
of Latin America. Also, attention to local firms was often an attempt to 
reduce growing dualism between dynamic foreign firms and lagging local 
enterprise. Attention to local SMEs also can assuage domestic political 
backlash concerning grants and subsidies used to attract FDI.33 In any 
event, Ireland started providing incentives to FDI without much attention 
to domestic linkages, but came, albeit a bit late, to a strategy similar to 
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that of Singapore (Ruane and Ugur 2006). A similar path was followed in 
Malaysia and the Czech Republic, the latter concentrating especially on 
developing an automobile cluster.
In some countries, local firms are being encouraged to “go interna-
tional” on their own. This is the case in Korea, where local conglomer-
ates have begun to transfer part of their production outside the country, 
thereby making it necessary for local SMEs to look for alternatives, be 
it in new products or markets. Singapore and Spain also actively pro-
mote “reverse FDI” by local businesses, some of which have become 
multinationals themselves (in Singapore, several of these companies are 
“government-linked”).
Efforts are also focused on promoting start-ups by introducing entre-
preneurs to special academic-business liaison programs and business asso-
ciations as well as by generating seed money and logistical support for 
them. This strategy is present in all the countries but receives very high 
priority in Finland and Sweden, which consider that they are lagging in 
this area given their level of development and wealth.
Export Promotion. Export promotion has a long history in all 10 coun-
tries. Strategies typically focus on assisting consolidation of market share, 
targeting certain new markets by product and country or region, as well 
as developing brand or country recognition. To achieve their goal, gov-
ernments assist in gathering information about potential markets in other 
countries, promote the exporting country’s image, help put suppliers and 
buyers into contact with one another, and support improvement in the 
quality of goods and services through training and support for international 
standards ratings. Since the mid-1990s export promotion strategies have 
increasingly been linked to strategic initiatives to negotiate free trade areas.
Innovation. Last, as noted, development strategies are increasingly being 
led by support for innovation, with all 10 countries aware that the future 
of their export development and international growth depends on the cre-
ation of new goods and services and on improved productivity, especially 
in the face of competition from low-wage countries such as China, India, 
and Vietnam. 
Innovation policies are largely defining the national development strate-
gies, not to mention export strategies, in advanced countries such as Finland, 
Korea, and Sweden. Other countries that are relatively less developed in 
regard to innovation are trying to narrow the R&D and innovation gaps 
that separate them from the more advanced OECD countries (table 2.6). 
That is the case for the Czech Republic, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
and Spain, which are seriously lagging behind in their innovation efforts. 
For its part, Singapore, also lagging, has made huge investments in R&D 
and innovation, while Ireland’s commitment has also risen dramatically 
in a short period of time. This effort also entails promoting investments 
in infrastructure for innovation; in human capital; and in closer national 
and international links between businesses, the academic world, and 
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Table 2.6 Strategic Orientation: Innovation
Australia Strengthen the national innovation system for more 
effective dissemination of new technologies, processes, 
and ideas; support a culture of collaboration within 
the research sector and between researchers and 
industry; increase international collaborations on 
research and development of entrepreneurs and 
researchers; improve policy development and service 
delivery. Diversify and increase value added in 
natural-resource-based industries. Development of 
biotechnology and ICT. 
Czech Republic Strengthen R&D as a source of innovation. 
Establish no more than seven priority areas for 
public investment. Strengthen public-private 
partnerships. Human resources training. Increase the 
competitiveness of the economy by incorporating 
innovation into industry and services to attain levels 
close to those of the advanced European Union 
countries. Improve the public administration of 
innovation, consolidating sources of R&D funding 
and the administration of support for innovation.
Finland Expand the sector-based, technology-oriented 
strategy through broad-based innovation policy 
that contributes to creating the preconditions for 
operating models combining the needs of users, 
consumers, and citizens, alongside knowledge, 
creativity, and competence. The main targets are to 
be pioneering in innovation activity and to assure 
an innovation-based development of productivity. 
Finland has already oriented technology development 
and innovation to the forestry sector, the metals 
industry, ICT, biotechnology, new software materials, 
nanotechnology, knowledge-intensive services, and 
social well-being industries. 
Ireland Invest heavily in R&D, give multinational companies 
incentives to locate more R&D capacity in Ireland, 
and retain and commercialize ideas that flow from 
that investment. Develop a world-class level of 
research based on investment in research-related 
infrastructure and human capital at the highest level 
with international networks. Develop business-
sector linkages with research and development 
activities. Focus research on sectors considered to 
be of key importance for leading economic and 
social growth—biosciences, bioengineering, energy, 
and ICT—as well as selected traditional areas. 
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Korea, Rep. Move from a capital-driven industrial strategy to one 
driven by innovation, emphasizing technology and 
efficiency. There is also a particular focus on 193 
products with established high potential.
Malaysia Develop a knowledge-based economy, increasing the 
role of the private sector in research and development 
and in innovation. Two critical areas in the strategic 
vision are ICT and the electrical and electronics 
industry. Strengthen the institutional framework and 
the efficiency of its services.
New Zealand Guide investment in innovative ICT, biotechnology 
activities, and creative industries. Strengthen 
collaboration between firms and the academic world. 
Boost the commercialization of innovation. Improve 
the return on public investment in innovation.
Singapore Increase R&D spending to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. 
Focus spending on a small number of areas where 
it can be competitive: existing clusters (electronics, 
chemicals, marine engineering, biomedicine) and new 
areas based on competitive strengths and growth 
potential: water technology and interactive digital 
media. Strike a balance between basic and applied 
research. Further develop private research and 
establish more R&D links with business and the 
world’s research talent.
Spain Close the gap in innovation and R&D with the 
European Union countries in the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy and of agreements on the use of 
European Union funds.
Sweden Maintain the country’s leadership in research and 
education, with emphasis on science and mathematics. 
Establish priorities in areas of basic and applied 
research. Improve links between businesses and the 
academic world. Strengthen innovation in SMEs. 
Sources: Authors based on official data, see Government of Australia (2008); 
Government of Finland (2009); Government of Ireland (2008); National Research 
Foundation for Singapore (no date); Government of the Czech Republic (2004); 
Nambiar (2007) and EPU (2006) for Malasyia; Hee (2006) for Korea; and Ministry of 
Economic Development (2002) for New Zealand.
Table 2.6 Strategic Orientation: Innovation (continued)
government. This type of networking is vitally important for innovation. 
In most of our 10 case countries, priority support is being given to selected 
activities or sectors. The table also demonstrates that attention is being given 
to two core transversal technologies, biotechnology and ICT.
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Annex 2A Strategies in Selected Countries
Australia
In Australia the First and Second World Wars gave rise to a strategy of 
self-sufficient development that lasted for several decades. As a result, 
industrialization and economic diversification gathered pace, with growth 
based on domestic demand and exports of raw materials. In the mid-
1980s economic instability, a low growth rate, and high inflation led to 
reforms geared toward market liberalization and deregulation, the elimi-
nation of protectionism, privatization of public services, and the promo-
tion of competitiveness for export development. In the 1990s the strategy 
was strengthened by the country’s involvement in Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), as well as by initiatives to boost innovation through 
promotion of collaboration between businesses and academia and strong 
public support for national centers of excellence. The past decade has 
seen a series of incentives (some preexisting) under the moniker “Backing 
Australia’s Ability” designed to boost innovation in agroindustry, mining, 
biotechnology, and ICT. A new national strategy began being discussed in 
2008 following the election of a Labor Party government. This new govern-
ment launched two initiatives to address long-term challenges facing the 
country. The first was to arrange a summit between February and April 
2008, the aim of which was to outline Australia’s long-term development 
strategy. This initiative fostered a discussion of ideas about the direction 
of policies and the matters on which policy should focus up through 2020. 
The second initiative, under the assumption that innovation would be a 
keystone in spearheading growth, was creation of a working group charged 
with proposing the reform of the national innovation system. The group’s 
proposal is contained in a document entitled “Powering Ideas: An Innova-
tion Agenda for the 21st Century.”
Czech Republic
Before 1989 the Czech Republic was part of the Soviet bloc and had a 
centrally planned economy. Independence resulted in a loss of traditional 
markets and suppliers, while economic stagnation and crisis combined with 
democracy, liberalization, and the introduction of market mechanisms. The 
country’s association with the European Union (EU) in 1993, the deepening 
of market reforms, and an industrialization strategy based on FDI attraction 
resulted in an economic recovery. The country joined the European Union 
in 2004 after fulfilling certain economic goals in a series of three-year plans 
that provided a financial framework for achieving them. Between 1998 and 
the world economic crisis, the country’s economic strategy gradually became 
more structural, with emphasis on selective FDI attraction through incen-
tives, local business development, and the promotion of a knowledge-based 
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economy. This approach was reinforced in 2006 with the adoption of an 
export-oriented strategy based on innovation and a focus on specific mar-
kets. Unstable political coalitions have often handicapped follow-through.
Finland
Following World War II, Finland’s industrial development was partly deter-
mined by the rebuilding of the Soviet Union and the trade in primary mining 
and forestry products with countries of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON). Both factors, along with the high priority Finland 
gave to education, served to strengthen the engineering and metal industries 
as well as the mining and forestry clusters. Between the 1970s and the end of 
the 1980s, Finland’s industrial strategy was geared toward export develop-
ment. It protected local industry by restricting foreign investment, by grant-
ing subsidies, targeting government procurement, and carrying out frequent 
devaluations to boost exports. The macroeconomic disequilibria and unem-
ployment in the early 1990s, resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
changed the country’s long-term vision and strategy. Finland then embarked 
wholeheartedly on developing knowledge as an engine for structural change 
and economic growth. Industrial policy oriented toward innovation was 
reflected in public programs designed to integrate science and technology, 
further strengthen education, forge closer links between industry and aca-
demia to improve the commercialization of innovation, and to embed a 
national system of innovation itself (which is now considered one of the best 
in the world). Finland’s current innovation strategy seeks to respond to what 
it perceives as the new challenges for growth and competitiveness. The aim 
is to diversify innovation activities beyond leading sectors and technologies 
as well as to redirect the strategy toward an innovation policy based more 
on demand—though without disregarding policy directed at supply. The 
approach seeks to establish a multifaceted and wide-ranging innovation 
policy with enhanced efforts to strengthen implementation. 
Ireland
Over the past 25 years, Ireland has experienced radical changes to its strat-
egy for growth and employment. The protectionist strategy that had been 
in force since the 1930s was frequently in crisis throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. This problem, along with the opportunity to join the European 
Union, prompted the country to liberalize the economy and draw up plans 
for the use of various EU development funds. Then, the debt and unemploy-
ment crises of the mid-1980s gave way to social partnership agreements that 
shifted strategy toward structural change based on education and export 
diversification beyond agricultural products. The first strategic partnership 
program was centered on stabilizing the economy and introducing guidelines 
for structural change aimed at stronger growth along with social equality. 
Once the economy stabilized, the strategy became even more focused on 
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education (including higher education) and on attracting foreign investment, 
especially from the United States, for export-led industrialization. To attract 
such investment, Ireland made the most of its EU membership; its English-
speaking population; its educated workforce with relatively low wages; and 
incentives, including a relatively low corporate tax rate. At first, FDI was 
sought indiscriminately, although with time attraction programs targeted 
higher-technology sectors and those with greater value added. Export devel-
opment therefore became specialized in a few sectors (pharmaceuticals, bio-
technology, chemical products, and electronics) and in services, while local 
businesses were later supported by policies aimed at achieving links with 
international export chains.34 The strategy at the turn of the century shifted 
to aggressive programs of incentives to stimulate science and technology in 
support of innovation; the integration of local business into the world econ-
omy; and the strengthening of production, commercialization, and innova-
tion networks. The current strategy—which has had the extremely difficult 
task of sharing space with crisis management of the economy—aims to reor-
ganize economic priorities in the next five years. The aggressive strategy, 
known as “Building Ireland’s Smart economy,” aims to build an intelligent, 
business-driven economy that creates high-quality jobs, ensures security of 
energy supplies, and provides first-class infrastructure, an area that lagged in 
the Irish economy when first priority was given to education. 
Korea
The aftermath of war in Korea left the country devastated and dependent 
on economic aid from the United States to rebuild the nation. Five-year 
economic development plans began to be implemented in the 1960s. The 
first plans emphasized industrialization based on protecting local industry 
and restricting foreign direct investment, while promoting exports and 
developing the chaebols (industrial conglomerates) along with their trad-
ing companies. The model was a reflection of many of the strategies of 
postwar Japan. In the early 1980s external debt and inflationary pressure 
prompted the country to implement a five-year stabilization program 
based on gradual market liberalization. At the end of the 1980s, once 
chaebols were more economically independent and technological prowess 
was on the rise, the country began to focus on innovation, with a five-year 
plan that continued to liberalize markets and limit public support actions 
for the large firms. At the same time, the country joined the OECD and 
continued to open up the economy. The new millennium saw the begin-
ning of competition with China and an appreciating exchange rate, which 
forced Korea to focus on developing an economy based on innovation, 
knowledge, and more internationalization. All of this was particularly 
relevant for SMEs, which had previously had been in the shadow of the 
chaebols. More recently, the strategy has included the negotiation of free-
trade agreements (the first of which was signed with Chile).
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Malaysia
In the middle of the 1900s, Malaysia was an agricultural economy that 
exported raw materials. There were four stages in its industrialization pro-
cess. First, an import substitution strategy in place between 1957 (when 
the country gained independence) and 1970 resulted in an industry focused 
on producing low-technology, finished consumer goods. Special incentive 
regimes were set up for the indigenous Malay population to increase its 
relative position in this multiethnic economy. That was followed by an 
export industrialization strategy, characterized by the creation of duty free 
zones, strong incentives to attract multinationals, and the reduction of 
the economy’s protectionist barriers. Between 1980 and 1985, the growth 
strategy took a new direction, with the reintroduction of an import substi-
tution policy, especially focused on support of heavy industry. The fourth 
and final phase of industrialization promoted a renewed focus on export 
development based on another phase of liberalization with active par-
ticipation in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
free trade agreements. Industrial policy was guided by two plans. The 
first Industrial Master Plan, covering the period 1986–95, involved indus-
trialization through investment attraction, privatization of public enter-
prises, lower trade tariffs, and proactive management of the exchange rate. 
Although this strategy achieved its objectives, it had structural weaknesses: 
labor-intensive production was losing competitiveness because of wage 
increases and inadequate production links and technology deployment. 
Since the mid-1990s, the second Industrial Master Plan has promoted 
the internationalization of services, ICT corridors, value added in certain 
manufacturing exports, and the development of a knowledge society. 
New Zealand
The fall in the prices of raw materials during the crisis of 1930 encouraged 
New Zealand to implement an import substitution strategy that remained 
in place until the mid-1980s. As in Latin America, economic crisis, high 
inflation, and indebtedness prompted economic liberalization, openness, 
and generally speaking the policies associated with the Washington Con-
sensus. New Zealand is also active in the APEC free trade initiative. Mod-
est growth at the end of the 1990s, increasing concern about relatively low 
levels of productivity (below the OECD average), deterioration of the social 
situation, a widening current account deficit, and disequilibria pushed the 
country to seek a new, more strategic thrust that combined elements of the 
market with public sector interventions. This strategy aimed for innova-
tion and structural change to promote productivity growth and sustainable 
and integrative export development. In 2002 the framework for “Growing 
an Innovative New Zealand” was established, but it ran into problems 
at the implementation stage because of a weak underlying public-private 
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alliance. In 2005 the strategy was reconfigured as one of “Economic Trans-
formation” and prevailed until 2008, when a more conservative govern-
ment took office. It appears that the strategy has since been scrapped for a 
more traditional focus on macroeconomics and infrastructure. 
Singapore
The country’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, along with the announce-
ment of the withdrawal of British forces in 1967, accelerated the search 
for an alternative development model that was not dependent on the 
small domestic market. The government therefore gathered together busi-
ness and union representatives to work on new directions. The general 
ingredients of the resulting strategy, which has been in place ever since, 
was an open economy, stability in a multiethnic society, and a vigorous 
FDI-attraction policy drawing on comprehensive incentives, a population 
with English language skills and (initially) low salaries, a British-style 
legal system, and a strategic geographical position in Asia. In light of 
competition from countries with a lower-wage workforce, the government 
adjusted its strategy from one of indiscriminate FDI attraction toward 
activities with higher levels of value and knowledge. In the 1980s this 
focus gave rise to the development of electronics, information technology, 
and new service clusters, in which local businesses integrated with inter-
national value chains or became suppliers to multinational corporations, 
or both. In the 1990s the country pushed forward with internationaliza-
tion, including participation in ASEAN, APEC, and free trade agreements. 
At the same time, the strategic orientation has moved to higher educa-
tion and innovation, especially in the areas of biotechnology, electronics, 
environmental industries, and global business promotion. Although this 
strategy persists in broad terms, the government has convened a Strategic 
Economic Committee comprising representatives of the public and private 
sectors to review the specific strategies for developing the various sectors 
on which national growth is based. The task is to review their potential, 
find new ways of attracting FDI, and secure new and creative responses to 
the 2008–09 crisis, especially its long-term impact on the world economy.
Spain
Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the 1970s, Spain 
was governed by an authoritarian  centralist state with an inward-oriented 
and protectionist strategy. The advent of democracy brought about two 
economic changes that had a profound effect on the country’s economic 
system. First, in 1986 Spain joined the European Union, which meant 
that the country had to adopt collective EU policies that resulted in mod-
ernization of the economic rules, market liberalization and elimination 
of monopolies, privatization of public enterprises, and a reduced public-
sector role in the economy. These reforms combined with a substantial rise 
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in promotion instruments for the private sector and in financial resources 
allocated to that end. Second, Spain went from being a centralist coun-
try to a quasi-federal state where the Autonomous Communities have 
been legally awarded considerable power over economic promotion, FDI 
attraction, and SME support, including the integration of local businesses 
into the world economy. Over the past 20 years, the strategy has varied 
from an export-promotion focus to one of FDI attraction and interna-
tional integration of local business, including reverse FDI. Following EU 
guidelines, the current strategy is focusing on innovation. However, fiscal 
retrenchment in the middle of a severe economic crisis raises challenges for 
implementation of that strategy.
Sweden
Between 1870 and 1970 Sweden was the second-fastest-growing country 
in the world, with a strong emphasis on educating its population. Growth 
subsequently came to a standstill for 30 years. During the first period 
of industrialization, growth was spearheaded by forestry (cellulose and 
paper) and mining. The country’s strategy (which was protectionist at 
first) enabled the technological enhancement of production processes, 
while differentiating and adding value to its natural resources. Technol-
ogy that was initially imported was then developed domestically, in a 
process that produced a much more diversified economic structure. This 
development was based on the export orientation of industry; the use 
of export income for technological development; industrial promotion 
resulting from government procurement; a constant effort to improve the 
education and health of the population; and a permanent drive to reduce 
costs through mechanization, process automation, and incremental inno-
vation led by major Swedish transnational corporations competing in 
mainly mid-technology markets. In the mid-1970s the protectionist policy 
against foreign investment was toned down and the development of ICT 
and electronics began. In the 1990s strategy focused on joining the Euro-
pean Union and the knowledge society. An innovation strategy became 
the focus of the policy for structural change and productivity growth; the 
national innovation system was strengthened; and the development of 
the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology sectors was promoted. 
Start-ups have also been promoted more recently. To deal with the crisis 
and its long-term consequences, the Swedish organization responsible for 
innovation policy, VINNOVA, made a proposal to the government: the 
strategy was called Development and Innovation: A Strategic Proposal 
for Sustained Growth. This set of policies is meant to attenuate the crisis 
and also is geared to the long term. The policies center on the adaptation 
of Sweden’s automotive industry, innovation in SMEs, mobilization of 
resources and actors to support innovation and competitiveness in the 
regions, and the further internationalization of economic growth and 
employment.
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 Annex Table 2A National Strategies: Selected Landmark Events
 First period Second period Third period Fourth period
Australia 1920 1983 2000–
Import substitution. Washington Consensus–
type trade and political 
liberalization.
Push forward in the area of 
innovation and FDI attraction.
Czech Republic Up to 1989 1990 2005–
Centrally planned 
industrialization.
Introduction of market 
mechanisms. Washington 
Consensus orientation. 
Privatizations and emphasis 
on business development. 
FDI attraction. Institutional 
development and strengthening 
of competitiveness.
Incentives oriented toward 
high-technology goods and 
services. Boosting the development 
of microinstitutions. Promoting 
innovation, institutionalization, and 
collaboration between industry and 
the academic world. Formulating 
a strategy for innovation and 
export development. More selective 
attraction of FDI.







subsidies for emerging 
industries. Continuing 
emphasis on education.
Joins the European Union. 
Liberalization of trade and 
external capital, together with 
increased attention to long-
term microeconomic trends. 
Toward an innovation society. 
Strengthening and coordination 
of industry and the innovation 
system. R & D approach 
guided by the growth of 
industry.
Strengthening the capacity for 
renewal of the innovation system. 
Increasing the knowledge base. 
Improving the quality and goals 
of scientific and technological 
research. Increase the marketing of 
innovation.
Emphasize the role of 
users and market demand 
as equally important 
drivers of innovation, 
growth, and renewal, 
and as central elements 
of the innovation policy. 
Also pursue nonscientific 
and nontechnological 
innovations in services, 
business models, branding, 
and work-life innovations.
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Ireland 1970 1986 1993 2006
Change from import 
substitution and a 
protected economy to 
openness to foreign 
capital and trade 
related to EU entry in 
1973. 
Program for National 
Recovery adopted to promote 
social stability and cohesion. 
Industrial policy based on 
attracting export-oriented FDI.
Capacity building for improvements 
in competitiveness, focusing on 
sectors or market niches, SMEs with 
export capacity, and incentives for a 
more selective attraction of FDI, in 
addition to an aggressive education 
program and a state modernization 
plan
Entry to a knowledge-based 
society, emphasizing high 
value-added activities. 
Ambitious program 
of incentives for the 
development of innovation 
and the internationalization 
of local businesses, as well 
as strengthening networks 
for production, marketing, 
and innovation.
Korea, Rep. 1964 1970 1981 2001–
Industrialization in 
low-technology goods 
with a focus on 
exports.
Industrialization based on 
dual-purpose military/heavy 
industry and increased export 
values. Emphasis on technology 
imports.
Stabilization, liberalization. 
Development of the electronic 










 Annex Table 2A National Strategies: Selected Landmark Events (continued)
 First period Second period Third period Fourth period
Malaysia 1960 1970 1980 1986
Industrialization 
oriented toward import 
substitution.
New Economic Policy (1970–
80). Industrial policy based on 
attracting export-oriented FDI, 
adding value to manufactured 
exports, and initiating 
development of technology 
corridors.
Reorientation of the industrialization 
process toward import substitution 
once more (heavy industry). 
Developing targeted protection 
policies, direct state participation 
in the production process and the 
development of complementary 
industries.
Export promotion based on 
trade liberalization, active 
participation in free trade 
agreements, and industrial 
development. 1986–96: 
export revival based on FDI 
attraction, lower tariffs, and 
managing the exchange rate 
to maintain competitiveness. 
1996 onward: developing 
the knowledge-based 
economy, guided by a long-
term vision based on the 
development of international 
services, ICT, value added 
in export manufactures, and 
technological innovation 
corridors.
New Zealand 1960 1984 2006
Industrialization 
oriented toward import 
substitution.
Washington Consensus–type 
trade and political liberalization.
A 10-year economic transformation 
agenda focusing on globally 
competitive firms, world-class 
infrastructure, stimulating 
innovation and productivity, 
environmental sustainability, and 
promotion of Auckland as a city 
able to compete on the world stage.
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of light manufactures 
and FDI attraction.
Policy of orientation toward 
medium- and high-technology 
industry and services. Wage 
increases in labor-intensive 
sectors to provide incentives 
for the achievement of the 
above goal.
Internationalizing manufacturing 
aimed at neighboring countries, 
followed by expansion toward 
China, India, and the Middle 
East. Initiating the development 
of industrial and service clusters 
(including local businesses with 
state participation). Development of 
a platform of financial and business 
services.
Development of existing 
clusters, identification and 
development of new ones 
through investment attraction, 
strong support for innovative 
businesses, technological 
development in areas of 
existing capacity and in a 
selective number of new areas. 
Internationalization of SMEs. 
Creation of new geographical 
spaces for investment and 
exports. 
Spain 1950 1978 1990 2005
Inward-oriented and 
protectionist policies.
Trade liberalization, entry to the 
European Union and adhesion 
to its policies. Beginning of 
economic internationalization 
process. Strong infrastructure 
development, support for 
internationalization of 
small and medium firms. 
Decentralization of certain 
economic responsibilities to the 
Autonomous Communities. 
Attraction of FDI.
Promotion of Spanish FDI. Strengthening of innovation.
(continued)
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 Annex Table 2A National Strategies: Selected Landmark Events (continued)
 First period Second period Third period Fourth period
Sweden 1900 1930 1975 1990
Export-oriented 
industrial development. 
Promotion of forestry 
and mining commodity 
exports. 
Construction of the welfare 
state. Exports of processed 
raw materials. Endogenous 
technological development. 
Differentiation of export 
products. Trade liberalization, 
protection from foreign 
investment. 
Industrial policy designed to 
support major corporations 
(including via state procurement). 
Development of ICT and services 
sectors. Reduction of protectionist 
policies against FDI. Promotion 
of exports from the electronics, 




Strengthening of the 
national innovation system. 
Development of chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology.
Source: Authors, based on official data.
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Notes
 1. There are many definitions of industrial policy (Chang 1994; Peres and 
Primi 2009). We think that basically IP involves the state, with a medium- to 
long-term perspective, strategically and proactively intervening in markets with a 
variety of instruments to promote or directly develop new industrial and techno-
logical capacities of a higher order than those prevailing in an economy in order to 
accelerate economic transformation and growth beyond what static market forces 
might provide. A key feature of industrial policies is strategic selectivity, whether 
through focused, goal-oriented horizontal policies supporting several sectors or 
vertical policies focused on a specific sector. While IP’s focus traditionally has been 
on industry, it should include services as well. Importantly, IP also can assist the 
“death” of sunset industries to free up resources for new activities with minimal 
damage to accumulated capabilities that still may have relevance for the perfor-
mance of new activities in the economy.
 2. Fajnzylber (1990) observes that obstacles to economic transformation can 
be particularly damaging in natural-resource-based economies.
 3. As Rodrik (2008) notes, the new growth theory also recognizes the exis-
tence of multiple market failures, as does the new trade theory. See also Lall (2000).
 4. The Republic of Korea has used an extensive battery covering many of the 
instruments, which can be perused in Chang (1994, 115–16).
 5. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, was in some ways 
countering ideas of state activism and mercantilism inspired by Louis XIV’s famous 
finance minister, Jean-Batiste Colbert. Meanwhile, Alexander Hamilton in the 
United States and Friedrich List in Germany were famous 18th century antagonists 
of Smith’s laissez faire theory of capitalism.
 6. As pointed out by authors like Sabel (2009a). Even Michael Porter (2008), 
who formerly argued that only firms, not countries, have strategies, Porter (2007) 
now counsels that the United States needs a strategy if it is not to fall behind.
 7. For an interpretation of how Latin America has viewed structuralism, see 
Di Filippo (2009).
 8. Chang (2003) and others argue that successful countries become free trade 
proponents only after they reach the top, in effect attempting to eliminate for other 
more backward countries the “ladder” of industrial policy that they used to get 
ahead. But even after reaching a category of a liberal economy the remnants of 
industrial policy, albeit more subtle, are present. As the head of France’s Strategic 
Investment Fund recently commented: “We consider it legitimate for the public 
authority to worry about the nature and evolution of the industrial fabric of our 
country…. The state has a right to have a vision” (Peggy Hollinger, “Dirigisme de 
rigueur,” Financial Times, June 4, 2009, p. 7).
 9. China’s growth spurt started so late (1978), and China was so far behind 
the United States, that, despite rapid growth over the past 30 years, it did not 
qualify for the elite club in this World Bank database. However, China would now 
seem likely to pass the threshold based on independent estimates of purchasing 
power parity. See Martin Wolf, “In the Grip of a Great Convergence,” Financial 
Times, January 5, 2011, p. 9. 
 10. An intellectual culture has its own language and norms, which inform, 
stimulate, and constrain the way one thinks about economic policy (Jung-en Woo 
2007).
 11. For example, some studies dismiss Korea’s heavy industry development 
policy drive of the 1970s, even though, albeit with mistakes, it proved over time to 
be largely successful in supporting economic transformation and profitability. This 
critique arose because at the time the ambitious program distorted relative prices 
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and drew resources away from light industry, which (temporarily) reduced the net 
competitiveness of manufacturing and global efficiency (see Jong-ho 1990 and Kim 
1990. From the different perspective of IP, the successful shifting of the economy 
from light to heavy industry represented the building of new capacities as well as a 
generation of public signals encouraging commitment to investment in new upgraded 
activities and learning. As Amsden (1989) famously observed, catch-up has often 
involved getting the prices “wrong” from the neoclassical perspective. Jong-ho and 
Kim also attribute the heavy industry drive to macroeconomic instability. However, 
others point out that temporary problems were not caused by IP as such, but rather 
by external shocks or excessively rapid capital account opening (Wade 2004).
 12. One could look at this from an angle of “dynamic” efficiency, in which the 
gains from IP would outweigh, in discounted terms, the temporary consumption 
losses of IP policies (Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2009). However, while this 
perspective is conceptually neat, problems of precision confront measurement of 
the impact of IP, as noted earlier.
 13. Frame (1958), p. 243.
 14. For instance, the Asians have been enormously goal-oriented and strate-
gic. As a contemporary illustration, the Chinese have a goal of making Shanghai 
an international fashion center by 2015; another goal is to raise the country’s 
research and development expenditure to 2 percent of GDP by 2020 (Devlin 2008). 
Meanwhile, Singapore planned to raise its R&D expenditures from 2 percent to 
3 percent of GDP by the end of 2010. 
 15. Moreover, in a new activity learning can be intense, allowing countries 
to move up the quality scale fairly quickly. In Korea, Hyundai Motors is a good 
example of learning. Behind a heavily protected domestic market, this industry 
within 30 years became a major player in the international auto industry.
 16. Where dynamism lies in the world product space has been a point of debate. 
Most feel that it is in industrial manufacturing and certain knowledge-intensive 
services, but some argue that natural resources are equally attractive. For more 
discussion, see ECLAC (2008).
 17. See Peres and Primi (2009). The breach emerges from questions about the real 
world relevance for public policy of the neoclassical paradigm’s efficiency benchmark.
 18. If the firm exports, the world market is big enough for more than one 
player. Moreover, new entrants can create intraindustry spillovers from which 
they themselves benefit. These spillovers are the outcome in some cases of export 
discovery analyzed in Sabel and others (forthcoming).
 19. But as seen in the Asian crisis of 1997, and recent problems in Ireland and 
Spain, successful practitioners of IP can be periodically seduced into macroeco-
nomic stances that are counterproductive to economic transformation.
 20. Export development has several dimensions, which can be combined. It 
can include exporting greater quantities of products that already have a share of 
the world market, and doing so with increased productivity. Another dimension 
would be horizontal diversification based on existing comparative advantages, 
which are relatively easy to identify but for some reason are not fully exploited. It 
can also involve improvements in the quality of export products that are already 
exported to increase unit values in existing areas of production. Last, it can mean 
the creation of truly new comparative advantages. 
 21. In some countries, membership in the European Union (EU) coincided with 
a convergence process. In Finland, convergence was interrupted by the fall of the 
Soviet Union and picked up again after Finland made reforms in the mid-1990s, 
which also coincided with entry into the European Union. The convergence of 
Spain also coincided with its entry into the European Union. Sweden experienced 
a long process of losing its superior ground but began to regain its footing at 
around the same time as its entry into the European Union (1995), while the Czech 
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Republic showed signs of convergence as it prepared to join in 2004. Nonetheless, 
policies and strategies to exploit opportunities are important—countries such as 
Greece and Austria did not achieve convergence even with EU entry.
 22. What is not conveyed in table 2.3 is that New Zealand and, especially, 
Australia have increased the productivity and added value to goods and services 
around their natural resources.
 23. For a very clear and intelligent official statement on how Singapore uses 
industrial polices to overcome these obstacles and effectively “enable markets,” see 
Menon (2010).
 24. Singapore has “rebranded” its strategy on a number of occasions. See 
table 2.4 and Kumar and Siddique (2010).
 25. Excluding Sweden, which industrialized in the 19th century and was 
already one of the richest countries in the world in 1970 (Andersson, 2010), in the 
postwar era almost all of these countries initiated liberalization with the interna-
tional economy after periods of import substitution industrialization with domesti-
cally protected markets. In some cases, especially in Korea and Finland, that did 
not rely on FDI, this industrialization process was especially critical for building 
basic knowledge and technological capacities that contributed to their progressive 
march to the technological frontier. 
 26. This phenomenon is, of course, to be expected in smaller countries, but, 
interestingly, it has also occurred in medium-size and even large countries such as 
China. The role of export development as a growth factor comes as no surprise, since 
for decades the world has been witnessing a rapid globalization process in which for-
eign trade has generally been growing much faster than world GDP. This favorable 
development has given countries an opportunity to boost productivity and growth 
both directly and indirectly by moving into external markets. Amsden (2007) argues 
that in Asia the move from low- to medium- and high-tech exports depended on first 
“practicing” in protected home markets. However, Asian strategies pressured firms 
to initiate an export drive at early stages of the learning process.
 27. Again, an intelligent reflection on this can be seen in Lee (2009). Ireland has 
undertaken a formal review of its strategy with reflections that aim to stabilize the 
economy, invest even more in R&D (with more incentives for local multinationals 
to do so), incorporate a new “green accord” around fossil fuels, and upgrade the 
country’s infrastructure to world class (Government of Ireland 2008). The capacity 
of the govenrment to fully pursue this strategy clearly will be challenging because 
of the severe fiscal crisis the country has been facing since the 2008–09 recession. 
 28. Countries such as Ireland, Finland, and Korea have very actively tried to 
anticipate demands for skilled labor based on forward-looking development strate-
gies. Expenditures on education, and priorities given different levels, are adjusted 
accordingly to prepare for a new phase of productive transformation.
 29. Funding mechanisms vary considerably. In Ireland, for example, the allo-
cation of resources is a “hard” budget commitment, while in Finland, the volume 
of resources allocated in the plan, like the plan itself, is only a guideline for the 
government, albeit a highly influential one.
 30. The situation varies considerably among countries, especially in foreign 
direct investment; as mentioned already, a number of countries have had a history 
of restrictions in that area.
 31. Taiwan, China, was also a latecomer in attracting FDI. China, meanwhile, 
has relied very much on FDI to gain a base for learning.
 32. For insights on the early story of Singapore’s FDI attraction, see Schien (1983).
 33. This was a problem for the Czech Republic’s successful FDI attraction program.
 34. Compared with Singapore, Ireland was slow to recognize the need to com-
bine FDI attraction policies with programs to integrate local businesses into the 
world economy (Ruane and Ugur 2006).
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The Second Principle: 
Create Public-Private Alliances for 
Effective Development Strategies 
and Industrial Policies
Development strategies based on a neostructuralist approach arise, in 
the first instance, from a systematic examination and assessment of key 
opportunities for market positioning and upgrading over the longer term. 
Obstacles that must be reduced or removed should be identified and 
appropriate priorities and sequences established to ensure that the country 
can access those opportunities. Obviously, the chosen objectives must be 
based on real capacities of the economy, either already existing or capable 
of being developed, as well as on the short-, medium- and long-term trends 
detected in the external environment.1 
Meanwhile, specific public policies and programs designed to help 
overcome identified primary constraints must be aligned with the political 
and institutional realities of the country concerned, the specific capacity 
of the agents in the public and private sectors, and the types of incentives 
that will best motivate the private sector to make decisions conducive 
to achieving the strategic goals. Last, to effectively combine market sig-
nals with government incentives, the strategy’s goals and programs at 
the macroeconomic and horizontal levels must be aligned with goals and 
programs relating to specific activities or sectors (figure 3.1).
How can this task be undertaken? In the early postwar era, even in 
many capitalist industrial countries, the state often had a commanding 
view of the market because the public sector owned or controlled a core 
of major enterprises. In many countries this ownership facilitated state-led 
planning—often indicative in nature rather than prescriptive (Shonfield 
1965). Today, in contrast, the means of production in most developing 
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countries are basically in private sector hands. Consequently, it is the pri-
vate firm, not the government, that has the contextual market information 
that, however incomplete, can serve to identify opportunities and obsta-
cles (including those related to public policy) to economic transformation. 
Firms can be shortsighted, however, when it comes to making decisions 
and undertaking measures that might yield markedly upgraded perfor-
mance. This shortsightedness is caused by inertia, or “status quo bias,” 
arising from uncertainty (Culpepper 2001), which can be aggravated by 
 so-called market failures—problems assessing first-mover advantages and 
the appropriation of the benefits of innovation and technical develop-
ments, optimum coordination of investments, and the like, all of which 
take on special importance in a fast-changing globalized world. 
Although governments have their own shortcomings, and are not very 
good at assessing the contextual information of markets that house the 
private sector, they have advantages in observing and assessing aggregate 
outcomes (Culpepper 2001). Moreover, a government’s political leader-
ship can stimulate proactive and forward-looking strategic thinking about 
the country’s position in the international hierarchy of production and 
export. Governments also can help coordinate collective actions in pursuit 
of national or sectoral objectives and motivate investment and risk taking. 
Thus, when private and public sectors work together, they can enhance 
their separate potential for supporting mechanisms and programs that 
























Source: Cutler 2008. 
Figure 3.1 Alignment of Strategic Policies and Programs
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transformation, including government failures.2 In short, in an effective 
enabling environment, group thinking can be smarter than isolated indi-
vidual approaches.
The neostructuralist approach adds some important requirements, 
however, to public-private collaboration. First and foremost, public- 
private alliances can be an effective tool of development strategies only if 
the state collaborates closely with the private sector but retains its auton-
omy to protect the public’s welfare. Only by retaining what Evans (1995), 
a pioneer in modern industrial policy, calls “embedded autonomy” can 
the state be a proactive partner of the private sector and at the same 
time avoid “capture” by special interests. The second point is that 
both elements of the equation—embedded autonomy and a successful 
public-private alliance for economic development—depend on an effective 
institutional design for a “social process” of public-private collaboration 
(Muñoz 2000). This institutional design must help the parties overcome 
their respective barriers of asymmetric information so that socially ben-
eficial opportunities, primary constraints, and effective promotional sup-
port, including distribution of functional rents, can be identified without 
the state being captured. In this sense, getting “right” the institutional 
setting and social process of public-private collaboration is central to 
modern industrial policy because it raises the likelihood that smart public 
interest–oriented strategies will emerge.
Given the mistrust between public and private sectors that often exists 
in developing countries, constructing these alliances is not necessarily 
easy.3 Strong and effectively focused political leadership, aimed at building 
a consensual national vision, coupled with the formation of a technically 
credible public bureaucracy armed with the finance and modern tools of 
industrial policy, are essential ingredients in bringing the parties together 
in a partnership. 
In many cases, alliances may incorporate other social groups.4 For 
example, depending on the area of interest, noncommercial agents, such 
as academics (including researchers), trade unions, or nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), may hold some of the information required for 
diagnostics and intelligent strategies. Moreover, building consensus, or 
at least a public understanding that generates sufficient public accep-
tance of policy, is necessary to ensure that strategies and their financing 
have the necessary political support to survive and coherently evolve 
over the longer term.5 
In sum, an alliance can be seen as a “bridging tool” that can bond dif-
ferent intersectoral interests into a common vision for collective action that 
mobilizes a country’s fullest capacity for the cause of economic transfor-
mation. The neoliberal school is skeptical about collective action because 
of fear that instincts for private gain will dominate and ultimately lead only 
to “cheap talk” (Ross Schneider 2009) or in the worst case “spell disas-
ter for collective benefits” (Sandler 1992, 193). In this view  individuals 
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 cannot be socially embedded in the alliance in a way that is beneficial to 
the functioning of a group objective (Storper 2005). There is certainly evi-
dence that group structures can turn socially perverse.  However real these 
risks, bad outcomes can be reasonably checked by institutional design and 
modalities, coupled with politically dedicated leadership. And as we show, 
there are countries that do this reasonably well.
The Scope of Public-Private Alliances
The scope of public-private alliances is set out schematically in figure 3.2. 
The dynamic for involving an alliance in building a strategy is shown on the 
left. As displayed in the figure, the construction of an alliance, the role it will 
play in formulating and implementing strategies, and the institutional setting 
clearly depend on the political, historical, and cultural context of the coun-
try.6 In certain political settings, a mature and effective alliance can lead to a 
veritable public consensus. In other cases, the nature of the political context 
may lead to a mature alliance that is best described as an expression of pub-
lic understanding, or passive acceptance, of the strategy. But, in one way or 
the other, it is the consensus or understanding, and the different ranges and 
nuances involved, that condition the formulation and implementation of a 



























Figure 3.2 The Framework for Public-Private Alliances
the second principle: create public-private alliances 83
In achieving consensus and understanding, the interaction between 
the parties of an alliance may vary both in the form of the discourse and 
in its scope. The left (vertical) axis of figure 3.2 shows that the discourse 
between government and private-sector stakeholders may range, along a 
nondiscrete scale, from a true dialogue, to a consultation of the private 
sector by the government, to a situation where the government imposes 
its strategy without any great attempt at dialogue or public consultation 
but in a way that commands public-private collaboration underpinned by 
a system of rewards and punishment. 
The extent of social participation in the alliance may also vary. The 
horizontal axis of figure 3.2 shows that the spectrum may range from a 
trilateral relationship between the government, business, and academia 
to a very broad partnership including practically all the main social 
groups.
Finally, a third dimension, not reflected in figure 3.2, must also be taken 
into account: the general operational structure. In this case three stylized 
variants may be identified: first, an alliance that operates through formal 
and permanent structures; second, an alliance that operates with formal 
structures that emerge on an ad hoc basis; and third, an alliance that func-
tions as an informal network or through tacit agreements. In practice, the 
three structures coexist in any public-private alliance, although one or 
more (that is, a hybrid) structure is likely to dominate. 
Alliances in the 10 Success Cases
Annex table 3A.1 sums up the nature of alliances for formulating national 
development strategies in our extraregional success cases by highlighting 
for each country the predominant structures of the partnership, its main 
stakeholders, and the principal means of engagement. Annex table 3A.2 
does the same at the level of national strategy implementation but through 
the prism of our four strategic orientations for strengthening integration 
with the world economy and export development.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the nature of national alliances for the studied 
countries using the information in annex table 3A.1 and the potential 
areas of interaction indicated in figure 3.2. In Finland and Ireland, the 
alliances are characterized by their formal structuring, breadth, and depth, 
with extensive coverage in the public sector hierarchy of strategy formula-
tion and implementation. While governments always make the policy deci-
sions in any alliance, these two alliances are a real force, having resulted 
in something that is tantamount to a social dialogue and agreements on 
strategies that transcend political cycles.7 Therefore, these countries may 
be placed in area 1 of figure 3.3, with Ireland having the broader alliance 
of the two countries. 
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Singapore also has a relatively broad, well-structured alliance, and 
Malaysia’s is even broader, including representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and political parties but excluding unions.8 In both 
cases, the government consults extensively with its alliance partners rather 
than engaging in dialogue as such; the government then comes to a deci-
sion and announces its strategy without pretensions of a consensus. The 
result is a public understanding of what the government’s strategy is. Both 
countries are thus positioned in area 3 of figure 3.3. 
The depth of the alliance in these four countries is important for the 
degree of interaction with the government bureaucracy (especially in 
Ireland and Singapore), contributing to the flow of information, coor-
dination of processes, and the building of consensus or understanding. 
 Figure 3.4 illustrates the institutional framework established in Singapore, 
where the interaction with the private sector is very comprehensive, with 
representatives of firms participating on boards of directors, including the 
Economic Development Board (EDB), which traditionally has been the 
“brain” behind the country’s development strategies.9 Multinational com-
panies with operations in the country (and foreign academics in the case 
of the Agency for Science, Technology and Research, or A*STAR) are rep-









































a.  Malaysia also incorporates representatives of political parties but 
excludes union representation.
Figure 3.3 Public-Private Alliances: The Playing Field
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but also showing that the government attaches a high priority to gather-
ing international intelligence from these firms relevant for its  strategy. 
The profile for Ireland is similar with the exception that the boards of 
directors in Singapore only comment and make periodic appraisals of 
policies and programs, whereas in Ireland, directors also have operational 
responsibilities.
Singapore (and to a lesser degree Ireland and Malaysia) has another 
strategically valuable modality to strengthen its international public- 
private alliance—international advisory panels for Singapore’s EDB and 
its Infocomm Development Authority (see figure 3.4). Each year the EDB 
organizes a meeting at which private discussions are held between high 
government officials and chief executive officers of major multinational 
companies on subjects such as globalization trends, developments in the 
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Southeast Asia region, and technological and commercial issues. At the 
end of the meeting a press report is issued. This event, which also includes 
social events, not only provides a venue for exchanging information rel-
evant to national strategies but also creates a network of contacts in the 
international market and helps to identify concrete opportunities for the 
country.10 An example of the same strategy, but at the academic level, 
is the international advisory panel for A*STAR, a high-level executing 
body that operates under the umbrella of the National Research Founda-
tion, the agency that leads the country’s innovation strategy; the panel 
includes Nobel Prize winners.11 In 2005 Malaysia formed a similar inter-
national council to advise on its latest national plan; the council includes 
senior international figures from academia and the private sector. 
The main national public-private alliance of Ireland is embodied in a 
special council, chaired by the office of the prime minister (Taoiseach), 
which regularly convenes representatives of the major social groups and, 
with technical support, engages in discussions to reach consensus on rec-
ommendations to the government for the future socioeconomic direction 
of the country. This council is believed to have been critical to the success 
of the Irish alliance and economic model (O’Donovan 2010). Finland has 
had its Science and Technology Policy Council (STPC), which has served a 
similar purpose. These forums are discussed in more detail later. 
Australia and New Zealand are intermediate cases within the classifica-
tion of figure 3.3. Rather than developing consensus as such, these alliances 
are related to the political coalitions constructed by the administrations 
in power. The alliance in Australia exists mainly between the government, 
business, and academia. New Zealand had an alliance with businesses and 
academia up to 1999, when a new government headed by the Labor Party 
included and gave more attention to the labor sector. The conservative 
government elected in 2009 may have different ideas about the nature of 
the alliance. In any event, predominant structures and participation in the 
alliances of these two countries are fluid and unstable, reflecting in part a 
certain aversion to corporatism, albeit for different reasons. 
In Australia, until 2009, the governments in power assumed a neolib-
eral economic policy stance. In New Zealand the Clark government that 
came to power in 1999 following a long period of relatively neoliberal 
economic policies found it difficult to firmly establish a consensus with 
the business sector and the political opposition around a new structural-
ist approach partly inspired by Ireland. It even encountered skepticism 
in pockets of the government bureaucracy (Haworth 2008). This case 
illustrates the obstacles to change that stem from “path dependency” as 
well as the point made earlier that forming an alliance between a govern-
ment and the private business sector is not necessarily an easy task. In any 
event, this inability to establish full legitimacy for a new approach caused 
the government to move slowly in fits and starts. Although two strategic 
and complementary medium- and long-term initiatives were launched to 
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promote economic transformation,12 the government ultimately failed 
in its effort to install an Irish-style model of alliances and consensus in 
 support of a strategy for economic transformation. In effect, the hybrid 
structure of the New Zealand alliance did not have either the stability 
or the coherence to generate lasting agreements at the national level 
conducive to the implementation of a well-structured strategy relatively 
insulated from electoral cycles. 
In both countries, a more structured and deeper alliance does exist in 
certain specific areas and is especially striking in the fields of innovation 
in natural resources exploitation and in marketing, where the corporate 
sector and academic representatives assume operational responsibilities 
on the boards of specialized public executing agencies. Nevertheless, the 
vagaries of their national alliances place Australia and New Zealand in the 
intermediate area (area 2) of figure 3.3.
Spain, for its part, has been able to build consensus on its national 
strategy during the process of democratization and integration into the 
European Union with forums, committees, working groups, and so forth. 
While that consensus was valid at least up to the crisis of 2008–09, the pre-
dominant modality for interaction of the alliance at the level of the central 
government and its specialized agencies is an informal one that functions 
principally with trade unions and business associations, some of which 
originate in, and are partly funded by, the public sector (Bonet 2010).13 
Spain is probably located in area 1 of figure 3.3. In Sweden, where a high 
level of consensus is traditional, the alliance between government and 
business has been so informal/tacit that it is not easy to describe.14 
Before the 1990s the Republic of Korea would have been located at the 
extreme bottom left of figure 3.3 (area 4), because strategy formulation 
and implementation were almost exclusively the domain of the govern-
ment and its technocrats. Before democratization in Korea, the national 
plan guided the activities of the major conglomerates (chaebols), involving 
strong public-private collaboration sustained with a range of unilaterally 
applied incentives and penalties.15 Now a sophisticated economy, Korea 
has dispensed with national plans, and the chaebols have a large degree 
of business independence. While today’s democratic framework includes 
growing government recognition of the value of the public-private alli-
ances for supporting strategies, the country is still in a transition in this 
regard. It is now located in the intermediate area, as is the Czech Republic. 
This country has fairly well-structured formal forums, with broad par-
ticipation and active interaction between the public and private sectors, 
both for setting and for implementing national strategies. However, their 
political relevance and importance in decision making have been strongly 
influenced by the ideology of the different government coalitions that have 
assumed power since the introduction of democratic rule.16 
To conclude, the most complete and functional alliances for support-
ing the formulation of medium- and long-term strategies with sufficient 
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public consensus or understanding to avoid pendulum swings are found 
in Finland, Ireland (at least until the recent crisis), Malaysia, Singapore, 
Spain (also until the recent crisis), and Sweden. The alliances in Australia, 
New Zealand, and the Czech Republic are less solid or effective. Korea is 
still in transition from a bureaucratic development model to a more open 
social model based on modern industrial policies.
Consensus Building 
Intelligent medium- and long-term strategies based on a high degree of 
consensus between the public and the private sectors can give better results 
for a number of reasons. Consensus facilitates consistency in the strategy 
between electoral cycles because the process that builds and maintains a 
consensus achieves a “buy-in” of stakeholders (especially elites) (Cam-
pos and Root 1996) and serves as an implicit public evaluation of the 
effectiveness of such strategies and associated public policies. Even more 
important, processes geared to building consensus can mobilize and incor-
porate the country’s best information, perspectives, and skills, as well as 
engender credibility for the strategy through agreement on financing of 
its priorities.
Unfortunately, building consensus takes time and is no easy task. It is a 
process rather than an event. The nature of the process depends on many 
factors, such as cultural dispositions, political institutions, the configura-
tion and power of the different social groups, leadership and political 
vision, and the sense of urgency.17 Nevertheless, appropriately structured 
and governed institutional frameworks for alliances can, over time, help 
to build consensus. 
As mentioned, there are no formulas for the structure and functioning 
of alliances; they are by their nature idiosyncratic, based on the particu-
lar conditions of each country. But theory and experience suggest some 
basic considerations about governance that can contribute to the effective 
operation of an alliance. Successful alliances at the national level that 
deliberate and make recommendations to government about the direction 
of national strategies are likely to:18
• Ensure representation of the civil stakeholders with the market-
based and scientific or technical information necessary to build a 
strategy and of those with political power to legitimize resource allo-
cation. It is advisable that civil appointments be of a very high level 
sufficient to garner the respect of the communities they are meant to 
represent. To avoid degrading the authority of the civil membership, 
the appointments should be for a set period, and substitute represen-
tatives should not be allowed.
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• Include government representation at the highest level to signal to 
civil participants that the alliance can seriously address their and the 
nation’s issues. But governments also should take care to include 
the ministries and agencies that lead or coordinate the formulation 
and implementation of strategies (Herzberg and Wright 2005). The 
government, as a member of the alliance, moreover must continually 
demonstrate its political leadership, its commitment to the process, 
and its respect for the alliance’s recommendations for strategies un-
derpinning public policy; only in that way will the alliance attract 
and maintain top civil participation.
• Minimize politicization of the deliberations. Alliances thus should 
probably not include representatives from political parties, which 
can observe and discuss recommendations from their seat in the 
legislative branch. It is difficult for politicians to take off their party 
“T-shirt,” even in private deliberations.
• Ensure that the alliance membership, while representative, is not 
overly large in number to facilitate interpersonal trust and manage-
able dialogue (Ross Schneider 2009).
• Make mandates clear, concrete, and realistic given the stage of 
maturity of the alliance and the state of the economy. Indeed, realis-
tic and manageable mandates over the term of the alliance facilitate 
“successes” that can give the alliance creditability. Initially, man-
dates might focus on what Herzberg and Wright (2005, 22) term 
“low-hanging fruit.” At the launch, then, the alliance may want to 
limit mandates to information exchange, coupled with very specific 
problem solving and recommendations at a lower level of aggrega-
tion, and then progressively aim at consensus building on big issues 
and directions (Ross Schneider 2009).
•  Establish a funded, quasi-independent secretariat to support delib-
erations. It should not just be administrative in nature, but rather 
have a high-level, objective, respected technical capacity to encour-
age fact-based discussion and problem solving.19
• Set deliberations at regular intervals—every month, every other 
month, or every quarter—so that discussions maintain their rel-
evance and a commitment to the process is demonstrable to the alli-
ance participants and the public (Ross Schneider 2009).
• Keep deliberations confidential to encourage frankness and an envi-
ronment where compromise is possible. Public reports can be peri-
odically released concerning fulfillment of the alliance’s mandates. 
• Insulate civil membership from political retribution.
• Set clear and transparent criteria and procedures for appointment 
to the alliance forum.
• Institutionalize explicit rules of conduct for members of the alliance 
to guard against conflicts of interest and rent seeking. Capture is 
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also minimized if the alliance has adequate transversal social repre-
sentation while avoiding a dysfunctional size.
• Ensure that the alliance body, or a sister institution, has a capacity to 
monitor the degree to which policy makers adopt its  recommendations. 
• Use independent mechanisms to periodically evaluate consensus 
positions in the alliance to avoid the risk of “locked-in” strategic 
vision that may be losing relevance.
Ireland’s experience in this regard is quite interesting. Once one of the 
poorest countries in Europe, Ireland, starting in the late 1980s, managed 
to build a consensus for its development and integration into the global 
economy that led to one of the greatest economic transformations in the 
postwar period. Even in its current severe economic crisis, it still main-
tains an above-average European income. Annex tables 3A.1 and 3A.2 
show that the alliance’s institutional framework covers many dimensions 
of the formulation and implementation of medium- and long-term strate-
gies. One entity in particular, the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC), throughout its decades of work, evolved from a publicly spon-
sored “talk shop,” which allowed representatives of the various social 
groups to exchange ideas, into a forum that facilitated the generation of 
consensus on the future course of the economy. In the next section, we 
examine the council in more detail. We also comment on the governance 
of other alliances.
Alliances in Practice
In this section we sketch out the governance of the alliances in three of our 
success cases and then look at a fourth, the Irish alliance, which is one of 
the most mature and sophisticated.20
A Snapshot of the Nature of Three Alliances
Finland. Finland’s development strategy has been led by the country’s 
Science and Technology Policy Council, founded in 1987. It is chaired by 
the prime minister and has seven additional ministers. Two industry rep-
resentatives and one labor representative, of the highest level, participate 
in a personal capacity. Another seven members are from the academic and 
science community. Members serve for a four-year term, and nongovern-
mental members receive a small honorarium. The council meets four times 
a year and is supported by two subcommittees (science and education), 
which work on specific topics, as well as a secretariat with four employees 
linked to the Ministry of Education. Every three years the council pub-
lishes a consensus-based report analyzing the opportunities and challenges 
the economy is facing in a globalized economy and concluding with an 
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outline of a recommended path for the national economy. The council 
also recommended amounts of resources to allocate to the strategic areas 
set out in the report. Ministries and executing agencies in charge of spe-
cific areas addressed in the council’s outline and then prepare a series of 
one-year operational plans, which are executed and monitored under the 
umbrella of the STPC’s strategic guidelines.
The council was renamed the Research and Innovation Council in Jan-
uary 2009, reflecting some changes in its operation. As its name suggests, 
the body is now more intensively focused on the issue of innovation, a key 
dimension of Finland’s most recent development strategies. Membership 
remains at 18, but the number of experts in innovation policy is higher, 
and fewer nominations are socially based. Meanwhile, the two subcom-
mittees were replaced by a science and education subcommittee and a 
technology and innovation subcommittee. 
New Zealand. In 2008 New Zealand’s Growth and Innovation Advisory 
Board had 20 members from civil society, including 14 high-level business 
representatives, 5 technical or academic members, and 1 labor union rep-
resentative. The members are nominated by ministers and discussed and 
endorsed at the cabinet level; they are paid a modest honorarium for each 
day’s work and their expenses are paid. One of the business representa-
tives is designated as chair and leads the interaction with the prime minis-
ter and other ministers. A board term is up to three years; the board meets 
about six times a year. The Ministry of Economic Development provides 
administrative secretariat functions.
The growth and innovation board is expected to carry out construc-
tive debate, arrive at consensus recommendations, and give policy advice 
to the prime minister and relevant ministers. When consensus cannot be 
reached, the board’s recommendations can reflect the different perspec-
tives of members, or the topic can be assigned to a “work stream” to 
further develop perspectives.
The board was set up by the Clark government to create a social buy-
in to its emerging neostructuralist initiative for economic transformation. 
Its mandate covers broad issues on the overall direction of the economy, 
specific issues, and the promotion of consensus on what needs to be done 
to stimulate growth and innovation. However, the board is not expected to 
focus on detailed policy advice, implementation, or monitoring issues. The 
board’s authority and interaction with government is less structured than 
the Finland’s council is, and it is less bound by consensus building. Hence, 
its influence on policy seems to ebb and flow according to the domestic 
political dynamics of the government (Haworth 2008). 
The Czech Republic. The Council of Economic and Social Agreement 
(RHSD) was established in 1990 to parallel the democratic transition. It 
is made up of eight members of government, seven trade union represen-
tatives, and seven business sector representatives. This plenary group is 
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supported by an executive body in charge of following up on the work of 
the plenary and by a number of expert working groups. 
The mandate of the RHSD is the widest of the three alliances discussed 
here; it is what Ross Schneider (2009) calls an open-ended forum of dis-
cussion. This format is not necessarily a powerful tool for guiding develop-
ment strategies as such, but it can and has served as a mechanism to bring 
together for social dialogue major groups with little contact during the 
previous Communist regime. 
In January 2009 the National Economic Council was formed. It is 
an apolitical, 10-member expert body, made up largely of economists, 
chaired by the prime minister. It initially made recommendations on ways 
to manage the impact of the world recession and financial crisis and was 
also charged with recommending measures to accelerate growth and 
development. The council’s procedures were a work in progress at the 
time of writing.
A Closer Look at the Achievements and Limitations 
of the Irish Alliance 
Ireland’s National Economic and Social Council dates to the early 1960s 
and started as an exercise in bringing together representatives of employer 
associations, trade unions, farmers’ organizations, and senior public offi-
cials to discuss the country’s economic and social development.21 More 
recently NGOs joined the group. In the 1970s and 1980s the NESC served 
as a peaceful, closed-door “talk shop” for discussion and information 
exchange. After a crisis involving severe macroeconomic imbalance, reces-
sion, and substantial unemployment in the second half of the 1980s, the 
NESC evolved into a genuine forum for common understanding and social 
agreements on an economic policy aimed at high and sustained growth 
with social cohesion. 
Duties and Structure of the Alliance. The NESC analyzes medium- and 
long-term strategic socioeconomic issues and reports its findings to the 
prime minister along with recommendations on the future course of 
national plans, policies, and programs. The council is chaired by the 
secretary-general of the Department of the Prime Minister, and the public 
representatives are the secretaries-general of certain plan-relevant govern-
ment departments (ministries) plus five representatives from the business 
sector; five from the trade unions; five from farmers’ organizations, five 
from NGOs, and five independent representatives (normally technical 
experts or academics). The government selects members from nominations 
made by the respective social groups. The five independent participants 
are appointed directly by the government, and their policy orientation 
may have some affinity with that of the government. All the members act 
in a personal capacity; their term of service is three years. Nongovernment 
members receive reimbursement for their travel expenses where relevant. 
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The NESC receives technical and administrative support from a semi-
autonomous secretariat of nine persons, most of whom are technical 
experts, all with master’s degrees or doctorates. The current director is 
an economist held in high esteem in Ireland and recognized as politically 
impartial. The officials are contracted through competitive examinations 
and granted contracts as temporary employees of the state. The NESC 
budget for 2007 was 1.1 million euros. 
The council typically meets once a month for a half or full-day session, 
and its decisions are made by consensus. Nongovernment members must 
recuse themselves when subjects present a potential conflict of interest. 
Risks of capture are also lowered by the transversal nature of membership. 
In any event, the NESC triennial report is the strategic input for negotia-
tion of the National Social Agreement between the government, business, 
and trade unions, and it has served as a highly influential guide for the 
government in the formulation of the National Plan.22
The effectiveness of the NESC was politically consolidated in 1986, 
when it successfully laid the foundations for the negotiation between the 
government and various social actors that led to a three-year agreement 
on wages, taxes, and social spending within the framework of a program 
of growth, employment, and fiscal balance. Once the country’s macroeco-
nomic imbalance had been overcome, subsequent reports focused on other 
strategic issues, including competitiveness policies, supply-side policies, 
industrial and service policies, and the knowledge economy, all explicitly 
underpinned by a concern for social cohesion.
As the NESC agenda evolved, the government in 1993 created another 
forum for the partnership, the National Economic and Social Forum 
(NESF), which was responsible for long-term issues particularly related 
to employment and social cohesion (for further information on NESF 
and other specialized social dialogue forums in Ireland, see Doyle 2005). 
With the incorporation of NGOs into the partnership, a clearer division of 
labor was established between the two entities, giving the NESC exclusive 
responsibility for the national strategic vision and NESF the responsibility 
for monitoring implementation policies. 
The two forums are coordinated by the National Economic and Social 
Development Office. With time more forums have been created for the 
alliance. The National Competitiveness Council (NCC) emerged in 1997, 
headed by the prime minister and heavily weighted with business repre-
sentation. The National Center for Partnership and Performance (NCPP) 
was created in 2006 to promote a discussion between business and unions 
on labor relations.
A Method of Discourse for Consensus Building.  The NESC over time 
developed a methodology of discourse to facilitate consensus building. 
Rather than entering into discussions on current issues, the council makes 
recommendations based on broad principles relating to Ireland’s medium- 
and long-term socioeconomic policies and programs. The aim is to agree 
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on an analytical framework that will facilitate adoption of a social agree-
ment, orientations for a national strategy, and the introduction of support-
ing government programs under the National Plan. The alliance expressed 
in the NESC has two dimensions: consultation and covenants between 
partners who share a functional interdependence; and a sense of solidarity, 
social cohesion, and participation. The alliance incorporates both these di-
mensions because depending exclusively on the first would give too much 
importance to the relative power of the partners, while depending only on 
the second could be an overly simplistic vision of inclusion, reducing the 
process to a consultation in which the interested parties merely express 
their points of view and needs. 
There is, however, an important third dimension: negotiation. Build-
ing consensus implies that the partners must come to the table willing to 
set aside the goal of maximizing their individual interests and instead be 
part of a process of deliberation that has the potential to formulate and 
reformulate agreement on problems and solutions; the expected result 
approximates the creation of a public good. Thus, the process of develop-
ing partnerships depends on the capacity to promote an understanding 
and to approach deliberations with a view to jointly solving a problem 
and producing a consensus. 
Indeed, the key to the NESC process may be the method of delibera-
tion. First, problem solving is assumed to be the central mandate of par-
ticipants. Second, the mechanism for deliberation is geared to solving one 
or more problems through a dialogue supported by inputs from impartial 
experts and working groups that help to create a common definition of 
problems. The particularity of this approach is that partners do not argue 
over a definitive point of view. Rather, faced with empirical evidence 
presented by an impartial technical secretariat and the mandate to solve 
a problem, a sort of joint decision may emerge among the partners. Par-
ticipants are bound, given the facts laid out by the secretariat, to explain 
and give justifications to their partners in the alliance, their affiliates, and 
the general public and to take responsibility for their proposals. Thus, 
understanding and consensus are not a prerequisite for the alliance but 
rather the result of a problem-solving process that fosters it. Another 
important element in consensus building is social cohesion, which is a 
constant objective throughout the deliberations on the management and 
content of future strategies. 
The experience of the NESC demonstrates that pragmatic deliberations 
geared toward the solution of a specific problem can produce consensus 
even in the presence of underlying conflicts of interest and absent an initial 
understanding. Another key aspect is that consensus achieved through 
the NESC is always provisional. In other words, consensus allows inter-
locutors to proceed with a recommendation for pragmatic action, while 
reserving the right to review goals, ways and means, and the analysis itself. 
Deliberations are private, the process is supported by the prime minister, 
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and different participants are involved in the deliberations depending on 
the agenda—all of which facilitate consensus. Another advantage is that 
the approach is forward looking, rather than retrospective or focused 
on the present; as a result, government representatives tend to be less 
defensive.23 
It must be recalled that the positive results of NESC and its meth-
odology are the outcome of a long process based on “trial and error,” 
stemming from the public sector’s decision decades ago to provide the inter-
ested social groups with a neutral, high-level forum with quality technical 
support for discussing, in private and under the aegis of the prime minister, 
views on the direction of the country’s development. Because this institu-
tional process aiming at national consensus had been in place for many 
years, the alliance was able to jell into a true forum of national consensus 
to deal with the severe economic crisis that struck at the end of the 1980s.
A Fall from Grace.  The onset of the big economic crisis of 2008–09, 
with roots in a latent macroeconomic disequilibrium, witnessed the col-
lapse of the Irish public-private alliance, expressed in the inability to re-
new the social pact on wages. A major factor was the reluctance of labor 
unions—especially in the public sector—to sacrifice wages for fiscal bal-
ance after a large public bailout of the banking system. The NESC and its 
secretariat have been working on bridging the differences.
The effectiveness of the NESC appears to have weakened during the 
course of the past decade, in part because of a progressive “balkaniza-
tion” of the Irish alliance. With the creation of the National Competitive-
ness Council, business, aiming to achieve a degree of exclusive dialogue 
with the prime minister, began to give its primary attention to this forum 
rather than the NESC. Meanwhile, after the creation of the National 
Center for Partnership and Performance, the dialogue between business 
and labor migrated to this forum from the NESC. As a consequence the 
discourse in the NESC was dominated by labor unions and NGOs, which 
progressively distanced themselves from issues of industrial policy (which 
were taken up more intensively in the NCC) and labor relations (domi-
nated by the NCPP) in favor or social policies (O’Donnell 2009). At the 
same time a type of rivalry developed between the technical secretariat of 
the NESC and Forfás (the technical secretariat to the NCC) over promot-
ing a national strategic vision of development. Finally, the coordinating 
role of the National Economic and Social Development Office was quite 
ineffective.
With the balkanization of the alliance, public sector unions gained 
more space to promote their agenda, often in conflict with the recom-
mendations for reform of the NESC secretariat, which was directed to 
focus almost exclusively on social issues. Meanwhile, the representatives 
in the different forums of the alliance began to be captured by the macro-
economic bubble that was developing in the real estate and construction 
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markets in the 2000s: the boom provided a short-term win-win environ-
ment through employment, acquisition of first and second residences, 
profits, fiscal income, and public support for the government. Indeed, the 
internal dynamics of NESC in the described balkanized setting was not 
conducive to sounding alarm bells about the direction of the economy or 
deflating the bubble and even more aggressively adjust policies to coun-
teract eroding international competitiveness.24
Perhaps the lesson here is that a national alliance forum like the NESC 
needs to incorporate suballiances for those players that have strong bilat-
eral agendas to discuss, such as business and labor or business and the 
government. These more intimate forums, however, perhaps should take 
place in special “rooms” under the single roof of the national forum, in 
this case the NESC. This arrangement would allow the subdialogues to fil-
ter up to the NESC plenary, permitting more coordination, counterpoints, 
and cross-checks among the partners, and perhaps even the sounding of 
an alarm bell. Nevertheless, under any circumstances there is always the 
risk that a consensus vision will become “locked in,” to the detriment of 
flexibility and adjustment of strategies to changing realities. It seems in 
this case that, although the NESC fostered a useful national consensus 
for the great economic expansion of the 1990s, that consensus did not 
evolve sufficiently fast enough to account for the emerging dangers of the 
real estate bubble and eroding competitiveness that developed during the 
next decade. The excessive compartmentalization of the alliance may have 
contributed to this short-sightedness.25
Finally, another weakness may have been that the NESC operated with 
an excessively national view of the economy. As the productive transfor-
mation and complexity of the economy progressed over the years, it prob-
ably would have been wise to link the national forum’s deliberations more 
closely to regional and more decentralized perspectives. 
Annex Table 3A.1 The Nature of Public-Private Alliances in National Strategy Formulation, 10 Success Cases
Country Type of alliance Participants Means of engagement





Ad hoc convening of summits, committees, and councils.





Council for Economic and Social Agreement, as well as forums 
and formal consultation meetings. In 2008 a National 
Economic Council was formed to advise the prime minister.
Finland Formal structured Government-business-
academia-trade unions
Participation in the Science and Technology Policy Council 
(STPC).a The STPC was reformed in January 2009 to become 
the Research and Innovation Council.




Permanent forums at a national level, such as the National Economic 
and Social Council, the National Competitiveness Council, and the 
Expert Group on Future Skills Needs. In addition, the National 
Plan is discussed at length with other representatives of society.
Korea, Rep. 
(post-1990)





Ad hoc committees of experts to fulfill specific tasks, public 
forums, and informal communication, especially between the 
government and the chaebols.
Malaysia Hybrid (formal 
structured; 





The National Economic Consultative Council, which gives views and 
provides inputs to the government’s Economic Planning Unit for the 
preparation of the National Plan. In preparation for the Industrial 
Master Plans, a high-level steering committee was set up for the 
business sector to coordinate working groups. Other views are also 
received through forums, meetings, and informal communications.
(continued)
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Annex Table 3A.1 The Nature of Public-Private Alliances in National Strategy Formulation, 10 Success Cases 
(continued)
Country Type of alliance Participants Means of engagement
New Zealand Hybrid (formal 
structured; 







Formal mechanisms, such as the Growth and Innovation 
Advisory Board; ad hoc arrangements (meetings, working 
groups, and consultancies), and informal communications.
Singapore Formal structured Government-business-
academia-trade unions
The private sector participates in the boards of three important 
bodies responsible for strategy development: the Economic 
Development Board; the National Science Foundation; and the 
Research, Innovation and Enterprise Councila. 
Spain Informal/tacit Government-business-
academia-trade unions
Mainly informal/tacit through communication with trade 
unions and business associations, some with joint financing 
by the government. In the 1980s, in preparation for entry 
into the European Union, extensive formal consultation 
arrangements helped to build consensus on the strategy for 
internationalization, which exists to this day.
Sweden Informal/tacit Government-business-
labor-academia
The government has had a tight informal/tacit relationship with 
large Swedish transnational corporations and academia and until 
relatively recently a formal link with the trade unions (in the 
context of wages). Academic advice strongly influences policy.
Source: Authors, based on official data.
a. Renamed the National Research and Innovation Council in 2009.
98
Annex Table 3A.2 Nature of Public-Private Alliances for Strategy Implementation, 10 Success Cases
Country Type of partnership Participants Means of engagement
Australia Hybrid (formal structured; 
informal/tacit)
Business sector and 
academia
The private sector participates very actively with 
operational responsibilities on the boards of public 
agencies supporting R&D/innovation. Informal 
contacts are predominant in other areas. 
Czech Republic Formal structured Business sector, academia; 
some monitoring 
committees include trade 
unions and NGOs
Participation on the board of directors of Czech 
Invest (only in an advisory capacity) and on 
program monitoring committees. 
Finland Formal structured Business sector, academia, 
and trade unions
Participation on boards of executing agencies with 
operational responsibilities
Ireland Formal structured Business sector and 
academia
Participation on boards of executing agencies with 
operational responsibilities, including Forfás 
(the “brain” of the public sector in the area of 
strategies for international integration).
Korea, Rep. Informal/tacit Business sector and 
academia
Informal/tacit
Malaysia Hybrid (formal structured; 
informal/tacit)
Business sector and 
academia
Participation on boards of executing agencies, 
with advisory responsibilities plus informal 
communication.
New Zealand Formal structured Business sector; in some 
cases, trade unions




Annex Table 3A.2 Nature of Public-Private Alliances for Strategy Implementation, 10 Success Cases
Country Type of partnership Participants Means of engagement
Singapore Formal structured Business sector and 
academia
Participation on boards of executing agencies (in an 
advisory capacity only) and on councils.
Spain Hybrid (formal structured; 
informal/tacit)
Business sector, unions, 
and academia
Formal in the area of export promotion through 
recent participation on the board of directors of 
ICEX; informal channels with business and trade 
unions including in the area of innovation.
Sweden Informal/tacit Business sector and 
academia 
Informal/tacit.
Source: Authors, based on official data.
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Notes
 1. As Cutler (2008) observes, the development of an effective vision of the 
future requires an assessment, among other things, of long-term trends. Nonethe-
less, to truly determine the underlying long-term trend, past trends must be borne 
in mind; it would be unusual for future changes to be unaffected by former trends.
 2. The primary constraints on sustained growth may be concentrated in the 
macro-, meso-, or microeconomic spheres. Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) 
have come up with some ideas for diagnosing the subject systematically and setting 
priorities.
 3. Thanks to Manuel Agosin for reminding us of this potential obstacle in 
Latin America.
 4. As pointed out by Prats i Català (2005), the weakest stakeholders may 
require technical support in order to become effective actors in a dialogue. 
 5. A strategy that does not have some degree of public acceptance, or under-
standing, runs a risk of popular political resistance to the allocation of scarce 
resources for its implementation. Some areas of a strategy—for example, public 
spending in support of research and development and innovation—may not be 
readily understood and accepted politically by the public, in comparison with 
other more easily grasped expenditures such as poverty reduction programs. Thus, 
an explicitly constructed public understanding, or consensus, might be a necessary 
condition to legitimize a strategy in the public’s mind.
 6. According to a joint study by the World Bank, the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2005, 3), “The process of building a 
national vision does not have a unique format but must be adapted to the country 
situation and the particularities of the participating stakeholders.” 
 7. However, in the middle of the Irish crisis of 2008–09 employers and unions 
were unable, for the first time in many years, to reach a wage agreement.
 8. It should be noted that trade unions in Singapore have links with 
the government. 
 9. Schein (1996) extensively examines the EDB and its role in the development 
of the country. More recently innovation agencies have taken the lead role.
 10. General managers of multinational companies may also be attracted to the 
meeting by the opportunity to learn about topics of interest for doing business in 
East Asia.
 11. The private representatives serving on the board of directors of the National 
Research Foundation and the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council are 
exclusively Singapore nationals.
 12. Office of the Prime Minister (2002); Ministry of Economic Development, 
New Zealand (2005).
 13. In some of the autonomous communities, such as Andalusia, the alliance is 
formal, structured, and essentially tripartite. 
 14. Sweden’s alliance may be in part a democratic version of the big 
firms–government alliance that prevailed for many decades in Korea.
 15. Campos and Root (1996) give a good description of how such a collabo-
ration can work.
 16. The European Union has had a positive influence on the alliances by insist-
ing on a broad social dialogue about the use its cooperation funds. 
 17. One fairly common factor in the selected countries is that the consensus 
(or understanding) has often emerged during a crisis that has served, together with 
other factors, as a catalyst for constructing a common vision. 
 18. As mentioned, alliances also can function at the level of sectors and specific 
activities. The main difference in this case vis-à-vis the national forums is that the 
102 operational principles for effective public management
group will be more homogeneous. Homogeneous membership facilitates consensus 
(Ross Schneider 2009).
 19. For an analysis of the dynamics of various evidence-based, consensus-
building strategies, see Caillaud and Tirole (2007).
 20. Herzberg and Wright (2005) examine public-private competitiveness alli-
ances in a wide range of countries in a study that is also instructive on governance 
issues.
 21. This section relies in part on a background paper by O’Donovan (2010).
 22. As noted, other dimensions of the Irish alliance penetrate the agencies that 
are responsible for providing inputs and executing the National Plan. These agen-
cies are overseen by ministries represented in the NESC.
 23. The deliberations on the national recovery strategy for 1986, when stabi-
lizing the economy was a matter of urgency, illustrate the NESC methodology. At 
the monthly meetings of the council, in-depth analyses of the issues involved were 
carried out under the guidance of the council chairman and on the basis of studies 
prepared by the secretariat. To arrive at a common understanding, the focus of the 
discussion was shifted from the annual fiscal deficit to the debt-to-GDP ratio. This 
focus facilitated a more constructive exchange of opinions than focusing exclu-
sively on socially controversial issues of tax increases or expenditure reductions. 
First, it was observed that, despite cuts in public spending, the fiscal situation was 
continuing to deteriorate and the record-high world interest rates then prevailing 
were giving rise to a heavy debt-servicing burden. The multiyear debt buildup 
was therefore a more important issue than the deficit in any given year. Second, 
it was noted that the Irish crisis went beyond fiscal deterioration and stemmed in 
part from the sluggish rate of growth in the economy. Furthermore, based on this 
understanding, the members realized that the poor performance resulted not just 
from the macroeconomic problem but also from the agriculturally based style of 
development in the country. In addition to formulating macroeconomic recom-
mendations, the council also emphasized the challenges of structural change and 
productivity growth: the need to develop comparative advantages beyond that of 
agriculture. To promote policies in this area, the group also analyzed the primary 
constraints on growth and recommended industrial policies for overcoming them. 
With the restoration of macroeconomic equilibrium, this last dimension of the 
NESC approach gained an even higher profile in subsequent reports.
 24. As mentioned in chapter 2, industrial policies had been addressing competi-
tiveness issues, principally through large investments in R&D and by focusing on 
attraction of hi-tech FDI.
 25. Another factor may have been the euro, which could have provided a false 
sense of security in bond markets.
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Operational Principles for 
Supporting Public Sector 
Leadership
So far we have reviewed two key dimensions of the most successful of our 
country cases: development of a medium- to long-term national strategy 
for structural transformation and establishment of public-private alli-
ances. In the next two chapters, we focus on the remaining necessary 
dimension for success—public sector implementation. 
Figure 4.1 shows that strategic public policies should be aligned with 
programs and incentives that support them. Moreover, both the strategy 
and the supporting programs and incentives should emerge from a public-
private alliance that takes into account opportunities and constraints in 
the context of the current capacities of the public and private sectors in 
their respective institutional settings as well as those that might be realisti-
cally realized in a relevant planning horizon for the future. The decisive 
factor for success or failure, however, is public sector implementation of 
the package. In other words, as in sports, good strategies are winning 
strategies only if they are well executed.
In other words, smart strategies are important, but effective implemen-
tation will determine actual outcomes at all levels. Moreover, while suc-
cessful outcomes are important in themselves, they also are important for 
the coherence and sustainability of the alliance: without effective imple-
mentation and successful outcomes, the public sector will lose legitimacy 
as a partner of the private sector. Hence, this chapter and the next present 
operational principles geared toward the implementation issue.
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The Third Principle: Give the Baton to the “Real” 
Sector Ministries
The technical leadership for a strategy of economic transformation should 
be in the hands of the ministries and their executing agencies charged 
with fundamental oversight of industrial activity, services, and innova-
tion. Although the finance ministry is an extremely important authority 
in a country, with primary responsibility for maintaining macroeconomic 
balance, administering tax policies, coordinating and controlling spend-
ing, and maintaining the solvency of financial services, it is not the most 
appropriate entity for assuming this leadership role.1 Aside from the issue 
of competency in strategic issues of economic transformation, personnel in 
the ministry of finance may not have the “cultural” disposition for selective 
interventions that industrial policy often demands. In Latin America today 
ministries of finance tend to dominate policy making much too much at the 
expense of leadership in the ministries responsible for real sector activities.2 
The strategies of our successful extraregional countries with rela-
tively well-defined goals for structural transformation have been led by 
one or two ministries responsible for the “real” sectors of the economy. 
As shown in table 4.1, in six of our success cases, the entities generally 
responsible for implementing the strategy are the powerful ministries 




















Figure 4.1 The Importance of “How” in Public Policies and 
Programs
Source: Authors.
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innovation is the very top priority), or a special executing agency or 
entity appointed for this purpose.
The power of these entities depends on several factors: first, as the 
previous chapter emphasized, the strategy must be built on the broadest 
possible consensus (or public understanding), especially regarding the key 
vehicles for the country’s development (such as integration into the world 
economy, export development, and innovation).
Second, ideally, an institution with recognized and respected authority 
should be available to manage the development and implementation of the 
strategy. This authority can be aided if the ministry, or one of its executing 
agencies, has the technical capacity to serve as the public sector’s respected 
“brain” for strategic thinking and implementation.3 One good example is 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) in Ireland, 
whose agency Forfás is a sort of strategic “think tank” with analysis that 
is highly influential in orienting Ireland’s precise insertion into the world 
Table 4.1 Government Entities Responsible for Implementing the 
Strategy of Structural Change and Productivity Growth
Country Design and implementation agencies
Czech Republic 1. Ministry of Industry and Trade 
2.  National Council on Research and 
Development 
Finland 1.  Science and Technology Policy Council of 
Finlanda
2. Ministry of Trade and Industryb
Ireland 1.  Department of Enterprise, Trade, and 
Employment 
2. Forfás 
Korea, Rep. (to 1993) Economic Planning Board 
Korea, Rep. (after 1993) 1. National Science and Technology Council 
2.  Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST)
Malaysia 1. Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
2.  Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation 
3. Economic Planning Unit 
Singapore 1. Economic Development Board 
2.  Research, Innovation and Enterprise 
Council 
3. National Research Foundation 
Source: Authors, based on official data.
a. In January 2009 this body became the National Research and Innovation Council. 
b.  Starting in January 2008 this ministry’s mandate was transferred to a new Min-
istry of Employment and the Economy.
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economy. The Economic Development Board played this role in Singapore 
for many decades (before the National Research Foundation took on the 
task), as has the Science and Technology Policy Council in Finland and the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Malaysia.
Third, the highest political level of government must support the prior-
ity strategic initiatives headed up by ministries or government agencies. 
This strong political signal can ensure the necessary budget allocations and 
can help to focus the actions of specialized agencies on strategic priorities. 
These three elements are seen in a number of our success cases:
Czech Republic. The National Research and Development Council is 
made up of 14 prestigious members of the scientific community nomi-
nated for a four-year term by the prime minister.4 The council is highly in-
fluential in the formulation of the research, development, and innovation 
strategies that have been a new priority thrust of Czech development pol-
icy; to reflect that priority, the prime minister has chaired the council since 
2007. The country also has had a very effective and influential agency 
called Czech Invest, which was responsible for two crucial and successful 
aspects of recent strategy: attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
development of local business. In 2007 a political disagreement within 
the parent ministry (Industry and Trade) precipitated an internal crisis in 
Czech Invest. Some commentators have remarked that Czech Invest could 
have avoided such problems if it had had a more direct link with the prime 
minister (Benácˇ ek 2010).
Finland. Innovation is the country’s national strategy. As discussed in 
more detail in chapter 3, the entity that developed the guidelines for 
strategy and proposed the allocation of resources was the Science and 
Technology Policy Council of Finland (now the Research and Innovation 
Council), chaired by the prime minister.
Ireland. In Ireland, research and development and innovation are now 
lead areas of the national strategy. The Inter-Departmental Subcommittee 
on Science, Technology and Innovation receives reports from the Advi-
sory Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (ACSTI), which is 
composed of nationally renowned technical experts and academics. Along 
with contributions from the chief scientific adviser to the Irish government, 
the subcommittee formulates strategy and defines relevant programs. The 
prime minister participates in the subcommittee, which falls under the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. DETE in turn is in 
charge of a constellation of agencies—Enterprise Ireland, Industrial De-
velopment Agency–Ireland (IDA), and Science Foundation Ireland—that 
manage a large proportion of the total public sector budget for research 
and for support of export-oriented innovation. DETE also oversees For-
fás, which produces studies for the Inter-Departmental Subcommittee on 
Science, Technology and Innovation and ACSTI, while also providing 
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major  technical contributions for the formulation of national strategy. All 
of these activities contribute to DETE’s leadership in the cabinet.
Republic of Korea. The country’s strategy is geared toward innovation, 
now including small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In 1999 the Na-
tional Science and Technology Council was created with maximum power 
to define strategies and programs and to allocate resources. The council is 
composed of representatives of several ministries plus nine representatives 
from the scientific community and is chaired by the country’s president. 
In 2004 the position of minister for science and technology was elevated 
to deputy prime minister. The ministry is responsible for planning and 
coordinating all science and technology programs. Last, some of the most 
prestigious public research centers working in strategically defined areas 
are sponsored by the prime minister.
Malaysia. In its recent national plans, development of information and 
communications technology (ICT) has been the country’s top strategic 
area. The Implementation Council, chaired by the prime minister, has 
been the most senior governmental decision-making body in the field. The 
initiative focuses on the development of a multimedia corridor managed 
by an agency of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation. The 
prime minister also appoints the members of a high-level International 
Council of Experts that advises on sectoral strategy. Meanwhile, the Eco-
nomic Planning Unit is a technical body responsible for formulating the 
national plan in consultation with ministries. The power and legitimacy of 
this body is strengthened by its location in the Office of the Prime Minister. 
Singapore. The focus of the country’s national strategy has shifted toward 
a new priority: knowledge creation and innovation, under the leadership of 
the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council, chaired by the prime min-
ister, and a subordinate agency, the National Research Foundation, whose 
director is also the deputy prime minister. The foundation has replaced the 
Agency for Science, Technology and Research as the country’s strategic 
“brain” for innovation policy; that agency had more resources but less po-
litical power. The foundation was allocated $5 billion of the $13.5 billion 
budget for public sector research and development in the period 2006–10.
Another factor that determines the power of entities implementing such 
strategies is the appointment of politically or technically renowned direc-
tors. Such appointments have been the practice in, among others, Singa-
pore (both for the Economic Development Board and A*STAR), Malaysia 
(the Ministry of Trade and Industry), and the Czech Republic (in Czech 
Invest up to 2007). Of course, the determining factor in the power of the 
strategy-implementing authority is whether financial and capable human 
resources are allocated in accordance with the relevant mandates.
Last, the formal presence of the highest political authority in and 
around a ministry or agency charged with a priority initiative does not 
guarantee it leverage; the political authority must exercise real political 
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leadership on behalf of the initiative. Moreover, putting a highly respected 
person at the helm of the initiative is no guarantee that the power of the 
public agency implementing the strategy will be sustained in the medium 
or long term. Such longevity, where relevant for a country’s development, 
requires that the priority and culture of leadership become institutionally 
rooted and publicly respected. In other words, initiatives and bodies that 
rely exclusively on the political power of an individual public figure can 
easily lose their legitimacy and momentum, even if they are successful, 
when the strong personality departs. This phenomenon appears to explain 
the crisis that occurred at Czech Invest when its head was dismissed and 
at Vision 2020 in Malaysia with the departure of Prime Minister Maha-
thir Mohamad. A subnational lesson along these lines involving a major 
hydrocarbon innovation strategy in the Province of Alberta, Canada, can 
be found in annex 4A. 
The Fourth Principle: Promote Medium- and Long-
Term Policy Strategic Thinking
Government bureaucracies, as participants in an alliance, need to pro-
mote a long-run perspective; in principle this responsibility is part of 
their comparative advantage in a public-private alliance. Politicians tend 
to focus on the next election cycle. Business can be either myopic and 
attracted to the siren call of market bubbles and fashions, or victims of 
status quo inertia. But a government bureaucracy also can get caught 
up excessively in day-to-day management and undermine its compara-
tive advantage. So while government has a role in helping a country be 
forward looking, it needs institutional structures and processes to exploit 
its advantage.
Boyle, O’Donnell, and O’Riordan (2002) point to some steps bureau-
cracies can take:
• Structure spaces and time for longer-term policy thinking in govern-
ment. Special units embedded in ministries or agencies dedicated to 
a long-term perspective create such space. We showed earlier that 
some success cases have special agencies or government-sponsored 
research centers that do this type of strategic thinking. However, 
these technical agencies must have additional space and time to in-
terface with ministers and politicians on long-term issues. 
• Launch initiatives within government and in academia that set an 
agenda for research on longer-term themes that are crosscutting and 
strategic in nature.
• Train a supply of technicians with the skills and capacities in associ-
ated methodologies and practices to think about the future as well 
as support networks of long-term thinkers.
operational principles for supporting public sector 111
Foresight exercises—systematic analyses of possible future scenarios—
support formulation of strategies and orient activities and thus have 
proved to be a helpful tool in promoting long-term perspectives. These 
exercises are used not so much for projecting an increasingly uncertain 
future but rather for socializing information to create networks of stake-
holders and expert analysts who contribute to the search for inputs to 
strategy definition and policy making. In effect, foresight exercises provide 
a structured platform for a broad public-private discussion of the future 
that can involve a large number of social actors. The process tries to detect 
weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges, while also building a common 
understanding of the most important determining factors. These system-
atic efforts attempt to “light up” potential paths for progress in various 
areas such as developing new markets, or protecting existing ones, and 
defining priorities for science, technology, innovation, the development 
of labor supply and skills required by the market, demographics, and the 
environment, all with the same aim of improving the standard of living of 
the population.
Although foresight analysis organizes a society-based reflection on the 
future direction of the economy, in areas such as technological development, 
changes happen so quickly that policy cannot be a “slave” of any particular 
exercise. Not only do foresight studies have to be carried out with some fre-
quency, but authorities must also be alert and adaptable between exercises. 
In addition, information and analysis contained in foresight studies carried 
out in more developed countries can be helpful inputs too. 
The most systematic application of forward-looking analysis at the 
country level was undertaken during the 1990s in nations such as Austria, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Today almost all members of the European Union have engaged 
in such work, while the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has 
promoted the practice in Asian countries.
In most of our success cases, foresight analysis is being implemented 
in an increasingly systematic and formal way by stable, dedicated agen-
cies that maintain a constant dialogue with the authorities on defining 
strategies and policies to face the future. As part of this process, govern-
ments have applied foresight analysis to many areas in various ways. Some 
countries use the methodology through agencies working in specific areas, 
such as technological foresight studies. As Finland’s experience illustrates, 
foresight analysis is also a way to create public consensus around possible 
scenarios and to prioritize strategies in various parts of the economy; the 
practice subsequently spread to other aspects of economic strategy. 
The Finnish Example
Foresight analysis was first used by the Finnish Funding Agency for Tech-
nology and Innovation (TEKES) in the 1990s to formulate its technological 
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strategy and guide the technology programs for which it is responsible. In 
2001 the Ministry of Trade and Industry (later folded into the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy) began to use foresight analysis more 
broadly, coordinating a project to analyze future scenarios and visions for 
innovation policy, track the development of various processes, and develop 
new focuses for long-term analysis. In the process, several networks of 
experts and ministers were established, along with an administrative 
committee with representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
TEKES, and the Technical Research Center of Finland.
In 2005 TEKES and the Academy of Finland launched a joint foresight 
project called Finnsight 2015. The aim was to identify future competencies 
in the fields of science and technology, society, business, and industry, and 
then to prioritize them. The project helped to identify the country’s cen-
ters of excellence in science, technology, and innovation, in keeping with 
the government’s decision to develop a public research system, mainly 
to advance export development and social well-being. The project also 
strengthened relations between TEKES and the Academy of Finland and 
created a climate of multidisciplinary discussion. The foresight analysis 
was carried out by panels of leading industry experts and researchers 
with multidisciplinary knowledge and experience working in different 
networks. Discussions were constructive, and each panel produced its own 
report, all of which were summarized in the publication Finnsight 2015.
In 2006 TEKES launched the Signals 2006 foresight project, which 
was focused on discovering new opportunities and challenges involving 
industry and society. The project partners included, among others, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the export credit agency Finnvera, the 
Finnish Innovation Fund, the Academy of Finland, and the Technical 
Research Center of Finland. For the government, such an exercise facili-
tated decision-making processes in a constantly changing environment. 
The project also helped TEKES to define its strategy for technological 
programs. The process involved recruiting 7,000 people, with the col-
laboration of foreign parties, to develop qualitative long-term scenarios 
through networking, workshops, Delphi surveys, and virtual platforms to 
carry out benchmarking of the country’s innovation environment.5
Foresight Analysis in Other Success Cases
Others of our success cases have centers of foresight studies, but these 
centers have only an informal relationship with government bodies. Such 
is the case in Sweden, where high-level foresight agencies (such as the 
Institute for Futures Studies, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Swed-
ish National Board for Industrial and Technical Development, Swedish 
Foundation for Strategic Research, and the Swedish Industry Association) 
act independently in choosing their agenda, experts, working methods, 
funding, and in drawing conclusions from their analyses (Paillard 2005; 
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Lübeck 2001). These bodies expect the government to take their analyses 
into account, however, and indeed that is the case. These exercises have 
become an important tool for the Swedish government because they con-
tribute to public debate and alert the population to future challenges, serve 
as a means of consultation on social reform, and help to define strategic 
priorities (especially in the realm of science and technology).
Other countries in our group have made efforts at foresight studies, 
with some creating government agencies for that purpose. However, these 
initiatives seem not to have had much impact owing to the dominance 
of a culture of short-term thinking in government decision making. For 
example, in Australia the first foresight analysis agency, the Australian 
Commission for the Future, was created in 1985, but its significance and 
budget decreased as the years passed. Then in the 1990s, the Australian 
Science, Technology, and Engineering Council, which had been set up in 
1979 to advise the government on science and technology policy, began 
trying to prepare for the future by applying long-term foresight analysis. 
Its proposals, however, did not have much impact. Other public agencies 
in Australia also carry out foresight analysis, but they too have had little 
nationwide impact (James 2001; Conway and Stewart 2004).
Despite this poor track record the new Labor government in 2008 initi-
ated the “Australian Summit 2020.” This project was an attempt to ingrain 
a culture of long-term thinking into society. The exercise involved a great 
number of actors across all of civil society who were asked to think about 
and analyze the challenges of the decades ahead. The discussion was far-
reaching in the sense that hundreds of proposals in different thematic areas 
were debated and evaluated. It remains to be seen whether, in the euphoria 
of China’s current high demand for Australian commodities, this ad hoc 
exercise has any effect in promoting long-term strategic thinking and policy. 
The Fifth Principle: Each Priority Area or Activity 
in a Strategy Should Have at Least One Dedicated 
Implementing Agency
 In applying this principle, it is important to strike a balance between dis-
persion of specialization and the demands of coordination. As table 4.2 
shows, some of our most successful extraregional cases have a range of 
main agencies working in the four strategic orientations of international 
integration and export development. The institutional structure of these 
agencies is dynamic and functional, that is, it is adapted to the evolution 
and priority content of the strategies in question. For example, in Ireland 
one large institution (the Industrial Development Agency) originally cov-
ered all four strategic areas. However, economic progress and an increas-
ing focus on structurally specific strategies resulted in a “rebranding,” 
with the development agency spinning off more specialized agencies. The 
Table 4.2 Main Agencies Implementing Programs and Policies for Integration with the World Economy




Australia AUSTRADE (part of the 
Department for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade) 
Various AUSTRADE Various
Czech Republic Czech Invest Czech Invest CZECH TRADE Various
Finland Invest in Finland n.a. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, FINPRO
Academy of Finland, 
TEKES
Ireland Industrial Development 
Agency 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) Science Foundation 
Ireland 




Malaysia Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority 
(MIDA)





New Zealand NZ Trade and Enterprise 
(through Invest New 
Zealand)
NZ Trade and Enterprise Various
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ICEX and autonomous 
communities





Singapore Economic Development 
Board 





Sweden Invest in Sweden Agency  National Board for 
Industrial and Technical 
Development 





Source: Authors, based on official information.
 Note: One common characteristic in export promotion not included in the table is that other export insurance and credit agencies often exist. 
n.a. = Not applicable.
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same story is seen in Singapore where the Economic Development Board 
divested functions to new specialized agencies as the economy’s structure 
and objectives became more sophisticated. This structure displayed a kind 
of Tinbergen’s Rule, with each main function covered by a clearly identi-
fied responsible agency.6 
Some countries such as Australia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Spain have a diverse array of institutions that may indicate degrees of spe-
cialization that complicate effective coordination. For its part, the Czech 
Republic’s Czech Invest—a very successful multipurpose agency—may 
have reached a stage where rebranding should be considered. 
The Sixth Principle: The More Structured and Specific 
a Strategy, the Greater the Need for Coordination 
among Ministries and Agencies and the More Likely 
Cabinet-Level Coordination Will Not Be Enough
Coordination is a central element of effective execution but a difficult 
objective for government to achieve. The successful extraregional countries 
with relatively structured strategies have used a multiple of coordinating 
mechanisms. As figure 4.2 shows, the greater the complexity and selectiv-
ity of policies and programs in a development strategy, the greater the 
demands for integrated management by ministries and executing agencies.
A clear mandate and hierarchy of functions for each agency is obvi-
ously fundamental. Giving institutions their own clear mandate limits the 









degree of complexity and selectivity in objectives of
policies and programs
Source: Marshall 2009.
Figure 4.2 Coordination for Effective Public Management
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of tasks. In any event, collaboration and coordination are always required. 
For instance, the Industrial Development Agency of Ireland must coor-
dinate its FDI attraction programs with Enterprise Ireland because the 
strategy also calls for the development agency to promote links with local 
suppliers. Ireland has multilayered mechanisms for facilitating coordina-
tion. The role of coordinating the country’s three agencies described in 
table 4.2 is assigned to Forfás, which along with these agencies all come 
under the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. The author-
ity of Forfás as a coordinating mechanism is strengthened by its renown 
as a strategic think tank for integration with the world economy and its 
influence over budget allocations to the executing agencies.
Moreover, although the representation on the boards of directors of 
executing agencies and committees in the export development constellation 
include various public sector entities (as well as private sector representa-
tives), coordination is facilitated by the presence of extensive cross-































Advisory Council for 
Science, Technology and 
Innovation (ACSTI) 
Expert Group on Future 
















t policy development and advice 
coordination
Source: Authors, based on official data.
Note: Board members representing the public and private sectors are not 
indicated in the figure. The only board members presented inside the boxes of 
the figure are those who sit on one or more agencies or bodies.
Figure 4.3 Ireland: Cross Representation on the Boards of 
Agencies and on Councils Implementing the Export Devel-
opment Strategy
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representatives, 5 academic representatives, and 3 private-sector represenatives 
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Biomedicine Interactive digital media 
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representatives of 
research centres, 
A*STAR, and EDB 














Source: Authors, based on official data.
Figure 4.4 Singapore: Coordination of Innovation Institutions
In addition, the formal assessment of the performance of agency offi-
cials makes reference to internal coordination and external coordination 
with other agencies. Finally, the buildings of Ireland’s export development 
agencies are in the same complex, thereby facilitating informal day-to-day 
communication. 
In Singapore there is some cross-representation on boards, but much 
of the coordination takes place through structured committees and infor-
mal networks within a stable cadre of professional civil servants who 
have worked together for a long time in the various agencies and bodies. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the formal network of coordination among commit-
tees and agencies (as well as their members) responsible for promoting 
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research and development (R&D) and innovation. There is a noticeable 
“cascading” specialization of responsibilities the nearer a decision gets to 
the final disbursement of resources to beneficiaries.
As mentioned, Finland’s national economic development strategy is 
concentrated on innovation. Coordination is facilitated by the strategy’s 
relatively singular focus and clear mandates as part of a simple divi-
sion of labor between the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation (which drives applied research) and the Academy of Finland 
(which promotes basic research). Furthermore, each agency submits an 
annual plan (with periodic monitoring of results) to its parent ministry 
that, when approved, forms a signed agreement for the execution of the 
actions recommended in the three-year guidelines prepared by the public-
private alliance’s Science and Technology Policy Council (see chapter 3).
Figure 4.5 summarizes this coordination in Finland.
In Malaysia the agencies are conventionally coordinated by the rel-
evant ministries and through regular interministerial meetings involving 
the prime minister as ultimate arbitrator. In addition to the Small and 
Medium Industries Development Corporation, at least 12 ministries and 
38 agencies are charged with implementing strategic lines of action related 
to SMEs. Each agency has explicit objectives identified in the national 
strategy. This in itself is a coordination mechanism. However, the National 
SME Development Council, a dedicated interministerial committee, was 
set up to improve coordination. 
The Czech Republic has an implementation and coordination system for 






planning 3-year outlines 
ministries 
(education, trade and industry, finance, etc.)
annual objectives and agreements 
institutions 
(Academy of Finland, TEKES, universities 
VTT, Sectoral Institutes) 
Science and Technology  
Policy Council, STPC government 
Source: Andersson 2010.
Figure 4.5 Finland: Planning and Coordination among Agencies
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within a ministry. Unstable government coalitions in the age of democracy 
have created a continuous risk of fragmentation of tasks. In the first half of 
2006 the Czech Council on Trade and Investment was established within 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade to coordinate government agencies and 
ministries working in these areas and monitor the 2006–10 export devel-
opment strategy.7 The council became operable in 2008. A discussion on 
the need to centralize the entities executing the country’s innovation plan, 
rather than relying on 22 ministerial channels, suggests that coordination 
in this area has been quite inadequate.8
Since Korea abandoned national planning in the 1990s, each ministry 
devises its own plan. Initiatives to create new coordination mechanisms 
within a very complex, proactive state apparatus and sophisticated econ-
omy have not always been successful. Organization in support of R&D 
and innovation is especially fragmented, which in turn has resulted in a 
duplication of efforts and bureaucratic tensions. 
Korea’s experience also demonstrates the importance for effective coor-
dination of hierarchical positioning in the government bureaucracy. The 
National Science and Technology Council had a mandate to coordinate 
innovation planning and implementation among relevant ministries and 
agencies. Until 2004, however, it shared hierarchy with the Ministry of 
Planning and the National Assembly, which diluted the council’s author-
ity and the effectiveness of the principle mechanism of coordination. Only 
after a reform that gave the council a preeminent place in the bureau-
cratic hierarchy did it gain the needed leverage for achieving unchallenged 
responsibility for coordination (figure 4.6).
New Zealand implements its strategy through a small number of agencies 
with responsibility for a wide range of policies and programs. This structure 
suggests that the economic transformation strategy of the Labor government 
was somewhat path dependent on the relatively entrenched liberal horizontal 
approach of the past, which made it difficult to implement a more focused, 
structurally oriented strategy. Agency coordination is traditionally carried 
out through a lead ministry. The economic transformation strategy was 
formulated by the Ministry of Economic Development, which used inter-
ministerial committees as part of the official framework intended to promote 
an integrated government. As in Ireland and Singapore, some specialized 
executing bodies have cross-representation on boards of directors.
Australia, Spain, and Sweden have faced serious coordination chal-
lenges. In Spain implementation responsibilities are relatively easy to 
assign and coordinate, thanks to a strategic approach to export develop-
ment that, until recently, was fairly horizontal. Serious shortcomings have, 
however, arisen in coordination between the central government and the 
17 autonomous communities, which have a high degree of independence 
as far as strategies and implementation are concerned (see Annex 4B
for the case of Andalusia). In effect Spain has 18 strategies counting the 
central government! In an effort to improve coordination, ICEX (the 
After 2004
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Figure 4.6 Reform of Korea’s National System of Innovation
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CSIRO = Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
ANSTO =  Australian Nucelar Science and Technology Organisation
AIMS =  Australian Institute of Marine Science
CRCs = Collaborative Research Centres
EMDGs = Export Market Development Grants
EFIC = Export Finance and Insurance Corporation
department of prime 































































Figure 4.7 Administrative Structure of the Main Innovation 
Programs and Agencies in Australia
Source: Cutler 2008.
Note: Information corresponds to the situation up to December 2007. 
central government export promotion agency) has attempted to join the 
boards of sister agencies in the communities.
Although Australia has a relatively liberal horizontal development strat-
egy, it is much more structured in the support of innovation, an area that 
covers multiple sectors and activities. Implementation has therefore been 
fairly spread out among specialized agencies and ministries. This struc-
ture could be interpreted as leaning toward a system of “open innovation” 
(a broad network of informal relations between agents contributing to 
innovation), but it also creates a huge demand for effective coordination 
mechanisms. Ministries and specialized agencies have traditionally operated 
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without much interaction, thereby creating a series of isolated “silos” that 
hampers the development of integrated management (figure 4.7).9 Second, 
like Spain and its relations with the autonomous communities in the coun-
try, Australia faces the challenge of aligning federal programs with state 
programs, a task that is further complicated by the size of the country.10 
The Seventh Principle: For Medium- and Long-Term 
Strategies to Be Effective, Public Sector Personnel 
Must Be Highly Professional, Career Oriented, and 
Nonpoliticized
A technically competent, motivated, and honest public workforce in which 
career advancements are based on merit is essential for successful strategies 
underpinned by industrial policies. Strong, competent public bureaucracies 
are an important element in “state capacity” and have been cited as a key 
ingredient in the success of catch-up countries (Evans 1995). 
As mentioned in chapter 3, capable public-private alliances that give 
birth to effective strategies need the “embedded autonomy” of the state. 
A necessary, but not sufficient condition for this is the availability of 
a highly professional public bureaucracy motivated by national devel-
opment objectives. A professional and capable bureaucracy, moreover, 
will be a credible partner of the private sector, allowing effective interac-
tion on the basis of trust. A professional bureaucracy also can serve as 
an institutional “memory” over political cycles, instilling consistency in 
development strategies over time. And effective implementation of strate-
gies, especially where Sabel’s (2009) “open industrial policy” is relevant, 
demands delegation of authority that only a capable professional civil 
service can undertake successfully.
The central role of a strong, technically competent public bureaucracy 
has been a key characteristic of the Asian countries that have succeeded in 
catch-up (Evans 1995; Wade 2004; Jung-En Woo 1999; Karagiannis and 
Madjd-Sadjadi 2007; Chang 1994; World Bank 1997). 
In East Asia recruitment is typically competitive and based on merit. 
The aim is to recruit the “best and brightest” either from local elite uni-
versities or among nationals studying abroad in top schools. Bringing in 
and retaining the best and brightest generates prestige for civil service, 
which in turn facilitates on-going recruitment of top talent. Once in the 
civil service system, recruits are put on a career path and given training. 
Promotions are based on merit, which encourages continuity, deepening 
of learning experiences, coordination, teamwork, and an esprit de corps. 
The civil service is technically driven and largely insulated from politiciza-
tion. In some cases salaries are competitive with the private sector, while 
in others national prestige, job experience, and security are sufficient for 
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recruitment and retention. Interestingly, in some East Asian countries, 
technicians outside the economics profession dominated the most influen-
tial policy-making groups during the period of intensive industrial policy 
and catch-up (Wade 2004; Chang 1994).11 
Salaries and incentives in our success cases are varied. In most countries 
public sector salaries are below those for equivalent work in the private 
sector. The exceptions are Ireland and Singapore; both countries have 
had a conscious policy to make public salaries equivalent to those in the 
private sector in order to recruit and retain a quality public workforce12 
Singapore is especially committed to parity (Schein 1996). As a Singapor-
ean minister commented in 2007 about public sector salaries: “We do not 
aim to lead private sector salaries, but we must keep pace. If we are not 
responsive, we will lose our ability to recruit and keep able people. This 
will do great harm to Singapore as we should have lost one key advantage 
over other countries—a clean, competent and effective civil service.”13 
Singapore also has an innovative merit pay system based on the country’s 
annual economic performance.
Singapore’s public sector human resource management encourages a 
corporate culture in its specialized agencies. The aim is to motivate not 
only individuals but also to facilitate the teamwork and delegation that 
is so vital for a system that implements strategic activities through a net-
work of agencies. Two strains run through this efficient civil service. One 
is the British tradition of “clean civil service,” or honesty (Schein 1996). 
The other, inspired by the French system of the Grands Corps de l’Etat 
(Kumar and Siddique 2010), is an elite body of about 250 public servants 
that serve as upper management in the public bureaucracy.14 Future senior 
managers for this elite corps are recruited from the country’s best students 
and receive special dedicated academic and business training at home and 
abroad throughout their careers, so that they are able to technically lead 
the public bureaucracy in the development and implementation of strate-
gies. The elite corps also facilitates consensus and informal coordination.
In Spain, pay in specialized agencies tends to be lower than pay in the 
private sector but somewhat better than that in central government. Korea 
and Malaysia have depended more on a sense of national pride and the 
prestige of public service to recruit and motivate top professionals. Sala-
ries in the civil services of Australia, Finland, and New Zealand also do 
not match their counterparts in the private sector.
Two organizational models prevail in our success cases. In the first 
model, the central government directly controls specialized agencies. This 
system is in place in the Czech Republic, Finland, Korea, and Sweden. In 
the second model, agencies are semiautonomous, with legally delegated 
mandates, and operate at arm’s length from the executive (often as a 
statutory body). This structure is used in countries with a commonwealth 
tradition (Australia, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore) and 
also in certain areas of the Spanish central government.
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In the first model, historical convention has given rise to agencies that 
are protected from political cycles (and have some autonomy in certain 
operational aspects), as in Finland. Czech Invest (responsible for FDI 
attraction and SME development strategies) enjoyed almost 15 years of 
relative autonomy based on the professional excellence of its executive 
directors and professional team; however, it was unable to establish a suf-
ficiently firm tradition within the public administration and public aware-
ness. Czech Invest underwent a bureaucratic and political crisis in 2007 
and lost its autonomy.
In the second model, functions are delegated more explicitly and agen-
cies are better protected from political cycles. This system also has the 
advantage of raising the specialized professional profile of the agency, by 
giving it more flexibility than central government offices have in profes-
sional recruitment, salaries, procedures, and the promotion of cooperation. 
Such semiautonomy encourages delegation and may also make the 
agency more accountable for the results of its programs. Autonomy 
remains relative because the government is represented on the board of 
directors and usually appoints the directors, stipulates periods of rota-
tion, and allocates funding. Agencies are also subject to public auditing 
procedures.
Annex 4A Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research 
Authority: Leading Innovation to Exploit the Oil 
Sands in Alberta, Canada
The Province of Alberta, Canada, is home to one of the world’s largest 
petroleum reserves.15 Trapped in sticky layers of sediment known as oil 
sands, the petroleum is difficult to extract. Of the total reserves, 80 percent
has to be drilled in situ, which requires a high level of technological 
development.
In 1984 the premier of the province made a key contribution to devel-
oping this resource when he created the Alberta Oil Sands Technology 
and Research Authority (AOSTRA), designed to promote the costly tech-
nological development needed to extract the oil in situ and ensure benefits 
for the local population. AOSTRA was run by an independent board; 
at least one of the board members was a political representative, while 
the remaining members (including the chair and vice-chair) were private 
sector technical experts recruited through competitive processes. Within 
this set-up, the political representative provided an essential strategic link 
between the objectives of AOSTRA and the world of politics. Similarly 
decisive for the future of the organization was the election of a highly 
experienced and respected engineer from the region’s private oil sector to 
serve as chair of the board of directors, a full-time job. 
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The provincial premier mobilized Can$235 million to cofinance 
the initiative (around half of the funding requirements) and to attract 
research projects with industry partners. He also introduced one the 
most striking characteristics of the new organization: the rights on the 
new technologies developed remained the property of the provincial gov-
ernment. The involved private sector enterprises had the right to use the 
inventions in their place of operation but were barred from commercial-
izing them. Any company that did not collaborate would have to buy 
the technology at a price reflecting its development costs. Information 
on new inventions would be kept by the government for 35 years. In the 
early stages of AOSTRA, this was the main bone of contention between 
the provincial government and the industry. Although only one company 
initially signed on to the requirement that the new technology would be 
owned by the provincial government, the rest of the industry eventually 
followed suit.
AOSTRA spent its first two years consulting with industry and aca-
demia. It then devised a five-year work program, which consisted of 
collaborating with industry to field-test the most advanced technologies 
developed by the private sector at that time. Devising the Underground 
Testing Facility and developing and commercializing the petroleum extrac-
tion system known as Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage was costly and 
discouraging. At the same time, international oil prices collapsed in 1982 
and the private sector pulled out. The provincial government maintained 
its long-term vision of innovation and the sector’s potential profitability 
and decided to continue to implement the testing facility alone. The facil-
ity opened in 1987, and in 1993 AOSTRA announced that it was about 
to overcome the obstacles to commercializing the extraction system. Fur-
thermore, over 100 patents or invention requests and reports had been 
produced in support of commercial licences. 
The AOSTRA vision, however, began to fade in the second half of the 
1980s. Peter Lougheed, the premier who had been the main promoter 
of the initiative, left office. Clem Bowman, the respected chairman of 
the board, also departed after 10 years. These departures coincided with 
economic problems at the national level. In this context, AOSTRA lost 
its political and financial independence in 1994 when its functions were 
subsumed under a new division affiliated with the Ministry of Energy. 
Several lessons can be gleaned from this experience:
• Political leadership is crucial. 
• Ambitious initiatives, especially in the sphere of technology, need 
long-term vision to be brought to fruition. 
• When technological development costs are high and the results uncer-
tain, funding must be long term and independent of electoral cycles.
• Implementing agencies should be semiautonomous with mainly 
technical staff and subject to the proper checks and balances. 
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• An alliance between academia and science and industry is vital.
• The long-term vision should be created by building consensus and 
institutional agreements that transcend political cycles and a “big 
person.”
Annex 4B The Autonomous Community of Andalusia: 
Another Subnational Case 
In 2003 the Autonomous Community of Andalusia launched a develop-
ment strategy known as the Second Modernization of Andalusia.16 Export 
promotion, FDI attraction, industrialization of SMEs, and innovation 
were the central hubs of this strategy. The resulting programs and policies 
were implemented by two agencies: the Trade Promotion Agency of Anda-
lusia (Extenda), which focuses on traditional export promotion activities, 
and the Innovation and Development Agency of Andalusia (IDEA), which 
deals with the other areas of export development. 
The relationship between the public sector (agency executives) and the 
private sector (business, trade associations, and chambers of commerce) 
has been a smooth and easy one, irrespective of the political party in office, 
with no serious differences of opinion between the public and private sec-
tors. There is an unwritten understanding about their roles and how to 
interrelate, with the public sector systematically consulting the main private 
organizations on issues of internationalization policy and, albeit to a lesser 
degree, on support for SMEs and innovation. The execution of promotion 
policies is decidedly sectoral. Private associations and organizations play 
a very active role in the design and execution of policies and plans. There 
are also frequent meetings (especially informal ones) between the sectors.
In time this relationship has become increasingly formal. One example 
is the admission of business organization representatives into the export 
promotion institutions of the Autonomous Community.
The capital of Extenda is 88 percent owned by the government of 
Andalusia, with the remainder owned by 12 of the region’s 14 chambers 
of commerce. The government has limited involvement in the day-to-day 
running of Extenda. Its strategic positioning and the design of instru-
ments and programs are defined by the 12-member management board, 
10 of whom represent various public administration bodies. These include 
ICEX, the central government export promotion agency (a formal policy-
coordination link is being forged between ICEX and Extenda). The two 
remaining members of the management board are elected by the chambers 
of commerce of Andalusia. 
The government has guaranteed increasing levels of minimum budgetary 
income over time, enabling Extenda to plan for the medium and long term. 
Extenda has also relief on instruments that have had low budgetary require-
ments but maximum visibility in addressing businesses needs: information, 
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training, advice, promotion, and support abroad. Extenda often carries 
out surveys and studies on the value of its business services, and the results 
point to a very high level of satisfaction with the services offered. In contrast 
to ICEX, the Extenda promotion programs have been part of the agency’s 
multiyear strategic plans since 1998. Strategic plans are produced by an 
external consultancy firm with the input of Extenda and then reviewed and 
presented to the managing board for discussion and approval. In terms of 
subnational public-private alliances, IDEA has an advisory board made up 
of representatives of the community’s socioeconomic agents. Meanwhile the 
agency’s strategic support is subject to consultations under the community’s 
Social Cohesion Accords. 
The autonomous communities, Andalusia in particular, are assum-
ing growing responsibilities in developing their business networks and 
boosting cooperation between government and the private sector. The 
fact that regional administrations are closer to local companies means 
they find it easier than the central government to understand business 
needs and thus have a key role to play in innovation and research and 
development. However, autonomous administrations have problems 
similar to those of the central government, such as slow and bureaucratic 
management and limited coordination with other bodies in the central 
government and within the region. In Andalusia, the regional govern-
ment’s autonomy and room for maneuver in the design and implementa-
tion of innovation and SME support policies have been influenced by 
European Union practices in this area. 
To a certain extent, the Autonomous Community of Andalusia could 
be said to have a higher level of institutional development for industrial 
policy than the central government, because the former has a medium-
term strategy based on a guiding, formally structured public-private alli-
ance, thereby driving the institutional reform needed to strengthen pro-
gram and policy coordination, all with a view to achieving more integral 
growth for the region. 
Notes
 1. In Ireland the Ministry of Finance coordinates other ministries and leads 
the public consultation on the strategy. 
 2. This dominance probably stems from the period when finance ministries 
took over the leadership of  the economies during and after the debt crisis and were 
usually the “port of entry” for the Washington Consensus.
 3. A lack of a strategic “brain” in Spain was perhaps the reason that the coun-
try was slow to realize the effects of competition from low-wage eastern European 
countries when EU expansion occurred and also slow to realize the need to boost 
its meager expenditure on R&D and innovation.
 4. They receive a part-time civil servant salary.
 5. Elija (2003); Pulkkinen (2000); TEKES and the Academy of Finland 
(2006a, 2006b). 
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 6. Under Tinbergen’s Rule, each objective requires its own instrument. Ire-
land combines export development with the business development of SMEs in one 
agency, because multinationals do not need export support. Singapore keeps the 
two areas of responsibility separate. 
 7. The council consists of  9 government and 10 corporate representatives.
 8. Nonetheless, the programming requirements for the use of EU funding is a 
positive factor in the coordination of strategies relating to  export development.
 9. Silos also hamper processes that could lead the development of effective 
national strategies. According to Cutler (2008), the new Australian Labor govern-
ment announced its intention to strengthen coordination mechanisms within the 
federal system and between that system and individual states. It is not clear that 
much has been accomplished as yet.
 10. One way of mitigating the problem of geographical dispersion would be 
for agencies to use regional offices more intensively. The gap between the federal 
government and individual states could be narrowed through cross-representation 
on agency boards of directors.
 11. Economists in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, China, especially foreign-trained 
ones, tended to be skeptical of industrial policy.
 12. During Ireland’s recent crisis, civil servants were forced to take a significant 
pay cut.
 13. Zakin Hussain, “Ministerial Civil Service Salaries Expected to Go Up,” 
Straits Times, March 3, 2007 (http://www.straitstimes.com/).
 14. France’s Grands  Corps de l’Etat has led postwar industrial policy and  has 
been a constant influential strategic force in business and government even in an 
era of reforms and liberalization (Loriaux 1999 and 2007).
 15. Based on information in Hester and Lawrence (2010).
 16. Drawn from Bonet (2010).  
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Principles for Managing 
Programs and Incentives
We examined in the previous chapter the issue of effective public sector 
organization for leadership in the formulation and implementation of 
strategies. In this chapter we draw insights and operational principles 
from our success cases on management of programs and incentives in sup-
port of the strategy.
The Eighth Principle: The Effective Application of 
Incentives Must Be Assessed Not only by How 
They Are Individually Managed But also by How 
They Are Coordinated for a Systemic Effect
To promote economic links with the world economy, public agencies sup-
port enterprises. Countries place more or less emphasis on the four areas 
of export development discussed in chapter 2 depending on their spe-
cific national strategies. This emphasis is conveyed through functional 
programs—the different types of technical assistance and support offered, 
including financing instruments, the most common being loans, grants, 
and tax incentives (table 5.1).
The strategic area of attracting foreign investment generally consists 
in establishing contractual arrangements under which governments offer 
tax breaks for given periods, supply public financing for infrastructure 
and training or education for needed local labor supply, and provide other 
incentives that can support the company’s activity. For its part, the com-
pany undertakes to set up operations in the country, or to make significant 
reinvestments, and to comply with certain goals (for example, job cre-
ation). Under other programs, the foreign firms are encouraged to support 
the development of local input supply industries and to locate part of 
134 Table 5.1  Typology of Programs and Instruments in Areas of Strategic Orientation
Policies Programs Incentives
International integration of 
local business
Training programs Subsidies for participation in specific 
training programs
 Improvement of operation, management, 
training, quality, and adoption of new 
standards
Subsidies for consultancy, technical 
assistance, training, preparation of 
business plans, quality enhancement
 Support for new projects Subsidies and competitive funding 
 Programs to develop collaborative 
innovation 
Subsidies for integration in networks and 
collaborative research 
  Availability of consultants; R&D alert 
campaigns and technology transfer 
services
Machinery and equipment Tax discounts, exemptions, preferential 
rates, rebates on machinery and 
equipment 
 Entrepreneurship Subsidies, soft loans, venture capital
Export promotion Assistance in gaining a foothold 
in external markets
Credit to generate export supply
Organization of country brand
initiatives and fairs 
Financing export loans and risk insurance 
for trade operations 
Competitive funding up to a percentage 
of the investment in promotion abroad
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Market alerts and research offices
Overseas promotion offices 
FDI attraction and reinvestment For infrastructure (transport, industrial 
parks, buildings, technology corridors, 
technological cities) and training of 
labor and professionals for the 
industry in question.
Public financing
 Machinery and equipment Tax incentives and import tariff rebates
 Encouragement for R&D activities Tax incentives plus special competitive 
subsidized funding
 Other support services Creation of a “one-stop shop” with 
representatives from different ministries 
and agencies to deal with problems 
concerning programs, public regulations, 
and postinvestment services
Innovation Technical assistance Technical assistance to companies 
through training in management and 
strategy design for innovation
Availability of “pay-as-you-use” 
laboratory installations 
(continued)
136 Table 5.1  Typology of Programs and Instruments in Areas of Strategic Orientation (continued)
Policies Programs Incentives
Innovation Promotion of innovation in 
key sectors
Collaborative research funds for 
clusters or consortia
Collaborative funding for links between 
companies and universities, research 
institutes, and centers of excellence
Tax exemptions or tax credits
Subsidies for conferences and workshops 
and for major researchers
Attracting talent Programs for recruiting high-level 
researchers from abroad or 
collaborating with them
Scholarships Various scholarship funds for 
education of locals
Marketing of knowledge Training in intellectual property
Seed or venture capital
Investor contact networks
Training in corporate management for 
innovation
Source: Authors.
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their research and development (R&D) activities in the country. As noted 
in chapter 2, countries where FDI attraction was a key component of 
their national export development strategy—the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Malaysia, and Singapore—typically started out with incentives supporting 
general objectives such as employment. These countries first established 
themselves as attractive FDI hosts and then targeted their FDI incentives 
on achieving more specific objectives. 
Local firms are supported to make them internationally competitive. 
The focus is often on small and medium enterprise (SMEs). Much atten-
tion is given to capacity building in areas such as management, scaling up 
production, upgrading product lines, R&D, and innovation. All 10 suc-
cess cases actively promote “start-ups.”
Export promotion strategies are designed to assist firms in gaining 
a foothold in external markets. The types of services offered are fairly 
common in all countries and any differences between one service and 
another lie more in their effective implementation than in the nature of 
the programs themselves. In most cases, some degree of subsidy is granted 
in ways that do not infringe on the rules of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).
As for innovation, programs seek to promote the development of new 
products and services as well as new processes in industries or clusters 
defined by the strategy. Incentives for technical assistance in manag-
ing innovation are also offered, as is assistance in commercializing the 
results of innovation. Indeed, this last aspect is receiving increasing atten-
tion, especially through the creation of formal and informal networks of 
researchers and businesses. Besides educational initiatives, the priority 
instruments in this area are grants and tax credits. Whether direct sub-
sidies are a more suitable instrument for innovation than tax credits has 
become a matter for discussion (see annex 5A). Singapore and, to a lesser 
extent, Ireland have active and generous programs for recruiting interna-
tionally renowned foreign researchers to work with their local counter-
parts (a kind of “twinning”) to boost national capacities.
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the instruments and programs for integrating 
SMEs into the world economy should tie in with each other in the four 
areas of strategic orientation for export development. The application of a 
particular incentive may fail if it is not combined with other elements nec-
essary for the success of the whole. For example, subsidies for consultancy 
and business management training in SMEs could be indispensable to the 
success of the special loans for international expansion granted by the 
export promotion agency. The programs of the agency in charge of inter-
nationalization of SMEs, which promotes links with transnational firms 
or with international value chains, must work together with incentives 
awarded to attract foreign investment that has the potential to stimulate 
demand for local suppliers and services. 
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The implementation of Malaysia’s strategy is a good example of this 
need for tie-in. One of the objectives of the Third Industrial Master Plan 
was to achieve stronger links between SMEs and the production chains 
headed by transnational corporations. The Small and Medium Indus-
tries Development Corporation (SMIDEC) is responsible for developing 
programs to achieve these objectives (SMIDEC 2006). The agency set up 
four programs to assist businesses in areas they need to improve, such as 
skills upgrading and industry networking, if they are to become exporters 
or suppliers for transnationals. In the sphere of innovation, the Strategic 
Business Intelligence Center, an agency in the Ministry of Science, Tech-
nology and Education, supports local industry through multidisciplinary 
technological programs (SIRIM 2005). Its R&D programs are geared 
toward new technologies and seek to bring companies to the technological 
frontier, transforming them into global players. The programs provide ser-
vices mainly for SMEs, including strategic planning, business intelligence, 
technological development, and quality. This set of actions complements 
those developed by SMIDEC to provide SMEs with comprehensive assis-
tance for integrating into the world economy. And, as mentioned in chap-
ter 4, Malaysia also has a special interministerial committee to oversee the 
integration of programs for SMEs.
The innovation chain in Australia, shown in figure 5.2, is another way 
of illustrating the need for integrated coverage and coordination of incen-



































internationalization of SMEs 
Figure 5.1 Functional Links between Support Programs: The 
Example of SMEs
Source: Authors.
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The figure reinforces the idea that the case of innovation support must 
take into account interconnections between chains of key activities aimed 
at a central commercial objective, bearing in mind the primary constraints 
faced, on the one hand, and avoiding gaps in the coverage of support by 
agencies and programs, on the other. For instance, awarding tax breaks for 
R&D makes no sense if there is an unrelieved constraint on commercial-
izing the results. Likewise, the return on the subsidy will underperform if 
there are impediments to the diffusion of the new knowledge or to identi-
fying export opportunities.
Last, countries may implement programs and policies and grant incen-
tives across the board or selectively. Some policies and programs are 
applied on a general basis and any company may opt for them; these 
include tax rebates for attracting FDI (when the investment is ruled eligi-
ble), subsidies for investment in integrating SMEs into the world economy, 
and tax credits for R&D. Other policies and programs are geared to clus-
ters, selected sectors, or specific activities and investments, using a battery 
of instruments, such as targeted FDI attraction, sectoral investment funds, 
or innovation funding in activities considered key for the country’s export 
future. The East Asian success cases have had the most selective strategies, 
Figure 5.2 Interventions in Support of Innovation: The Case 
of Australia
Source: Cutler 2008.
Note: The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO), rural R&D corporations (RRDCs), and collaborative research 
centers (CRCs) support innovation. Austrade, the Agency for Export Market 
Development Grants (EMDC), and the Export Finance and Insurance 
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but Ireland and the Czech Republic also became increasingly selective as 
their objectives for upgrading became more focused. 
The Ninth Principle: The Effectiveness of 
Programs and Instruments Is Intimately 
Linked to the Way in Which the 
Process Is Managed
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the type of policy and the 
nature of private participation in the context of a public-private alliance. 
The left axis represents policy orientation. On one extreme of the left axis 
is the generic or horizontal policy (with its across-the-board incentives). 
In these types of policies, the private sector does not participate actively 
in the life cycle of the program because the program does not precisely 
identify beneficiaries. Interaction tends to take the form of wide-ranging 
consultations in the program design phase and a selective interaction dur-
ing the operational phase.
At the other extreme is a selective policy, geared to developing a new 
sector(s) or specific activity(ies). In such cases, the nature of the public-
private interaction is more active and collaborative in nature, including 
coinvestment (when the subsidies, credits, venture capital, or even the 
fiscal incentive granted are just a percentage of the cost) and specific 
performance agreements by the parties. This more intimate arrangement 













spectrum of public-private interaction
targeted
policy
Figure 5.3 Programs and Policies and the Nature of 
Public-Private Participation
Source: Cutler 2008.
principles for managing programs and incentives 141
arises because the parties are targeted beneficiaries and hence there is 
greater specific interest in design and outcomes. Formal links are thus 
established between the private sector and the public agencies and their 
programs throughout the life cycle of the activity. The Rural Research and 
Development Corporations (RRDCs) in Australia are a good example 
of this collaboration—they are funded through joint investment by the 
government and the private sector, which contributes through a collec-
tive tax, and the sectors are represented on the board of directors of the 
RRDCs. Singapore also has special funding for specific technical support 
of SMEs financed by a collective tax on these firms.
Coinvestment and risk sharing may boost the efficiency of programs. 
Cofinancing tends to work best when the projects it supports are relatively 
close to market activities. Such is the case for the just mentioned RRDCs, 
the Collaborative Research Centers (CRCs) in Australia, and the techno-
logical programs for product and process innovation development in Fin-
land and Sweden. In these cases, the investment funds contributed by the 
state complement the resources contributed by firms and industries for the 
purposes of a possible commercial application. Basic R&D, which tends 
to be a more strictly scientific activity, is further removed from profitable 
market activity and hence is generally supported by the state in the form 
of grants, competitive or otherwise. 
Some of the other insights drawn from our success cases should be 
borne in mind:
Incentive programs are more likely to succeed if they correspond to 
industries or activities where the private sector already has some dem-
onstrated interest and capacity in coordination (even if only incipient). 
This is an important consideration when transitioning into the world of 
industrial policy where legitimacy may depend on early demonstration of 
successes.
The availability of sufficient financing for the effective implementa-
tion of programs and policies is a critical issue. In many of our success 
cases, the government arranged funds, or agreements with financing cov-
ering several years, for new priority initiatives, which by their nature 
have a medium- to long-term gestation period. These arrangements help 
to increase the credibility of the initiative and to reduce uncertainty for 
the private sector. Support of innovation is characteristically an uncer-
tain long-term endeavor. Science Foundation Ireland, Sitra in Finland, 
the National Research Foundation in Singapore (and the aforementioned 
subnational case of AOSTRA in Alberta, Canada) have credibly signaled a 
commitment to research and innovation through the availability of multi-
year financing. Another point related to the funding issue is that financing 
should not be spread thinly across many programs; in the face of limited 
resources it may be better to prioritize and ensure that a critical mass of 
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resources are available where they most count. Underfunding an initiative 
erodes the credibility and effectiveness of a program and industrial policy 
more generally. 
A proactive attitude on the part of executing agencies is important. 
The most effective executing agencies are not “passive windows” waiting 
to be approached by users. In many of our countries the agencies actively 
seek to identify clients with potential and provide them with information 
and technical assistance for their business plans and investment. For 
example, one of the missions of Enterprise Ireland is to proactively search 
out businesses with potential and offer to conduct a rigorous analysis of 
the company with an eye to developing a business plan that encourages 
start-ups, upgrading of the existing firm’s output or activities, increased 
productivity, and innovation and R&D. Assistance also helps companies 
to identify government support programs that may be relevant to them. 
Enterprise Ireland has proactively built its client base to more then 3,500 
firms (Sinnamon 2009). Moreover, the agency’s services are often subsi-
dized or free.
Encourage accountability in awarding incentives to transnational 
corporations. In the Czech Republic, Ireland, and Malaysia, formal 
agreements are concluded to establish explicit conditions and com-
mitments undertaken by the company and the promotion agency. The 
agreement establishes the terms under which the subsidies, tax incen-
tives, or support investments are granted and specifies the obligations of 
the corporation in areas such as investment and job creation. These are 
long-term agreements (for example, in Ireland, they are for 10 years). 
In most cases (except Malaysia), the agreement includes a clause that 
provides for partial refund of the incentives should the investor fail 
to fully comply.1 In Ireland, the incentive programs are divided into 
various stages, so that fulfilment of the targets can be monitored as a 
precondition for the next disbursement. The same holds true for incen-
tives granted to SMEs to work with newly hosted FDI to develop local 
supply chains, a process that makes the country a more attractive host 
for the foreign firm. 
In Ireland, a cost-benefit model is used to select and determine the 
exact incentives to be awarded to a transnational company. The calcu-
lation is made over a seven-year period and all public expenditure on 
FDI attraction is taken into account, including the cost of standardized 
tax exemptions and administration, plus an estimate of the benefit in 
terms of increased economic activity resulting from FDI. The benefits 
are discounted by 50 percent to take into account the possibility that 
the investment might have occurred in any event. Recently, special 
weighting has been applied to FDI in high-technology enterprises. 
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Meanwhile, in the year 2000, the Czech Republic established Invest-
ment Act 72/2000, which did away with the discretionary power in this 
area by spelling out the types of benefits available for FDI (and local 
investment). This act has served as the blueprint for awarding incentives, 
except in the case of two large-scale projects. The act had the disadvan-
tage of limiting negotiation space for the attraction of FDI, but it did 
enhance transparency and reduce transaction costs (Benácˇ ek, 2010). 
And of course when the potential investment was attractive enough, 
as in two large-scale automobile manufacturing projects, discretionary 
policy worked on the margins of the act. Meanwhile, Malaysia, a coun-
try recognized for the effectiveness of its FDI-attraction program, has a 
relatively high degree of discretionary power in offering incentives and 
limited transparency.
It is normal for support programs that entail a certain level of risk 
to sometimes fail. Indeed, in some areas a high success rate may be the 
sign of a bad program. This is especially the case in the area of innova-
tion. In Finland, where public programs are particularly well managed, 
roughly one-fifth of supported innovation projects in 2002 failed out-
right or gave less than satisfactory results. It took some time for the 
Finnish innovation agencies to convince the Ministry of Finance that 
failure is inherent in programs encouraging learning and experimenta-
tion (Kotilainen 2008). 
Too much red tape in a program can deter a company from participat-
ing. A balance must be found between rigorous administrative procedures, 
on the one hand, and promptly responding to a company’s application 
and disbursement of funds, on the other. Time can be of the essence for a 
successful investment; moreover, too much red tape will debase the value 
of the incentive vis-à-vis the opportunity that the incentive is designed to 
support. 
The countries that use strong incentives as part of their structurally 
oriented strategies consider them not so much as subsidies but rather as 
an investment in the country’s growth, which will bring in returns for 
the treasury. This point is illustrated in figure 5.4 for the case of Finland, 
where subsidies for enterprise performance have been calculated to have 
generated a positive return to the fiscal accounts. Naturally, the returns 
depend on sound program design and management. 
In program conceptualization and design, an explicit “checklist” of 
points to be covered may be useful in raising the likelihood of success 
and reducing risks by anticipating needs such as avoidance of excessive 
bureaucratic noise, identifying and terminating “losers,” and ameliorat-
ing problems of potential capture and strategic behavior of beneficiaries, 
among other things. Box 5.1 illustrates a checklist.
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Figure 5.4 The Cycle of Return on Incentives in Finland
Source: Kotilainen 2008. 
Box 5.1 Example of a Checklist for Program Conceptualization 
and Design
Clarity on the nature of the problem to be addressed 
Have the objectives been clearly and unambiguously defined, with a 
view to overcoming any specific constraints?
Additionality
Is it clear that the program will encourage the desired behavior and be 
well received by the designated users, and does the scale of the financ-
ing match the expected actions and results?
Competition 
Does access to the program need to be competitive? The answer to 
this question depends on a capacity to define objectives in terms of 
social benefits, the ability to assess the merits of alternative proposals, 
estimate administrative costs, and manage users’ potential strategic 
behavior to obtain preferential treatment.
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Consistency 
What are the possible interactions with other programs, and how does 
the program fit into the overall set of support activities for the identi-
fied objective?
Duration 
How long will the program need to continue to achieve the objective 
and produce sustainable results? Is there a natural cycle for the devel-
opment of the objective, or should the program be introduced in seg-
ments? Is there a plan for ending the program?
Risk calculation 
Is it clear what the risk of program failure is in relation to the potential 
benefits? If both the risk and the benefits are considered to be high, it 
may be better to begin with an experimental program and, if it proves 
satisfactory, expand the program to its full scale on a pilot basis before 
launching it as an official initiative.
Risk management
Have those involved remained alert to possible conflicts with the objec-
tives of other programs, both within and outside the set of programs 
for the export activity being supported? Given the danger of capture 
by lobby groups, is there an exit plan for shutting down the program 
according to success or failure vis-à-vis the objective. One mechanism 
that can be considered for that purpose is a specific program duration 
(a sunset clause) that automatically triggers an assessment of whether it 
should be continued or not. Possible abuse of the program on the part 
of users must be anticipated by doing studies of the real behavior of 
agents in the market concerned.
Administration
Does the design of the administrative framework match the complex-
ity of the program and its risks, so as to avoid excessive bureaucratic 
interference that would discourage its potential users? Examples of 
interference would include unnecessarily slow processing of requests 
and disbursement of funds. Insofar as accounts or reports are required 
from those who benefit from the program, efforts should be made to 
apply procedures that are familiar to, and not excessively burdensome 
for, those in the industry.
Source: Drawn from Cutler (2008).
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The Tenth Principle: The Effectiveness of Strategies 
Is Dependent on an Objective Assessment 
of Implementation and Their Impact on the 
Objectives Set Out
In that regard, the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, has 
commented on that country’s attitude about design of public support pro-
grams: “Does it work? Let’s try it and if it does work, fine, let’s continue 
it. If it doesn’t work, toss it out, try another one.”2
This may be a good pragmatic philosophy for a proactive and solvent 
government with medium- and long-term ambitions and strategies for 
structural change. Nonetheless, to be effective, governments must have the 
capacity to evaluate the impact of their support programs.
Many of our successful countries have a structured system for assessing 
and monitoring strategies from the programmatic viewpoint of the out-
puts of ministries and agencies. Ireland, for example, has a committee that 
monitors implementation of the national development plan. The commit-
tee itself meets every six months. In addition, each government department 
is required to prepare its own three-year strategy for implementing the 
national plan, as well as a yearly output plan with quantifiable perfor-
mance indicators. In Finland, as mentioned, yearly operational plans are 
prepared and monitored by executing agencies.
However, outputs are not necessarily synonymous with impact and the 
attainment of the objective. Few countries systematically conduct impact 
assessments. Indeed, most governments have only recently begun to pay 
special attention to the systematic assessment of the impacts of strategies, 
projects, and programs.3 Rigorous assessment based on an appropriate 
methodology and empirical evidence is quite difficult. Consequently, only 
a few of the challenges can be outlined here.
As Alan Hughes (2007) observes, it is vital to know what would have 
happened if public support had not been granted to an activity. One possi-
ble methodology for program assessment is to create control groups, com-
paring the performance of firms having similar characteristics with that 
of firms that benefited from the incentive. There is a problem, however: 
the firms that take advantage of programs may be the most astute, and 
without the incentives they would have done well anyway. To overcome 
this potential bias, the firms that enter the program can be modeled using 
an econometric exercise with a counterfactual. An alternative is to use a 
subjective counterfactual, where participating firms are asked what would 
have happened if they had not made use of the program. The advantage 
of this approach is that participating firms have the greatest amount of 
information about themselves. A strategy suggested by Hughes (2007) to 
overcome the methodological pros and cons is to combine methodolo-
gies. For example, in the case of an innovation program for SMEs in the 
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United Kingdom, a combination of paired control groups was used, with 
a selection model, along with a subjective counterfactual and case studies 
(a “mixed method”).
Cutler (2008) points to three additional challenges. First, in addition 
to stating goals in a quantifiable way that can be evaluated,4 a quantity 
of information and data must be collected on the firm’s performance 
before and after the support program. To that end, the program must—
without discouraging participation—require firms to provide a minimum 
of relevant data on performance when they enter the program and dur-
ing a monitoring process, which also has to be organized. Second, some 
programs have quite long-term impacts, such as the field of innovation; as 
a result, the monitoring and data collection system may have to function 
for as long as 10 or 20 years. Third, better understanding is needed of the 
complex transmission mechanisms between an activity and its impact on 
aspects such as productivity, enterprise growth, and trade. Other consid-
erations that can be added to those noted by Hughes and Cutler are the 
importance of using independent assessments, the need to strike a balance 
between the quality and benefits of an evaluation methodology, and the 
cost in financial terms as well as the time spent by officials.
Two countries with a culture of systematic and relatively rigorous 
evaluation of impacts, particularly in the difficult area of innovation, 
are Finland and Australia. Finland has been cited by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development for the particular atten-
tion it pays to evaluations. For example, its ministries organize (generally 
independent) expert groups, which may include non-Finnish nationals, 
to evaluate the programs of certain sectors or clusters. The Academy of 
Finland evaluates both research programs and individual projects, but it 
now places more emphasis on the former. Programs are evaluated taking 
into account the initial conditions and goals and the level of financing, 
with an analysis of scientific results, impacts, and the efficiency of pro-
gram administration. Another aspect that is monitored is the implemen-
tation of recommendations arising out of the evaluation. The academy’s 
sister agency, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation 
(TEKES), uses goal-led indicators. There are also evaluations of the sup-
port bodies themselves. Program evaluations have been used as inputs 
for the analyses conducted by the former Science and Technology Policy 
Council (STPC) for the three-year strategic national guidelines. Annex 5.2 
summarizes the evaluation of an R&D and innovation program in the 
field of electronics and telecommunications.
Another country active in evaluation, this time in the area of enterprise 
and export promotion, is New Zealand, which conducts both internal and 
external evaluations. For example, the various programs of New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise are evaluated externally every three to five years; the 
agency also has its own assessment unit. The methodology used is a mixed 
method; for example, the evaluation of one program involved a review of 
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documents and files; interviews with users and officials; and three surveys, 
two administered to user groups and one to a group of non-users. The 
respondents totaled 3,000. 
In Ireland, incentive programs are justified to the public using cost-
benefit analysis (“value for money”). However, the ex post assessment 
of program impacts does not yet appear to be particularly systematic. 
When requested by its ministry, Ireland’s national economic development 
authority, Forfás, which is the coordinating agency for supporting integra-
tion with the world economy and export development, can evaluate a pro-
gram three to five years after its inception. In its analyses, it uses a mixed 
method combining independent external consultancies with beneficiary 
interviews. The other selected countries also conduct, on a relatively ad 
hoc basis, evaluations with varying levels of rigor. 
The Eleventh Principle: Structured Public-Private 
Alliances Representing a Diversity of Interests, with 
Well-established Rules, Transparency, and Evaluation, 
and Supported by a Professional Public Bureaucracy, 
Can Minimize the Risk of Private Sector Capture 
of the Government
It has been argued that medium- and long-term strategies cum industrial 
strategies can be more effective when developed in the context of an alli-
ance between the public and private sectors. It is, however, essential that 
the government’s collaboration with the private sector represent a public 
good. Special interest capture of the government is always a serious risk 
of industrial policy (but also of most any public policy) and the utmost 
attention, particularly to the design of modalities, is required to guard 
against the problem.
Constructing formal frameworks for primary interaction between the 
public and private sectors in the development of strategies and programs 
is one safeguard against private sector capture. An alliance dominated by 
informal channels of communication, without parallel control mecha-
nisms, can easily lead to capture of the government by lobby groups. 
In addition, representation in the formally structured alliance by valid 
stakeholders with different roles in the economy can contribute to self-
regulation. This diversity is harder to achieve the more narrow the scope 
of an alliance’s policy purview. 
Promoting public transparency is another way to prevent capture, but 
there are practical limitations. For example, publishing the cost of an agreed 
incentive to attract an FDI project can be effective, but it would not be 
advisable to reveal in real time the precise content of a negotiation on 
the subject, or to reveal it ex post, if there will subsequently be a need to 
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negotiate with other businesses. The publication of precise information on, 
for example, the contributions to the investment project by the foreign com-
pany and the government may also encounter practical constraints associ-
ated with proprietary information not traditionally considered to be in the 
public domain. A failure to respect confidentiality in related areas could 
discourage other firms. This is why TEKES, the Finnish agency for busi-
ness innovation, often performs its own in-house evaluations. In addition, 
to make public a very positive impact assessment on a horizontal subsidy 
program to which access is generally available might not be appropriate if it 
resulted in demand exceeding the available resources, leading to rationing.5 
The advisable degree of transparency in decisions by high-level committees 
depends on incentives and the institutional framework (Levy 2007). None-
theless, despite exceptional reservations that may arise depending on the 
circumstances, transparency is usually a very important tool for avoiding 
the capture of government by special interests.
Clearly setting out the objectives of an incentive program, together 
with appropriate ex post evaluation based on evidence, can minimize the 
capture of a government by industry. This procedure guards against the 
continuation of programs that favor companies but that are not yielding 
satisfactory results. As mentioned, the presence of a sunset clause in the 
incentive program can avoid such problems 
A highly professional and reasonably well-paid public bureaucracy, 
coupled with explicit rules of conduct for public servants and participants 
in the public-private alliance are also important to avoid a conflict of inter-
est. Auditing of programs should be standard.
Notwithstanding the gradual emergence of serious weaknesses in the 
governance of the national alliance led by the National Economic and 
Social Council, addressed in chapter 3, some of the procedures at the 
level of executing agencies are illustrative of certain measures that can 
be adopted to ward off potential risk of capture. The private partners 
(with operational responsibilities) sitting on the board of directors of the 
executing agencies that manage the incentives for private businesses are 
appointed in an individual capacity by a government minister. They must 
be highly respected as experts in their fields and not act as representatives 
of their companies or associations. Appointments rotate over time. The 
private directors, like all the government officials, sign a code of conduct 
and the members submit annual declarations of their financial and com-
mercial interests.6 The private directors receive no documents and take 
part in no discussions that are directly linked to their own commercial 
or financial interests. The cost of fees, travel expenses, and per diem pay-
ments for the directors appear in the budget published by the agency.7 As 
would normally be expected, auditing is carried out. The decisions of the 
board are almost always reached by consensus. Each year, the minister 
responsible for the agency is required to confirm that all procedures have 
taken place correctly. Public agencies in Ireland exhibit a high degree of 
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transparency, while employees are channeled through a professional civil 
service that is reasonably well paid and subject to codes of conduct.
 Although its system is less transparent, Singapore discourages capture 
by offering good wage levels for a professionally oriented civil service, a 
strong culture of accountability for decision making among public offi-
cials, and the existence of an independent anticorruption agency with 
extensive powers.
Annex 5A Efficiency of Tax Credits for 
Research and Development
Tax credits (or concessions) for R&D have been successfully used in coun-
tries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but they 
have not had the same success in less advanced countries. Studies have 
been carried out to compare the efficiency of tax credits in less advanced 
countries with that of direct subsidies in specific programs designed to 
boost corporate supply and demand for R&D (Maloney and Perry 2005). 
Tax credits are said to be more useful than direct subsidies in avoiding 
conduct that might lead to government failures in the selection of projects. 
However, direct subsidies might be an advantage in some countries where 
relatively scarce resources make it necessary to prioritize certain activities 
or sectors. It is also argued, however, that tax credits occasionally support 
investments in R&D that would have been made in any event. Although 
direct subsidies theoretically support marginal projects that might not 
have been undertaken in their absence, the difficulty of identifying those 
types of marginal projects may in practice make this particular distinction 
about the advantages of direct subsidies less relevant. From another angle, 
tax credits do not take account of the difference between the social rate 
of return and the private rate of return, which may not be the same in all 
projects. So here subsidies might be advantageous because theoretically 
they could be granted only for projects with a high social rate of return, 
although in practice identifying such projects also can be difficult. Subsi-
dies do have a clear advantage for sectors and activities that show promise 
but that have yet to generate profits, such as start-ups or some SME sec-
tors or clusters. 
Perhaps the main problems with tax credits are the limited capacity of 
tax systems to absorb and administer them and their possible lack of trans-
parency, except where there is a detailed record of the amounts involved. 
Transparency is especially relevant for most developing countries, which 
means that using subsidies instead of tax credits may facilitate better gov-
ernance of the system (Maloney and Perry 2005). 
The truth is that one option is not necessarily better than the other. 
In short, instead of assessing the impact of an incentive in the abstract, 
it is preferable to analyze the system and governance of the program 
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arrangement within which the incentive operates. For example in 1989, 
Australia extended a tax credit to syndicated loans for projects carried 
out by corporate groups. The aim was to encourage companies to assume 
much larger costs and risks than would be possible to take on individually 
(Australian Taxation Office 2004). Concerns about abuses in the syndica-
tion led to elimination of the scheme in 1996, even though much of the 
increase in firms’ R&D expenditure was attributed to the syndicated proj-
ects. The administrative agency lacked transparency and accountability. In 
addition, the authorities’ lack of knowledge and experience with institu-
tions in corporate financial structures made it difficult to make decisions, 
limiting more and more the award of incentives. 
One of the problems of incentives, irrespective of the instrument used, 
may be that the approach adopted is too narrow. This was the case in 
Australia, where a tax credit for innovation took into account only direct 
R&D costs, while neglecting the costs of commercializing innovation, 
which tend to be extremely high, especially for small and medium-size 
enterprises. Firms that benefited from the incentive ignored the commer-
cialization stage, so part of the R&D did not necessarily generate value. 
It was therefore essential to supplement the tax credit with direct subsidy 
programs for commercialization. 
Annex 5B Finland: Evaluation of the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Program 
The Finnish Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) funds 
technology programs in strategic areas identified by the agency and the 
business community. One of the sectors that has benefited is the elec-
tronics and telecommunications sector, with three programs funded 
between 1997 and 2001: Electronics for the Information Society (ETX), 
Telecommunications—Creating a Global Village, and the Telectronics 
Research Programme, the latter funded by the Academy of Finland. These 
programs cost a total of €300 million.
All three were subject to a mid-term evaluation. In many respects, the 
evaluators approved the progress of the projects. However, they ques-
tioned whether the programs were solving problems of particular techni-
cal and commercial importance for Finland. When the programs were 
concluded, a new evaluation was conducted by a consultant from outside 
the institution, two government agencies, and peer-expert panels. 
This evaluation focused on four issues. The first related to the selection 
of the strategy and the research portfolio of the three programs and their 
relationship to the development needs of the economy of Finland. The sec-
ond referred to the effects of the programs and projects on the ICT sector 
in the country (including the impact on the entire network as well as on 
individual participants). Third, the evaluation turned to the value added 
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of the programs and the improvements in their administration. Last, the 
evaluation analyzed the way in which the two most industry-oriented 
programs had been able to interact with the program financed by the 
academy, which had been of a more scientific nature.
Seven techniques were used to provide answers to these questions:
• Analysis of networks created by the project: the TEKES database 
was used in mapping relations among firms and between firms and 
public institutions.
• Interviews with those responsible for various subject areas within 
projects.
• Review by panels of experts that looked at the administration of 
the programs and the functioning of a small group of key projects. 
• Strategic interviewing of firms to test program strategies and 
examine any discrepancies in the expectations of senior executives of 
firms and corporations vis-à-vis the program’s objectives. 
• Interviews with project leaders about the functioning of the project 
and the relationship with companies and public bodies.
• Analysis of self-assessment questionnaires.
• Analysis of foreign programs, identifying and reviewing the strate-
gies of four programs in other countries, to use as benchmark com-
parisons for the Finnish programs under way.
The application of the methods are outlined in table 5B.1.
























portfolio    
Impacts on 
ICT sector     
Impacts on 
subject areas     
Interaction 
among 
programs   
This set of methods provided a fairly complete view of the program’s 
impact in the electronics and telecommunications sector in Finland. 
Not only did responses suggest a significantly positive impact in industry, 
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but a series of recommendations were delivered in relation to the actual 
administration of programs, interactions among projects, the need to inter-
nationalize innovation, and the need to increase cooperation between the 
agency promoting innovation in businesses, TEKES, and the Academy of 
Finland.
Annex 5B Source: Data from the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology 
and Information.
Notes
 1. The state is also bound to comply with its agreed obligations to the multi-
national corporation.
 2. Seth Mydans and Wayne Arnold, “Creator of Modern Singapore Is Ever 
Alert to Perils,” New York Times, September 2, 2007, p. 8.
 3. Until recently, multilateral development agencies did not carry out system-
atic and rigorous evaluations of the impact of their programs.
 4. An added example is that Australia’s rural R&D corporations look for a 
7:1 benefit-cost return (in impact terms) for their grant program.
 5. Effectiveness depends on the actual rationing system adopted (Gavazza and 
Lizzeri 2007).
 6. See Forfás, “Code of Conduct,” www.forfas.ie/about/howwedobusiness/
Forfas_Code_of_Business_Conduct_Committee_0501_webopt.pdf.
 7. Not all the selected countries pay honorariums to private directors.
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Are the Operational Principles 




Medium- and Long-Term 
Strategies Based on Public-Private 
Alliances
Now that we have examined principles, drawn from our success cases, on 
how governments should organize themselves effectively for deployment 
of industrial policies, in the second part of the book we explore, against 
this backdrop, how well Latin American governments are complying with 
the principles in their own efforts to support productive transformation. 
This chapter focuses on medium- and long term development strategies 
in the region and the role played by public-private alliances. But first we 
quickly review how Latin America got where it is today.
From a Strategic and Structural Economics Tradition 
to the Washington Consensus
Between the 1950s and the start of the 1980s, Latin America underwent 
what Ocampo (2006) terms “the age of state-led industrialization.” Indus-
trialization was a gradual process in the region, beginning in the second 
half of the 19th century through the independent strengths of economies 
exporting natural resources in response to external demand.1 As noted 
in an earlier chapter, disruptive phenomena in the 20th century, such as 
the collapse of international markets during the Great Depression and 
shortages during the Second World War, had a profound impact on the 
industrialization process and thrust the state into a central role in the 
economy. This period of industrialization in Latin America was more a 
forced reaction to external events than a strategy as such. The 1930s and 
1940s were also a period of relative success on the growth front, which 
gave a certain legitimacy to state action. By the 1950s one can see a clear 
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shift from a reactive state to one that was proactive in its intervention, not 
only in the macroeconomy but also in microeconomic matters. Emphasis 
was placed on diversification of the productive structure by promoting 
import substitution and technological development, building basic infra-
structure, fostering social development, and consolidating the state itself. 
In macroeconomic matters, governments pursued active fiscal and 
monetary policies geared to revitalizing consumption and investment, 
while exchange rate policy gave priority to multiple rates to encourage the 
import of machinery and equipment for manufacturing, while providing 
some compensation for the export sector. Currencies were often allowed 
to appreciate to contain inflation. All of these policies were accompanied 
by a broadly protectionist trade policy pursued through tariffs, quotas, 
and nontariff barriers.2 
In microeconomic matters, the strategy concentrated on fostering 
industry. The state adopted a proactive promotional stance in government 
procurement, subsidized credits granted by development banks, provided 
tax subsidies, and expanded the role of public enterprises. Over time these 
activities, which once sought to promote nascent industry, were beset by 
internal contradictions and external vulnerabilities arising from manage-
ment deficiencies, political turbulence, and external sector disruptions 
(Thorp 1998; Ocampo 2006). Economic performance after 1950 was 
comparatively mediocre, as evident in the growth of output and produc-
tivity discussed in chapter 1.
The Role of Planning in the Context of State Leadership
Industrial policy after the war was broadly in the character of Evan’s 
(1995) “demiurge,” outlined in chapter 2. Formal planning played an 
important role in the implementation of the industrialization strategy. 
In the 1950s and 1960s interest in planning was largely driven by exter-
nal factors, such as the region’s knowledge of practices from Europe’s 
postwar reconstruction, the construction of the Soviet bloc, advances in 
mathematical modeling during that period, and the predominant schools 
of thought on economic development.3 In 1961 planning became wide-
spread, encouraged by the resolutions of the Charter of Punta del Este and 
its main mechanism, the Alliance for Progress, which was promoted by the 
United States and supported by the multilateral development institutions. 
The planning was in a context of mixed capitalist economies—excepting 
revolutionary Cuba, which was excluded from the alliance and used Soviet 
style central planning. 
Mostly indicative in nature, planning was regarded as a basic instrument 
for implementing national programs of economic and social development. 
The setting broadly favored such exercises. Because the state had a strong 
influence on economic activity through public enterprises, state monopo-
lies, and widespread market regulation, the setting, in principle, allowed 
medium- and long-term strategies 159
planning to fulfill the task of coordination. With support and encourage-
ment from the international community, the institutions entrusted with 
carrying out that task were emerging, growing, and consolidating; these 
institutions included government ministries, offices, and secretariats as 
well as a number of national, regional, and sectoral planning schemes 
supporting investment programs, preinvestment processes, international 
cooperation, and the like (Lira 2006). In almost every country, planning 
was a formal process of constitutional rank and had three basic features: 
a focus on industrialization and development; a demiurge tradition of 
skepticism about the private sector’s capacity and entrepreneurial ambi-
tion to lead investment and development; and a high degree of direct state 
intervention in the economy to leverage the plan (Rufián 1993).
During the 1970s most countries of the region were engaged in indus-
trial planning (table 6.1). In line with the prevailing thinking, national 
development plans were geared toward increasing the absorption of new 
technologies and lessening perceived threats to the balance of payments 
arising from abrupt shifts in world demand, commodity prices, and capi-
tal flows. Although nascent industry was protected in this period, export 
promotion now was a widespread goal—usually more for balance of pay-
ments reasons than for any direct role exports could have in productive 
transformation or in strengthening a country’s international integration. 
Table 6.1 Selected National Development Plans in Latin America
Country Development plan
Argentina National Development Plan 1970–74
National Development and Security Plan 1971–75
Triennial Plan for National Reconstruction and 
Liberation 1974–77
Bolivia National Economic and Social Development Plan 
1976–80
Brazil Targets for and bases of government activity 1970–72
First National Development Plan 1972–74
Second National Development Plan 1975–1979
Colombia The Four Strategies 1970–74
To Close the Gap 1975–78
National Integration Plan 1979–82
Costa Rica National Development Plan 1974–78
National Development Plan 1979–82
Cuba First Five-Year Plan 1976–80
Chile National Economic Plan 1971–76
National Indicative Plan 1979–81
Indicative National Plan 1979–84
(continued)
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Table 6.1 Selected National Development Plans in Latin America 
(continued)
Country Development plan
Ecuador Comprehensive Plan for Transformation and 
Development 1973–77
El Salvador National Economic and Social Development Plan 
1973–77 Well-Being for All 1978–82
Guatemala National Development Plan 1971–75
National Development Plan 1975–79
National Development Plan 1979–82
Honduras National Development Plan 1979–82
Jamaica Five-Year Development Plan 1978–82
Mexico National Economic and Social Development Plan 1966–70
Nicaragua National Plan for Reconstruction and Development 
1975–79
Panama National Development Plan 1976–80
Paraguay National Economic and Social Development Plan 1971–75
National Economic and Social Development Plan 1977–81
Peru National Development Plan 1971–75
National Development Plan 1975–78
National Development Plan 1979–80
Dominican 
Republic
First National Development Plan: Macroeconomic and 
Public Sector Projections 1970–74
Uruguay National Development Plan 1973–77
Venezuela, R.B. de Five-Year Plans 1960–88
Source: CEPAL–ILPES 1982.
The Positive Impacts of Planning on Public Policy Development. Although 
the phenomenon has been submerged in the region’s memory, planning had 
significant positive impacts on Latin America’s institutional development. 
First, to a greater or lesser extent it fostered institutional attempts to develop a 
common vision of the future mediated by various social actors and a national 
strategy, thereby (in principle) facilitating the coordination and organization 
of medium- and long-term actions. Developing that link required creation of 
an organization to lead the process as well as the establishment of a govern-
ment system of sectoral and subsectoral development promotion, headed 
by officials trained in several disciplines. In some countries these multidisci-
plinary and multisectoral teams were the pillars of transformation during the 
import substitution period. The very process of planning called for skills and 
knowledge of techniques and methodologies in the area of public administra-
tion, capacities that spread and endured beyond the planning institutions. 
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Brazil is probably the paradigmatic case of planning in the region. 
The state, under President Getulio Vargas (1930–45; 1951–54), assumed 
leadership of the country’s economic development with the onset of the 
Depression in 1929, and gradually centralized the management of finan-
cial resources and the coordination of investment projects, taking on 
direct productive roles through the creation of large public companies. 
It was during this period that Brazil consolidated its strong culture of the 
development state, probably still the strongest in Latin America and the 
most successful in promoting industrialization (Castro 1994). 
Apart from ad hoc initiatives, the development programs that most empha-
sized industrialization were the Targets Plan of the Kubitschek administra-
tion (1956–60) and the Second National Development 1975–79 (PND II), 
implemented by the Economic Development Council during the military dic-
tatorship (Suzigan and Furtado 2006). The development state was motivated 
largely by a shared view of how to attain a significant level of self-sufficiency 
and economic independence, as well as by a desire for a greater role for 
local capital (Martinez-Díaz and Brainard 2009; Evans 1995). Throughout 
the postwar period, Brazil’s various development plans made an uneven but 
cumulative contribution to the development of economic and institutional 
structures, some of which enjoy a very favorable legacy in Brazil to this day.4
Given its importance in Brazil’s industrial development, PND II mer-
its more comment. Conceived as a flexible and dynamic instrument to 
streamline decisions, it was designed in a period of growing uncertainty in 
Brazil about the direction of the world economy and sought to adapt to 
the high world energy prices of that time and to the new opportunities for 
industrial development (CEPAL-ILPES 1978). 
It concentrated on the chemicals and metals industries, as well as on 
capital goods. In addition to industrial policies, the plan emphasized 
energy independence and rural development, with a focus on the export 
of foodstuffs, raw materials, and processed agricultural goods. To attenu-
ate the problems associated with inequality, social initiatives promised an 
increase in “social wages” and an improvement in human capital.
Thus PND II was seen from the outset as a development policy docu-
ment, one that avoided setting rigid targets at the general, sectoral, or 
regional levels. It also included perspectives based on socioeconomic indi-
cators that were reviewed and integrated into continuous planning. The 
program also moved forward with detailed sectoral and regional plans, 
such as the Second Basic Plan of Scientific and Regional Development, and 
the National Postgraduate Plan. At the federal level it included financial 
targets in the form of multiyear budgets and spending programs, including 
investments by state enterprises, and entailed evaluation systems related to 
the budget, the programs, and the priority projects. 
PND II was thus one of the hallmarks of planning in Latin America in 
this period. It had several features that helped ensure its relative success: 
first, it was an ambitious industrialization plan to which the government 
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was strongly committed, as evident in the resources made available through-
out its life. Second, it displayed more faith in the national private sector, 
with the government seeking the sector’s support for investment in strategic 
areas. Finally, it was ahead of its time in its flexibility on targets and in 
attempts at evaluation systems. 
The Limits of Planning and State Leadership. Most of the plans devised 
in Latin America during this period faced serious problems for a number 
of reasons: political or macroeconomic instability (or both); management 
difficulties, including bureaucratic fragmentation and the loss of political 
power on the part of the institution in charge of planning; mistrust among 
the public and private sectors, with an attendant low level of private in-
volvement and consensus; capture by special interests; and unallocated re-
sources for implementation (CEPAL-ILPES 1978, 1982; García D’Acuña 
1982). Additionally, more liberal economic thinking that was diametri-
cally opposed to planning began to expand its influence in the region.
The strategies and plans were largely implemented from the top down. 
But in unstable or nonexistent democratic cultures, society had little input 
into the planning and its implementation and little understanding of the 
plans, which were often captured by special interests. The professional-
ization of the state bureaucracy, including the planning apparatus, faced 
serious limitations. As centers of excellence were created, which happened 
especially in Brazil, they were too often distanced from the operations 
of the general public bureaucracy (Evans 1995). This approach not only 
hampered coordination but also impeded the planning-related authori-
ties from influencing the centers of government, leading to their gradual 
isolation (Lira 2006). Additionally, and not unrelated to the previous 
point, political considerations often took primacy over the plan’s technical 
demands. There was also a lack of transparency. Planning was conceived 
as a means of advancing a particular government’s political and economic 
program, so plans were often set aside by that government’s successor. 
Because the plans did not guide the later activities of successor govern-
ments, a permanent gap opened between what was planned and what 
was implemented. Usually major new goals were defined and new targets 
proposed each time the government changed. 
At the same time, most plans lacked even indicative multiyear budgets 
underpinned by a firm commitment to implement them. One reason for 
this was the absence of a shared, long-term vision within which to devise 
the targets and allocate the resources. 
Finally, with the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, the emergence 
of Thatcherite/Reaganite thinking on the benevolence of the free market, 
and a decade of structural adjustment accompanied by the withdrawal of 
the state under the watchful attention of the Washington-based multilateral 
institutions, the state-led import-substitution model withered away. Willing-
ness and capacity to plan in Latin America were thus weakened further, as 
was the disposition to cultivate longer-term thinking and outlooks. In the 
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face of the debt crisis, fiscal and balance of payments adjustments became 
the predominant objectives, while the core focus of economic policy was 
on managing the immediate situation. The finance minister or the president 
of the central bank took the lead coordinating role without any counter-
balance from ministries overseeing the real economy—ministries that had 
become marginalized by the short time horizons of the market fundamen-
talism of the period. In other words, budget allocations were determined 
mostly by the goals of fiscal policy and external adjustment rather than by 
any strategic medium- or long-term objective for accelerating productive 
transformation. In this new mental setting, an enabling environment for 
market forces was all that was necessary.
Strategies after the Washington Consensus
As we observed in chapter 1, the reforms of the Washington Consensus 
helped bring about economic stabilization and a degree of modernization 
in Latin America. It is also true, however, that those reforms weakened the 
state’s role in productive policies. The state remained active in macroeco-
nomic management, but at the microeconomic level the notion prevailed 
that the liberalization of market forces would spontaneously bring about 
optimal resource allocation to promote growth and transformation. This 
policy orientation diminished the value of a vision of the future, long-
term strategies, and proactive plans geared toward upgrading industry and 
services. The pendulum had swung and now the government authorities 
of Latin America mistrusted any systematic leadership by the state in the 
productive arena. Referring again to Evan’s (1995) characterizations of the 
roles of government in development, Latin American governments abruptly 
abandoned their demiurge role in the economy to take up a custodial role.
Nonetheless, as time passed and concerns mounted over the region’s 
lagging performance in competitiveness, innovation, export development, 
and growth, governments again began to devise more active policies and 
programs to remove certain obstacles to productive transformation. In 
some cases these policies were confined to specific areas, such as innova-
tion, export promotion, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), 
while other countries took a more comprehensive approach that gave 
rise to new strategies and plans for major transformation and develop-
ment (Muñoz 2000, 2001, Peres 1997, Peres and Primi 2009, and Melo 
2001). Such plans were particularly apparent in the late 1990s and even 
more strongly evident in 2000–05. Table 6.2 shows nine Latin American 
countries where the operational principles discussed in the previous chap-
ters have been applied to varying degrees.5 Eight of the nine countries 
have explicit development strategies, almost all of which have been given 
shape through a development plan. The exception is Argentina, which has 
policies in various economic areas but no overall plan or coherent vision 
coordinating initiatives. The table also shows some factors related to the 
principles that are discussed along with others throughout this chapter.
Table 6.2 Characteristics of Contemporary Development Strategies and Plans in Latin America 
Country Documented national 
development strategy




Argentina No national plan None None None
Barbados National Strategic Plan 2005–25 Prime minister Creation of special organizations Yes
Brazil Complementary strategies: PAC, 




Special agencies, some of them 
created for the purpose
Yes
Chile 1982–95
Tacit strategy of 
export development in natural 
resources












Colombia 2004 Domestic Agenda
National Development Plan 
2007–10








Traditional government structure 
and creation of special 
organizations
Traditional government structure 
and creation of special 
organizations





Costa Rica Since the 1980s: export 
diversification and investment 
attraction strategy,












Mexico National Development Plan 
2007–12
Vision 2030: The Mexico We 
Want
Presidency Traditional government structure No
Panama Agreements of the National 
Concertation for Development 
2008–25
Vice presidency Traditional government structure Yes
Peru National Competitiveness Plan 
2005–11
Prime minister Creation of special organizations No reliable 
information 
available
Source: Authors, based on official documents.
aGrowth Acceleration Plan (PAC), Science, Technology and Innovation Action Plan (PACTI), Productive Development Policy (PDP),  Educational 
Development Plan (PDE).
bCINDE refers to the Costa Rican Coalition of Development Initiatives, a private agency set up to attract FDI. It collaborates closely with the 
government.
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As noted, the mere existence of a document spelling out the develop-
ment strategy does not ensure the implementation or effectiveness of that 
strategy. Nonetheless, making a strategy explicit by drawing up a docu-
ment allows it to be disseminated, which in theory can aid the focus and 
coordination of state actions. And at least civil society is made aware of 
the key directions the government wants to take the economy in the future. 
Brazil. Brazil has had a very ambitious set of initiatives, programs, plans, 
and activities that cover various strategic pillars for sustained growth and 
that together amount to a de facto national plan.6 The main pillars are the 
Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC), geared to boosting public and private 
investment in infrastructure; the Science, Technology and Innovation Ac-
tion Plan (PACTI); the National Education Development Plan; and the 
Productive Development Policy (PDP), which seeks to consolidate long-
term productive transformation and growth.7 Given the PDP’s importance 
in Brazil’s efforts at productive transformation, its features merit analysis. 
The backdrop to the PDP was the 2003–04 Technological Industrial 
and Foreign Trade Policy, which focused on only a few productive sectors 
but signaled that industrial policy was “back” in Brazil. The PDP took a 
step forward by broadening the goals, and it is now the most ambitious 
public industrial promotional policy program in Latin America if judged 
by scope and the financing available and the institutional responsibilities 
assigned to implement it. The scheme also has novel dimensions, such as 
implementation on three levels: actions designed for their systemic effects, 
actions designed for achieving strategic objectives, and policies aimed at 
structural change over the long term (figure 6.1).
Note also that Brazil’s de facto national plan is an example of a well-
thought-out initiative, one that was devised strategically and has adequate 
financing. Brazil could come to lead the revival of a Latin America that 
takes seriously a strategic approach to productive transformation. The 
main challenge will be the plan’s implementation by a public appara-
tus that is somewhat out of practice in bringing to fruition ambitious 
large-scale industrial policy initiatives. Early evaluations suggest that the 
program has lagged behind a number of its established targets, partially 
attributed to the world economic crisis of 2008–09 (Zebral 2011).
Colombia. Planning in Colombia has been a task of government since 
1961, an exercise that is repeated every four years as the political cycle 
moves forward. The plans have been drawn up in a serious manner, but 
they have tended to be used to justify spending related to the political 
platform of the incumbent government, rather than to express strategic 
priorities for medium- and long-term productive transformation. 
Since the 1990s Colombian governments have centered their produc-
tive development policies and plans on boosting competitiveness.8 But the 
process has been somewhat discontinuous because initiatives have expired 
with each presidential election. In 1994, under the Samper administration, 
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Figure 6.1 PDP: Objectives, Challenges, Targets, and Policies
Source: Authors, based on Federal Government of Brazil 2008.167
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an effort was made to improve firms’ productivity and enhance the busi-
ness environment by means of sectoral competitiveness agreements. That 
initiative was redefined in the 1998–2002 National Development Plan, 
devised by the successor government under the leadership of the Foreign 
Trade Ministry, which in turn created a program known as the Colombia 
Competes Network (RCC). This was a crosscutting program that sought 
to identify, prioritize, and surmount obstacles to competitiveness. 
In 2004 President Alvaro Uribe began another process led by the 
National Planning Department (DNP), which gave rise in 2006 to the 
preparation of the Domestic Agenda (“Agenda Interna”) and the estab-
lishment of a National Competitiveness Commission.9 The process of 
drawing up the Domestic Agenda led to a pattern of work and coordina-
tion at the national and regional levels that has continued throughout 
the decade and has been complemented by a foresight exercise “Visión 
Colombia 2019 Segundo Centenario.”10 The DNP, which led the exercise, 
regards it as a process of consensus building on a medium- and long-term 
vision of Colombia, with the potential for laying the groundwork for a 
real national medium- and long-term development strategy. 
In 2008 Colombia’s National Council for Economic and Social Policy 
published Document 3527, which presented the strategy for competitive-
ness and productivity approved by the National Competitiveness Com-
mission. That in turn gave rise to 15 plans of action that define strategic 
pillars, some of which have specific objectives. The competitiveness plan 
incorporates horizontal objectives (dealing with infrastructure and educa-
tion, for example) along with programs with a more specific sectoral focus 
(in both traditional areas such as coffee and textiles and newer sectors 
such as cosmetics and medical tourism). However, no resources had been 
allocated for the new sectors as of the end of 2009.
Peru. Peru’s National Competitiveness Plan, prepared by the National 
Competitiveness Council in 2005, was spurred largely by the challenge 
of concluding a free trade agreement with the United States. The plan 
has enabled some degree of coordination among policies on productive 
development and competitiveness, but its first version had an unman-
ageable number of focal points of activity: 44 strategies, 138 policies, 
431 actions, and 1,400 subactions. In 2006 the scope of the activities 
was reduced first to these areas (competitive production chains in cotton, 
textiles, clothing, cacao and chocolate, and wood and furniture); Peru 
Innovates, and Peru Start-Ups (Perú Innova, Perú Emprende); simplifi-
cation of municipality-business red tape; regional competitiveness; and 
monitoring competitiveness).
The virtue of these initiatives in Peru, like those in Brazil and Colombia, 
is that they adopt concrete action plans. Nonetheless, Peru’s first version 
of the National Competitiveness Plan also reflects the tendency, frequent 
in Latin America, to prepare analyses with very long “to-do” lists but 
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without adequate priority setting. Another lesson from Peru’s experience 
is that it is difficult to meet goals when ministries and agencies are not 
obligated to take action, either because of lack of a legal framework or 
because of dissension within the government about what should be done 
and who should do it. Moreover, sustained activity might be adversely 
affected by a lack of financing when, as in Peru, the plan depends to a 
large extent on mobilizing off-budget resources in the form of technical 
cooperation from multilateral institutions. Instability in ministerial lead-
ership also weakened the process. Finally, in some Peruvian circles there 
was suspicion that President Alan Garcia was only lukewarm to Peru’s 
National Competitiveness Plan—drawn up by the previous government. 
Costa Rica. Costa Rica’s national development plans are prepared every 
four years following changes in government. However, as President Oscar 
Arias stated in 2007, “The plans suffered from an exuberance of inten-
tions, from an excess of activities and the consequent lack of priorities. 
The National Development Plan became such an extensive document that 
it was not even sent to be printed, and so complex that not a single citizen 
was able to understand it.”11 Hence the Planning Ministry had a vision 
of the future, but that vision did not take shape in actions or financing. 
According to Arias, the plan was dominated by government policies based 
on “improvisation.” Moreover, because of the inability to build consensus, 
the plans became simply another program of the incumbent government, 
and in practice the country moved forward without systematic national 
medium- or long-term action plans. In any event, Arias committed his 
government to a coherent planning exercise.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid weaknesses, in parallel to the national 
plans, the country was able to develop a relatively tacit medium- and long-
term strategy focused on diversifying and boosting exports by means of 
incentives and attraction of FDI.12 Since the mid-1980s, along with trade 
liberalization (which has not been as drastic and swift as in other Latin 
American countries), the government pursued policies biased toward pro-
motion of upgraded nontraditional exports; the export processing regime 
is prominent in this regard. From the outset the private sector played a cru-
cial role, and CINDE (a private organization set up with financing from 
the U.S. Agency for International Development and devoted to attract-
ing foreign investment) was a policy catalyst. What is interesting about 
this experience is that Costa Rica’s presidents pursued (informal/tacit) 
public-private collaboration over the long term as the basis of the export 
development strategy, with a view to helping it succeed. Intel Corpora-
tion’s decision in 1996 to invest in chip production in the country involved 
many personal interventions of Costa Rica’s president at the time. This 
public-private collaboration has continued beyond changes in govern-
ment. As internal conditions changed, however, so too did the programs 
and policies, as well as the associated institutional arrangements. Finally, 
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the strategy also has involved negotiating free trade agreements such as the 
ones with the United States and the European Union.
Currently, the Costa Rican government’s strategic vision is expressed in 
the National Development Plan 2006–10, which sought to avoid the urbi 
et orbi nature of previous plans. It also incorporates some of the recom-
mendations made by the Twenty-First Century Strategy (Estrategia Siglo 
XXI), a long-term vision to make knowledge and innovation the basic 
engines of Costa Rican economic development.13 This strategy was not 
a government project, but rather a nationwide, multisectoral initiative to 
devise an action plan to drive Costa Rica’s overall development based on 
education, science and technology, and innovation, all having to be con-
sistent with Costa Rican culture. 
Chile. Chile has had a national strategy for the past 35 years, albeit one 
that is not formally documented; it is geared mainly to export develop-
ment based on natural resources and gaining access to external markets. 
This strategy began with the policies imposed by the Pinochet military 
regime, which evolved into an informal/tacit strategy based on economic 
and political consensus among the public sector, the private sector, and 
the leading political parties in the democratic period. It should also 
be noted that the prevailing thinking over recent decades has favored 
private sector leadership in this process and minimization of the state’s 
scope of action. 
However, Chile’s export model, successful for many years, began to 
lose momentum in the late 1990s.14 The country needed to move to a 
“new phase” of productive and export development, one focused on 
activities entailing greater knowledge and value added. The result was 
the “rediscovery” of the proactive role of the state, the clearest expres-
sion of which is the innovation strategy drawn up by the National 
Council on Innovation for Competitiveness. As well as pushing for 
improved coordination in a somewhat fragmented innovation system,15 
the council proposed concentrating resources on the development of a 
specific number of export clusters and creating production chains for 
natural resource–based goods—activities that involve greater knowl-
edge and value added. The council had help in preparing its proposal 
from a foreign consulting firm and was assigned resources from min-
ing royalties. The strategy shifted the direction of development from 
horizontal policies geared especially to supporting small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)—policies that were justified as a means of resolv-
ing market failures, increasing firms’ productivity, and updating their 
technology—toward an emphasis on vertical policies that focus selec-
tively on certain sectors and clusters. Within the coalition government 
(la Concertacion) that created the program consensus on the wisdom 
of this approach was relatively weak, reflecting “path dependency” 
on the previous approach that stressed minimum and horizontal direct 
medium- and long-term strategies 171
state interventions in support of productive transformation.16 In 2010 a 
new government with unambiguous conservative economic credentials 
was elected; this marked a rollback of the new industrial policies and a 
weakening of the influence of the national innovation council. 
Panama. The decision in 2006 to expand the Panama Canal and the 
accumulation of external debt to finance it generated political space for 
a national debate on the need to forge a vision of the future that would 
capitalize on the benefits of that initiative. This debate underpinned the 
creation of the Concertation National. Launched by President Martín 
Torrijos, the concertation had two main phases: a very extensive con-
sultation process facilitated by the United Nations, followed in October 
2007 by the conclusion of agreements on a series of key themes for 
national development up to 2025. Geared in particular to overcoming 
poverty, these general themes are related to welfare and equity, economic 
growth and competitiveness, institutional modernization, and education. 
The initiative defined objectives, targets, and development strategies, 
some more specific than others. 
This historic effort to forge a national vision for the country’s develop-
ment had the virtue of being a true plan, in the sense that specific targets 
were set for many (though not all) the areas, medium- and long-term 
financing commitments were made based on projected revenue from the 
canal, a commission was set up to monitor and assess implementation, and 
it made a pledge to create a system of formal indicators to determine if the 
targets are being met. Nonetheless, this initiative is very broad in scope 
and its greatest challenge may be the government’s capacity to coordinate 
and implement it as well as to maintain high-level political commitment 
over subsequent political cycles with new leaders. 
Barbados. One of the most successful countries in the region, Barbados 
has an unbroken tradition of planning dating back to the 1940s (ECLAC 
2001). Following independence from Britain, its strategy centered on 
export diversification,17 the development of social services, and the pro-
motion of tourism. To this end it promoted foreign investment, and in 
1965 it passed the International Business Company Act, providing tax 
incentives for investment (ECLAC 2005; Artana, Auguste, and Downes 
2008; Springer 2010). In this period consensus was widespread on the 
importance of economic opening and attracting FDI. 
The governments of the 1970s focused development on light industry in 
an effort to increase employment. The withdrawal of Intel Corporation in 
the mid-1980s caused a shift in the strategy toward developing the finan-
cial sector. The strategy did not avert the serious balance of payments crisis 
that the country faced, and overcame, in the early 1990s. The government 
then shifted the strategy again to center on consolidating an international 
business platform, reformulating the International Business Company Act 
and developing complementary legislation to attract FDI. 
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The National Strategic Plan for Barbados (2005–25) has six general 
objectives: unleashing the spirit of the nation, new governance for new 
times, building social capital, strengthening physical infrastructure and 
preserving the environment, enhancing the country’s prosperity and com-
petitiveness, and branding Barbados globally. Each of these six objectives 
is broken down into subobjectives also made up of very general strategies 
and targets, although in a few cases final indicators have been proposed 
to verify that the targets have been met (annex 6A). 
Like the Mexican plan examined below, the Barbadian strategy is a 
general framework within which policies are developed. In other words, 
the strategy expresses only relatively general aspirations about the devel-
opment of a modern and competitive economy; consequently there is no 
operational action plan that can be effectively assessed. Since a strategy 
and its specific activities and actions are two indissoluble elements of the 
realization of the aspiration, it is unsurprising that in this case the concrete 
results are often limited. 
Mexico. Mexico’s National Development Plan 2007–12 is another 
good example of a strategy that lacks the precision needed to make it 
operational. The plan took a comprehensive approach based on “Visión 
2030.”18 As in other countries, it has several strategic pillars: the rule of 
law and security; a competitive, job-creating economy; equal opportuni-
ties; environmental sustainability; effective democracy; and a responsible 
foreign policy. For each of these policy guidelines, the plan presents a 
series of goals and the strategies or paths to reach them. For example, 
the pillar on “a competitive, job-creating economy” has 13 objectives.19 
These objectives are not prioritized but, rather, represent the complete 
range of issues related to the pillar. One reason for the absence of priori-
ties is confusion about the difference between a government program, 
which is confined to the political cycle, and a national development 
strategy, which addresses medium- and long-term objectives. Priorities 
must be set and sequenced with more than one political term as a refer-
ence point.20 
The plan moreover does not set out in concrete terms how the goals 
are to be met. For example, one goal states that “the cost of opening new 
firms should be lowered” but offers no actions for meeting the goal.21 One 
might well ask: how are the goals to be met? Who is responsible for decid-
ing? Which agencies are involved? What resources does the government 
currently manage, and what resources will have to be added to meet these 
objectives? Nor is a timeframe given for achieving the goals, not even in 
the context of a program for a single presidential term. 
In sum, strategies and plans like this one for Mexico are a conceptual 
framework of aspirations rather than an action plan. Hence it is not sur-
prising that the programs and policies of the specific government entities 
are poorly coordinated with the goals of the strategy. 
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Contemporary Public-Private Alliances: Achievements 
and Limitations
Although experiences within the region have not been nearly as advanced 
as those outside Latin America, some dialogue between the government 
and the main economic and social actors has played a role in defin-
ing national economic development strategies and plans, especially in 
recent years. This phenomenon is evident at the national level: forums 
for dialogue, special commissions, and even permanent, legislation-based 
presidential advisory bodies. There is also public-private collaboration 
in sectors and regions, which in some cases is more mature than that at 
the national level. Finally, in some cases the private sector has gained 
representation in the agencies responsible for implementing public poli-
cies and programs
The types of alliances are equivalent to those discussed in chapter 3. 
Formal and structured alliances dominate in Barbados, Colombia, Pan-
ama, and Peru. Public-private collaboration in these countries has been 
legislated. This formal status can help to legitimate the alliance and its 
organization and may help to insulate public-private collaboration from 
changes in government and radically different changes in approach from 
one government to the next. Structured alliances need not necessarily be 
legislated: they can find expression in councils or commissions that some-
times, over time, acquired permanent legitimacy. There are informal/tacit 
alliances in Costa Rica (where the public and private sectors collaborate 
constantly but without formal bodies) and ad hoc forms of participation 
in Mexico, where the government consults the private sector on specific 
matters for a limited period and for limited purposes. 
Several kinds of alliances coexist in some countries. Brazil, for example, 
has a hybrid public-private alliance. A formal, structured alliance exists in 
the Council on Economic and Social Development (CDES) at the highest 
level of government, while significant public-private collaborations have 
formed around specific policies and plans, such as the Productive Devel-
opment Policy. In Chile, too, under the government coalition called the 
Concertation, the predominant form of collaboration was hybrid: a for-
mal and structured alliance in the National Innovation Council for Com-
petitiveness (CNIC), the regional agencies for productive development, 
and sectoral clusters defined for the purpose of promoting innovation. 
Meanwhile, ad hoc committees were also brought together for specific 
issues, such as the committees on education, and equity.
In understanding the development of alliances in Latin America, it is 
helpful to recall that antagonism has traditionally prevailed between the 
state and the market in Latin American countries. On one hand are the 
advocates of the market who continue to call for a smaller state—a pro-
cess that in many cases has brought about a severe weakening of public 
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institutions. On the other hand are those who vigorously defend the state 
and are mistrustful of private enterprise, calling for ever more control over 
the market’s normal operation. These vastly differing perspectives often 
manifest themselves in a severe mistrust between the public and private 
sectors, both tied to the past in a way that hampers the formation and 
sustainability of alliances. 
This reality leads us to reiterate an important overarching conclusion 
for this book: forming functional alliances is not a cakewalk. It is a highly 
political process that requires sustained political leadership and commit-
ment to the idea. The alliance must be housed in an institutional arrange-
ment that is sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of the stakeholders and local 
politics. The public side of the alliance must be a credible partner, which 
requires a steady political hand and a commitment to continuous upgrad-
ing of the capacity of the public bureaucracy. A credible alliance also 
needs to focus on objectives that are actionable. And while consensus is 
a goal, it is not an event but rather a process that can take considerable 
time to mature. While alliances and consensus are not easy to build, get-
ting started now with a well-designed, governed, and financed process is 
important.
In any event, the public and private sectors in some Latin American 
countries have recently experienced a degree of rapprochement and are 
working together to build a joint national project that looks to the future. 
This trend began before the 2008–09 global financial crisis. Progressive 
strengthening of the alliances would be helpful, given the need to tackle the 
short-term impact of crisis in a manner consistent with the medium- and 
long-term structural changes demanded for high and sustained growth.22 
Table 6.3 illustrates the public-private alliances in selected Latin Ameri-
can countries, showing their general and sectoral fields of activity, their 
functions, the kinds of dialogue in which they engage, and the way in 
which the bodies that express the public-private alliances are instituted, as 
well as the representation of their members. These alliances are discussed 
in more detail in the remainder of the chapter.
Advisory Councils to the Presidency
There are two good examples in the region of formal alliances set up using 
structured and participatory bodies with the aim of strengthening govern-
ments: the Council on Social and Economic Development in Brazil and the 
National Accord in Peru. 
Brazil’s council was set up in 2003 when the government recognized 
the importance of shared responsibility between itself and the various 
social actors for economic and social development. The council, which 
acts as a consultative and advisory body to the presidency, has more than 
100 members who are formally designated by the executive for a two-year 
period. Members include representatives of the labor movement (unions 
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No public-private alliance for a 
national strategy 
Public-private alliances with specific 










Tripartite social partnership— social 
pact to stabilize industrial relations, 
raise employment, lessen inequality, 
and strengthen social dialogue and 
development





High-level committee: prime minister, business 
representative, union representative; quarterly meetings
Mid-level committee: 18 members from all sectors 
but with less hierarchy; monthly meetings 
Consultative-level committee: broad participation 
including members of parliament; annual meetings 
To promote policies that raise productivity and 




Table 6.3 Types of Public-Private Alliances in Latin America 





Economic and Social Development 
Council, advisory body to the 
president on state reform and on 
medium/long-term issues
National Industrial Development 
Council supervises industrial 
development polices 
Sectoral and state-level councils and 
forums for public-private alliance 






Formal ad hoc 
but in the 
process of being 
structured
Representatives of workers, businesses, social 
movements, and the government organized in 
thematic groups; 102 council members chosen by 
the president
14 ministers and 14 representatives of industry
Sectoral and thematic business associations and 





National Innovation Council for 
Competitiveness defines the 
innovation strategy and advises the 
presidency on innovation policies
Various alliance forums set up at 
different times on different issues
Productive Development Forum, a 







Alliance operates at both the executive and 
grassroots levels, through the leaders of the clusters 
and participation in the regional productive 
development agencies 
Tripartite partnership, with representatives from 
government, unions, and business; 24 council 
members chaired by the minister of economy
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implementation of the Internal 






Composed of representatives of various civil 
society groups 
23 members chaired by the president, with members 
from businesses, academia and unions, public 
agencies, private organizations, and regional 
competitiveness commissions
Costa Rica
Agencies From the late 1990s, long-term social 
agreement on the need to diversify 
exports by attracting FDI; core of 
the strategy was FDI attraction, 







National Consultations by the presidency Formal ad hoc Private sector participation through consultations and 





Country/level Alliance Type of alliance Structure
Panama
National National Concertation prepares and 




Council with representatives from business, unions, 
religious groups, social sectors, political parties, and 





National Accord advises the 
government on medium- and long-
term policies
National Competitiveness Council 
aims to boost competitiveness 
Permanent multisectoral commission 








Representatives of national government, political 
parties, business associations, unions, universities, 
religious groups, and professional associations
Governing Council: president of the Council of 
Ministers, eight ministers of state, the president of 
INDECOPI (an NGO that oversees competition 
issues), representatives of the business sector and of 
the labor movement 
Public-private body responsible for the 
implementation of operational export plans at 
the regional, sectoral, and national levels, with 
members from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Tourism, exporters associations, and other private 
sector groups
Source: Authors, based on official data.
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leaders); entrepreneurs who participate on a personal basis; and indi-
viduals from several economic sectors. Permanent members of the council, 
all of whom come from the government, cannot amount to more than 
25 percent of the total. The business sector accounts for 45 percent.
The council’s work has been organized into plenary sessions and thematic 
working groups whose agendas are defined by the demands of the govern-
ment or the council members themselves. In 2004 and 2005 the council ana-
lyzed the importance of forging a vision for the country and addressed itself 
to preparing what eventually would be a series of policies gathered together 
as the National Development Agenda (CDES 2007). This agenda did not 
become a government rallying cry, but it influenced some reforms.
The council encountered some problems over time that needed to be 
addressed. One problem was presidential appointment of council mem-
bers. In some cases the appointments did not represent the pertinent 
economic actors, and some complained that the president was using the 
appointments to reward friends and supporters—complaints that aroused 
mistrust in some circles about the council’s role (Zebral 2011). Second, 
because some powerful sectors were not represented, such as the leaders 
of the national confederation of industry and the sectoral associations for 
capital goods and vehicles, those sectors communicated with the president 
exclusively by lobbying outside the council, thereby weakening the legiti-
macy of the council itself. Third, the large number of members and their 
diversity of interests (their organization into thematic areas notwithstand-
ing) severely impeded the agreements and consensus needed to support 
operational decision making. Fourth, doubts about the real political rele-
vance of the forum constrained high-level interest in participation. Finally, 
despite the efforts made, there was a need for much greater outreach to 
civil society regarding the council’s work.
Peru is the other Latin American country with a general advisory 
body to the government on medium- and long-term issues. Created by 
the Toledo administration in 2002 and headed by the prime minister, the 
National Accord was set up to forge a shared vision of the future among 
the government, the political parties, and representatives of civil society, as 
a means of furthering democratic development. Up to 2009 the accord had 
proposed 31 state policies on democracy and the rule of law, equity and 
social justice, competitiveness, and state efficiency, and it has also pushed 
implementation of several projects. But the alliance failed to capture the 
full attention of senior government officials, and it lacked representatives 
of sufficient political importance to make itself heard. Still, the National 
Accord is a seed that could bear fruit over time. If, with government 
political leadership, the accord makes progress in linking the govern-
ment’s decision making with the proposals of a diverse core of important 
actors, be they political or professional, and if it is given proper resources 
and technical support, it could perhaps become a true reference point for 
longer-term economic policies. 
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Chile’s Productive Development Forum no longer exists, but until it 
failed in 1999, it was the most important channel for social dialogue in the 
country. Created in 1994 to be a permanent channel for interaction among 
the economy’s main productive development actors, the forum’s chief goal 
was to identify and promote initiatives to facilitate dynamic and sustained 
economic growth in a context of stability and equity. It sought to foster a 
broad social dialogue that would find expression in public-private agree-
ments, with a view to devising a shared development strategy.
The chief body of this forum was the Productive Development Council, 
chaired by the economy minister and with 24 members representing the 
government, business, and labor.23 The council’s primary function was 
to review the follow-up to activities springing from the agreements and 
recommended policies. It never gained the full support of either the gov-
ernment, where the economy minister had little influence, or the political 
parties (which were not invited to participate). Moreover, a focus on the 
short-term outlook among workers and entrepreneurs, as well as the gov-
ernment to some extent, constrained the prospects of building consensus 
on longer-term issues. These problems, combined with the mistrust among 
these groups, led to the disbanding of the council. 
In 2001, during the Lagos government, a new ad hoc alliance was cre-
ated between the major business group, the Confederation for Production 
and Trade, and the government. The Public-Private Council for Export 
Development, charged with implementing the confederation’s progrowth 
agenda, organized four commissions oriented to promoting trade facili-
tation, productivity, international integration, investment, tourism, and 
exports. The alliance was effective in promoting a dialogue and agenda in 
the context of negotiations for free trade areas with developed northern 
markets. Once these negotiations were completed, however, the group lost 
initiative and stopped operating in the subsequent administration.
More on National Alliances
Table 6.4 shows the national public-private councils in Latin America that 
have won legitimacy in supporting national strategies. Those in Barbados, 
Colombia, and Peru are formally instituted and have been working for 
several years. Others are more recent, as in Chile and Panama. In Brazil 
there are incipient ad hoc mechanisms. Finally, there have been very effec-
tive informal or ad hoc public-private dialogues in the past in Costa Rica 
and Chile.
The national tripartite partnership in Barbados: progress on consensus 
building but with the risk of “lock in.” The national tripartite alliance in 
Barbados has been a positive force for institutionalizing consensus build-
ing on socioeconomic issues. It was established in the 1990s as a result of 
economic crisis, following a history of informal and ad hoc collaboration. 
Table 6.4 Participation of Alliances in Strategies and Plans 
Countries Alliance
National development strategy Action plans in sector or specific area







Barbados Tripartite Social Partnership Yes Follow-up and 
evaluation
Brazil PDP competitiveness forums No No Makes proposals to the 
executive committees and 
secretariat of the PDP
Yes
Chile National Innovation Council for 
Competitiveness
Yesa Yesa No Only monitoring
Colombia National Planning Council Yes Yes Yes Yes
National Competitiveness 
Commission
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Costa Rica Private sector participation is 
informal
Yes via informal 
consultation
No Yes but informal





Panama National Concertation for 
Development
Yes Yes




Source: Prepared by the authors.
a.  A strategy has been formulated but it has not achieved sufficient consensus, even in the government, to be considered a national development 
strategy.
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Efforts at more formal collaboration between representatives of business, 
workers, and government finally took form in “protocols” that deter-
mine how industrial relations unfold and that are regarded as a tool for 
public policy making.24 The three parties involved regard the protocols 
as a way of meeting the challenges of globalization and the demands of 
information-based competitiveness. The declarations in the protocols are 
quite general—create a modern and efficient economy, create a balance 
between prices and incomes by means of low inflation, attain a more 
inclusive society, and distribute the benefits of economic growth in a fair 
and equitable manner. 
Although it has contributed to the national strategies for economic 
development,25 the partnership’s main role has been to provide a forum 
for dialogue to identify and address issues regarded as problematic by the 
members. Of course the central government is the determinant actor in 
public policy making, but it traditionally has considered and valued the 
interaction and advice that has emerged from the partnership. This tripar-
tite collaboration has been crucial in moving the country toward a more 
liberalized economy at the same time that it regulates industrial relations 
and the labor market. 
Essential parts of the partnership’s success have been the general con-
sensus among the leadership of the country’s political and administrative 
structures, an organized and united labor movement, and a very rep-
resentative private sector. These circumstances have allowed Barbados 
to move toward social cohesion and policy continuity that transcends 
changes in government.26 Nonetheless, the most distinguishing feature of 
this partnership has been the relatively high level of sophistication among 
the unions, whose professionalism has been critical to consensus building. 
Figure 6.2 shows the different levels of the dialogue in Barbados’s 
public-private alliance, its members, and the frequency with which they 
meet. This structure allows the actors to participate in developing pol-
icies, as well as in the follow-up and evaluation of implementation. 
Another important feature is the equilibrium among the different rep-
resentatives, which ensures better dialogue and the trust of the private 
sector—including representatives of the workers—in the institutional 
arrangements. The alliance receives secretarial support from a ministry.
The Barbados partnership is the most advanced in the region, but in 
recent years it has suffered from governance problems that have lessened 
its effectiveness. Its lower institutional level, which meets monthly, has 
had only modest decision-making capacity. Moreover, the higher level, 
though it has had decision-making power, is supposed to meet quarterly 
but has often failed to do so for lack of a quorum. Moreover the union 
representative at both levels has often been the same high-level person; 
thus, labor issues have tended to predominate in the discussions, to the 
detriment of sectoral economic issues and matters on the national strate-
gic plan. And although the partnership has ad hoc secretarial support, it 
medium- and long-term strategies 183
needs structured technical backing to underpin discussions aimed at iden-
tifying and resolving problems and at dealing with specific operational 
issues of the national plan. Preparing annual action plans for the national 
strategy, as well as formal evaluations, would have been a means of bring-
ing the partnership’s discussions on these operational matters down to 
earth. Finally, there has been some acknowledgment that nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) should be included in the discussions (Springer 
2010). In 2008 the Democratic Labor Party displaced the long reigning 
Barbados Labor Party in government with some expectation that the 
partnership could eventually be revitalized.
Colombia has been a model of public-private collaboration for planning 
and implementing strategies, but its sustainability has been undermined 
by the political cycle. Colombia has used a participative methodology 
whereby economic and social actors express themselves in two central 
bodies: the National Planning Council and the National Competitiveness 
Commission. The government strengthened planning in 1991 by mandat-
ing the involvement of civil society organizations in the National Planning 
Council. The aim was to correct the executive’s centralist and unilateral 
practices and to curb the clientalist conduct of the legislature and the 
• prime minister,
  chairman 
• head of Barbados 
  private sector association 
• chairman of  
  Barbados CTUSAB
public sector 
• 3 ministers, one of whom shall be 
  chairman 
• head of civil service 
• director of finance and economic 
  affairs 
• PS ministry of civil service
• a very wide 
  representation of all 
  stakeholders, including 
  parliamentarians 
private sector 
 a number of representatives equal to 
that of the public sector
trade unions 
 a number of representatives equal to 





national private/public  
consultation| 
(annual meeting) 
Figure 6.2 Organizational Structure of the Social Pact in Barbados
Source: Springer 2010. 
Note: PS = Permanent Secretary; CTUSAB = Coalition of trade unions and staff 
associations of Barbados.
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political parties. Thus the National Planning Council was coordinated 
with territorial councils in 32 departments and 1,067 municipalities. The 
main task of these public-private councils has been to offer opinions and 
make proposals on the development plans prepared by the president, the 
departmental governors, and the mayors of the municipalities, as well as 
to make recommendations to actors (Forero Pineda 2000). However, with 
time this forum weakened, in part because of the great number of regions 
and the heterogeneity of the needs and capacities of the participants. In-
deed, a number of the departments have ceased to participate.
Between 1998 and 2002 the Pastrana administration set up another 
channel for public-private partnership in the form of the Colombia Com-
petes Network (Red Colombia Compite). This partnership was involved 
in raising productivity in three spheres: regional, production chains, and 
specialized networks. The first was involved in efforts to collaborate in 
regional crosscutting projects to improve productivity. The Agreements 
on the Competitiveness of Productive Chains were set up simultaneously. 
These provided an arena for dialogue and public-private coordination 
of activities to improve the productivity and competitiveness of firms in 
the chains. Finally, specialized networks were set up as a mechanism to 
provide national coordination of crosscutting initiatives, supporting prog-
ress in those complex activities that could not be addressed successfully 
solely from the perspective of sectors or chains. These networks initially 
had significant business participation, but their activities waned over time 
because of a lack of government leadership and clarity of objectives.
As noted, in 2006 the process of dialogue led to the creation of the 
Domestic Agenda for productivity and competitiveness and the creation of 
the National Competitiveness Commission to oversee implementation of it; 
the commission is a public-private alliance presided over by the president. 
The commission coordinates actors and organizations at the national and 
regional levels on matters of public policy related to the development plans. 
It offers a space for dialogue among representatives of the national govern-
ment (15, mostly ministers, plus departmental delegates), two representa-
tives named by business associations, two from the workers unions, two 
from universities, and three appointees of the president. 
Unfortunately the civil members of the commission have not been very 
active. Other factors that have weakened the effectiveness of the commis-
sion and the Domestic Agenda were, according to Meléndez and Perry 
(2009), the persistence of clientelism and rent seeking among ministers, and 
Congress and organizations at the margins of the Domestic Agenda with 
the end result of loss of coherence and full effectiveness in public policy.
Meanwhile a group of 30 important firms (including multinationals 
operating in the country), along with representatives of three prestigious 
universities and small and medium enterprises, organized the Private 
Sector Competitiveness Council. Two large unions participate as observ-
ers. This council plays an important role in Colombia’s public-private 
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alliance, giving the private sector a voice in the Domestic Agenda and a 
leadership role in monitoring progress and sustaining a medium- to long-
term national vision over political cycles. The council replicates itself at 
the regional level, where local councils implement and monitor comple-
mentary strategies. Figure 6.3 summarizes the structure of the council.
To assess progress on the agenda, the council publishes an annual 
National Competitiveness Report.27 This document provides an updated 
national, sectoral, and regional analysis and highlights the obstacles and 
problems encountered in furthering the national strategy.
Of the countries examined here, Colombia has had the most practical 
experience with public-private alliances. Nonetheless, despite longstand-
ing efforts to create synergies for expanding dialogue between the public 
sector, business, and academia, the process has not been easy. Perhaps 
the constant redefinition of the alliance with each new political cycle has 
most undermined joint action among the parties involved. Hence the 
strengthening of a body such as the Private Competitiveness Council, 
as Meléndez and Perry (2009) suggest, could help sustain the long-term 
policies of the Domestic Agenda and strengthen it with new, updated 
proposals.
assembly
(made up by all its members)
directors board
president of the private Council of Competitiveness  
executive vice president technical vice president
associated researchers associated researchers




Figure 6.3 Composition of Colombia’s Private Council 
on Competitiveness
Source: Consejo Privado de Competitividad, “Esquema organizacional del 
CPC.” http://www.compite.ws/spccompite/content/page.aspx?ID=69.
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Panama’s experience of public-private collaboration is recent: the 
challenge is to make it endure beyond changes in government and to 
strengthen its institutional structure. As mentioned, the Council of the 
National Concertation for Development was created during the Torrejos 
government as a public-private body of citizen participation for consul-
tation, proposals, and approval of a development strategy. It is chaired 
by the vice president and initially consisted of 33 representatives of the 
sectors taking part in drawing up the national development plan. The 
representatives were drawn from three spheres: the productive sector—
workers, business associations, SMEs, and associations of professionals 
such as lawyers and economists; the political sphere—representatives of 
the political parties,28 local governments, and the provinces; and civil 
society—organizations working on women’s issues, human rights, the en-
vironment, indigenous peoples, and education, as well as churches, youth 
groups, and others. The council has a technical unit and a monitoring 
group to oversee the implementation of the agreed strategy. 
The council is relatively new; only in April 2009 did it choose its execu-
tive secretary, whose mission is to coordinate the council with a view 
to advancing the agreements and projects emerging from the national 
dialogue. The Torrejos government also promulgated a Framework Law 
on Citizen Participation to institutionalize the system of citizen involve-
ment in the design and implementation of public policies at the national, 
provincial, regional, and local levels. The idea was to foster the shared 
responsibility of citizens for the management of public policies. The gov-
ernment that took office in 2009 will help determine whether the council 
consolidates its relevance in the country’s development strategy. 
The experience of Chile’s National Innovation Council for Competitive-
ness is novel for that country, but approval of the draft law in Congress 
would strengthen its operations and civil legitimacy. The National 
Council on Innovation for Competitiveness, another relatively new body 
for public-private collaboration, was created in late 2005 by presidential 
decree. The council was renewed by President Michelle Bachelet in 2006 
as a permanent advisory body to the presidency. Its mission was to advise 
the authorities in identifying, devising, and implementing policies, plans 
and programs, measures, and other activities related to innovation. These 
activities covered the fields of science, the training of specialized person-
nel, and the development, transfer, and dissemination of technology. 
The council consisted of a president, chosen by the nation’s president, 
5 ministers, and 11 private sector representatives selected for their knowl-
edge of science, business, or public policy making. These representatives 
were not official representatives of the sectors to which they belong, but 
rather took part in the council on a personal basis. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD 2009) evaluated the council, pointing out that it enjoyed several 
achievements in its short life but also that it exhibited some weaknesses. 
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Among the achievements were that it had gained credibility as an advisory 
body to the presidency, it had conferred greater selectivity on public policy 
making by focusing on certain clusters, and it had sought to strengthen 
the national innovation system. The weaknesses were presented as chal-
lenges and referred to the lack of clarity about its responsibilities; a certain 
remoteness from medium- and long-term policies, because it operated 
within the confines of short-term budget exercises; the excessive time 
taken to prepare a strategy (two years); and the weakening of its political 
legitimacy. In the latter regard, three factors were mentioned: the legisla-
ture’s failure to approve a draft law that would have clarified the council’s 
responsibilities; the lack of closer dialogue with the universities; and the 
lack of outreach to the public and to the actors in the national innovation 
system (OECD 2009, 5–7). 
The draft law in Congress was rejected twice, weakening the coun-
cil’s operations for several reasons. First, in a country as legalistic as 
Chile, rejection of the bill weakened the council’s legitimacy and power 
to enforce its decisions with respect to the rest of the state administra-
tion. Second, the legislation would have allowed a clearer demarcation 
of responsibilities between the council (an essentially advisory body) and 
the Committee of Ministers, the body that implements the strategy and 
policies.29 This step would eliminate the overlapping activities that have 
plagued the national innovation system. Third, the bill proposed that the 
council’s membership be more representative of the actors in the national 
innovation system. Finally, it established a formula for the distribution of 
resources from mining royalties, which had been at the heart of vigorous 
debate in Congress. 
The new institutional structure also called for establishment of public-
private councils and commissions at the cluster and regional levels. This 
undertaking has not been easy owing to a lack of coordination and links 
among businesses in the regions and productive sectors chosen for support 
in the strategy. The council’s spokesperson said in an interview that great 
effort had been made to communicate with the business organizations 
linked to priority sectors; however, effectively engaging them in the strat-
egy proved to be a difficult process given rather indifferent public-private 
business relations in the democratic era. Another perceived challenge was 
the development of a culture among entrepreneurs, academics, and gov-
ernment geared to new opportunities in the medium to long term. This 
clearly would be a learning process given past practices.30 
In Brazil collaboration was under way between business and government 
for implementation of the Productive Development Policy with efforts 
focused on less organized sectors and on certain regions. During Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva’s first government (2003–06), the National Council 
on Industrial Development, with 14 private sector members and several 
representatives of the public sector, was set up as a high-level forum for 
public-private debate and as a body to monitor and validate the PDP. 
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It was supposed to meet every six months, but because of a lack of lead-
ership and participation, it did not play a significant role in the dialogue 
over the PDP. 
The public sector’s collaboration with business associations during the 
two Lula administrations took place at a lower level, through executive 
committees and competitiveness forums. The committees comprised offi-
cers of the public agencies involved in the PDP, who analyzed and priori-
tized the policies to be implemented in the sectors. The forums involved 
meetings of various business associations, and the participants included 
public officials from agencies that also operated at the level of specific 
sectors and thematic areas. The forums and the committees were meant 
to be in close communication. This collaboration was an effort to define 
the sectoral agenda and the programs to be implemented, as well as to 
collect information on the businesses’ needs and strategies, which were 
negotiated with the public sector. An effective relationship between these 
two bodies was crucial for transferring information and drawing up the 
productive development agenda. 
Several factors hampered the relationship between the committees and 
the forums: the technical and organizational weakness of businesses in 
some sectors; lack of information on the PDP itself in others. In some 
sectors and states, the forums did not work. According to the Federation 
of Industries of São Paulo State, 50 percent of the state’s firms were unfa-
miliar with the PDP.31 Exporters also felt they had little representation in 
the initiative. Members of Brazil’s Association of Foreign Trade Exporters 
claimed that the PDP was too general and the proposed targets were less 
than what already had been achieved. Moreover, PDP policies were not 
considered in the context of decisions of multinational companies, which 
accounted for more than 70 percent of Brazil’s exports.32 Another factor 
that ran counter to public-private collaboration was the conduct of large 
firms, both multinational and local, which preferred to go directly to the 
presidency or the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce in an 
effort to gain customized benefits. This undermined the implementation 
of the PDP and weakened the legitimacy of those leading it. Indeed, some 
have characterized the PDP exercise as being partially captured by the 
interests of the large firms that make up Brazil’s traditional “networked 
capitalism” (Zebral 2011). Nonetheless, the National Industrial Confed-
eration, which brings together business associations and federations in 
Brazil, believes that the PDP represented a significant step forward relative 
to previous governments. The confederation is monitoring and evaluating 
the policy and has been active in trying to influence future directions.33 
Peru’s National Competitiveness Council was set up with a great deal 
of government support, but the absence of a common vision has weak-
ened it over time. In April 2002 the Peruvian government created the 
National Competitiveness Council (CNC) as an arena for public-private 
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coordination; one of its missions was to develop and implement a na-
tional competitiveness plan. Some 250 experts from the public and 
private sectors, as well as academia, were involved in drawing up the 
plan. This ad hoc body lasted until the plan was produced. To prepare 
the plan, the CNC was especially careful in considering the policies and 
commitments emerging from the aforementioned National Accord. 
The CNC had a governing council comprising nine ministers of state, 
the presidents of five business associations, a representative of the SMEs, 
a representative of the workers, and the president of the National Insti-
tute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual 
Property. But the CNC had only limited influence on the ministries and 
executing agencies, which were not obligated to comply with the national 
competitiveness plan. Despite their positions, moreover, the senior figures 
in the CNC (the president of the Council of Ministers and the Minister 
of Foreign Trade and Tourism) were not respected as authorities on com-
petitiveness. Finally, the CNC’s task was made harder by the lack of a 
common vision of the competitiveness agenda and by the absence of com-
mitted leaders from either the public or private sectors. The private sector 
often preferred to ignore the CNC and meet directly with the ministers, a 
recurring problem in Latin America when the formal channels for public-
private communication lack credibility because of insufficient political 
and technical leadership and representativeness.
The informal public-private partnership in Costa Rica has been effective. 
Costa Rica’s informal/tacit partnership, one that is not underpinned by 
institutions or legislation, has operated reasonably well in practice. To 
secure the arrival of Intel in the country, a series of informal public-private 
alliances were formed involving the president, ministries, universities, the 
national private sector, business associations, multinational firms in Costa 
Rica, the Foreign Trade Corporation, and the Coalition of Development 
Initiatives (CINDE). Despite the proven success of these partnerships, 
their significance waned once the four-year term of President José María 
Figueres came to an end in 1998. Chaves and Segura (2007, 41) point 
out that some of these activities were later undertaken by CINDE and 
are part of its task of promoting the country and the business agendas of 
firms that want to invest in Costa Rica. But the extent of the participants’ 
involvement has not been the same as when efforts were being made to 
attract Intel. 
Public-Private Collaboration in Sectors and Regions
In some countries forging a common national vision has been especially 
difficult. Where there has been mistrust between the public and private 
sectors, regional projects driven by public-private alliances have occasion-
ally emerged and been successful. As Ross Schneider (2009) points out, 
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although the policy realm might be more restrictive at the regional or sec-
toral levels, public-private dialogue in those areas can more easily be pro-
ductive. The actors are less diverse and have a broader range of common 
aims, a circumstance that facilitates consensus building. In other cases 
the members, especially those among the elite, have links that predate the 
alliance. Finally, in the bigger countries with federal systems, the need to 
compete with other states or provinces is a unifying factor. Argentina and 
Mexico are examples of countries in which significant regional or local 
public-private alliances have developed in specific industries, such as elec-
tronics and software (both countries), coffee producers (Mexico), and the 
wine business and agroindustrial production chains (Argentina).
A particularly interesting case is the alliance in the high-technology 
industry in Jalisco, Mexico, to restore the industry’s competitiveness in the 
face of China’s penetration of its markets (Palacios 2008; Medina Gómez 
2006). This joint effort by the public and private sectors centered on the 
electronic equipment and software industries. It began with the firms’ senior 
executives, particularly in the affiliates of the multinationals. They were 
joined by local business organizations, and the collaboration fostered the 
emergence of a vision of the future and a cluster-based development strategy. 
From the outset, the climate of cooperation allowed a range of joint 
projects to emerge. These centered on promoting the development of the 
electronics cluster, which eventually led to the expansion of the sector’s 
export capacity, even in the face of Chinese competition. Between 1990 
and 2000, the industry moved from being a mass production model—
creating goods of relatively low value added and limited technological 
content—to one that operated on a smaller scale but produced goods with 
higher value added and dearer per unit transport costs, which provided 
Jalisco a competitive edge over China for export to the neighboring U.S. 
market. This shift lessened variety but heightened the sophistication of the 
product portfolio. 
In this collaborative context, an important initiative by the state gov-
ernment was the launch of a consultation campaign for the preparation 
of the Jalisco State Development Plan, 1995–2001. The consultation 
involved a large number of entrepreneurs, company managers, academ-
ics, government analysts, and public officials, as well as representatives 
of universities and business organizations. Participants readily agreed on 
the need to devise a step-by-step strategy centered on the existing capacity 
of foreign investment, attracting new investment, and strengthening the 
competitive capacity of a critical mass of operations in the most dynamic 
sectors of the state’s economy—especially electronics and information 
technologies. Also of note was the authorities’ willingness to cooperate 
with foreign firms, and those companies’ constructive proactive attitude 
to stick with their host location.34
In short, the experience of Jalisco’s high-tech sector reveals the results 
of cooperation and collaboration among an already organized business 
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sector. Jalisco had the advantage of state authorities that supported the 
initial private initiative. Nonetheless, with the public and private sectors 
joining forces and with greater government initiative and long-term com-
mitment in terms of strategy, support programs, and resources, this pro-
cess could produce an even stronger collaboration, one that is even better 
placed to face future challenges.
Another case of successful public-private collaboration involved wine-
growers and the provincial government in Mendoza in Argentina. Between 
1990 and 2000 the Argentine wine industry underwent a productive and 
technological transformation that allowed it to advance from being a 
national supplier of popular wines to an exporter of quality wines, similar 
to the experience of the Chilean wineries in the 1980s and early 1990s. To 
induce growth and competitiveness in the industry, the Argentine Viticul-
tural Corporation was set up with the participation of several regional and 
local organizations. The corporation’s governing body has 17 members, 
12 from the private sector and 5 from the public sector. One of its main 
aims was the implementation of the Viticultural Strategic Plan 2002–20.35 
Representatives of the region’s viticultural associations36 and the National 
Viticultural Institute (an autonomous national body promoting the tech-
nological development of the sector) helped draw up the plan. It was 
agreed that a constant improvement in all the links in the production 
chain was needed to sustain growth in external markets, and to that end 
forums were created in which local institutions took part (Escofet 2006). 
The provincial government helped organize the forums, wherein dialogue 
between entrepreneurs and government officials opened the way to the 
productive, commercial, and logistical transformation of the industry; the 
incorporation of new technologies; and an increase in technical capacity.
The public-private alliances in Jalisco and Mendoza were successful 
for several reasons. First, the private sector had sufficient connections to 
develop a collective awareness of the benefits of organizing to tackle some 
grave problems foreshadowing a crisis in the sector. Second, the public 
sector, while not the leader, showed commitment in supporting the needs 
of the private sector.37 Finally, the construction of effective alliances, as 
noted earlier, and as Ross Schneider (2009) points out, depends on learn-
ing through experience.
Also notable are the regional and sectoral bodies created in Colombia 
as a result of the Domestic Agenda. These competitiveness commissions 
facilitated the coordination of priorities in regional and sectoral plans for 
productivity and competitiveness and helped define the main crosscutting 
and sectoral projects analyzed in the National Competitiveness Commis-
sion. To prepare the agenda, 10 joint technical committees were set up in 
strategic areas.38 Some 60 percent of the participants in these committees 
were public officials, 33 percent were entrepreneurs, 1 percent were from 
academia and research groups, 1 percent from unions, 1 percent from 
NGOs, and 4 percent were foreign invitees, of whom 3 percent came 
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from multilateral organizations. The National Competitiveness Commis-
sion coordinated the regional commissions, which were tasked with pre-
paring guidelines and coordinating activities and policies at the regional 
level. These commissions consisted of representatives of the public sector 
(35 percent), the private sector (48 percent), academia (12 percent), labor 
(2 percent), and others (3 percent). The regions’ governor and mayors also 
took part, and a technical and executive secretariat staffed by the chamber 
of commerce and a public authority was set up. 
Public-Private Alliances in the Agencies
So far we have looked at the participation of the private sector (entrepre-
neurs, academics, and workers) in organizations created specifically by the 
state to bring about effective collaboration in preparing strategies advising 
the executive. Private participation, however, has also been important in 
other public sector bodies, such as the agencies that implement the strate-
gies, thereby allowing public-private collaboration to materialize “on the 
ground.” 
Under the traditional model used in Latin America, the executing agen-
cies are answerable to the central government and are direct appendages 
of a ministry. Normally, therefore, there is no private participation in their 
management, and they lack relative autonomy over decisions and budgets. 
Nonetheless, although they have not yet been studied extensively, channels 
for private sector participation seem to have opened up recently in some 
agencies, thereby increasing the business community’s influence on the 
implementation of the programs. 
Because of its maturity, an important example is the Foreign Trade Cor-
poration of Costa Rica, which dates from 1996.39 Conceived as a public-
private association to promote exports, its governing board consisted of 
four representatives from the public sector and five from the private sector. 
The business sector’s participation was crucial in securing information on 
the needs of the companies and their workers, as well as in prioritizing and 
defining the programs. These programs were geared to gathering market 
intelligence, improving export capacity, creating entrepreneurs, and pro-
viding business training and advice on internationalization. In recent years 
the agency has promoted a series of new partnerships centered on the 
development of sectors that are strategic for the country’s future (Chaves 
and Segura 2007, 31).
In Chile, following the growing interest in having the private sec-
tor engaged with executing agencies, an important initiative was the 
launching of the draft law on the National Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness, which contemplated changing the corporate gover-
nance of the two agencies responsible for implementing the innovation 
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strategy. The governing boards of these organizations (one consists of a 
large number of ministers) should gradually be transformed to include 
renowned experts in each agency’s field of action, under the chairmanship 
of the responsible minister. A proposal to give the agencies consultative 
committees made up of experts from the public and private sectors was 
also offered. These committees would provide specific knowledge for 
selecting, prioritizing, and monitoring projects, as well as for reviewing 
and designing the instruments used to support them. The committees of 
experts was expected to include entrepreneurs, prominent scientists, and 
consultants. As noted, the draft law had not been enacted at the time this 
book was written.
Finally, in Argentina, where governments have faced difficulties in 
developing a public-private alliance on a national policy level, there has 
recently been close collaboration at the level of executing agencies to pro-
mote exports and attract foreign investment. This collaboration has been 
institutionalized in the agency Export.Ar, whose main goal is to make 
Argentine products more competitive, and Prosper.Ar, the agency respon-
sible for promoting investment, attracting FDI, and internationalizing 
SMEs. Both have forms of private sector participation (for the structure 
of Prosper.Ar, see figure 6.4). 
Prosper.Ar’s private sector Consultative Council has honorary members 
who have been prominent in business, academia, science, and labor. Their 
mission is to work together to develop and implement policies and pro-
grams to foster investment, competitiveness, and innovation. The private 
sector Higher Council for International Assistance comprises respected 
international leaders whose task is to support Argentina’s international 
commercial positioning. The initiative is relatively new and cannot be 
assessed until some time has passed.
National Council for 
Development
• Cabinet Chief of Ministries 
• Minister of Economy and
  Production
• Minister of Foreign







Advisory Council: private sector
Higher Council for International 
Assistance
Internal auditing unit
Figure 6.4 Board Structure of Prosper.Ar
Source: Agencia Nacional de Desarrollo de Inversiones (Prosper.Ar),
“Estructura organizacional,” http://www.prosperar.gov.ar/home
.php?page=estructura.
194 operational principles relevant for latin america?
Annex 6A Summary of National Development Strategies
Barbados National Development Plan 2005–25 
The Barbados National Development Plan (Government of Barbados 
2005) has six broad targets expressed in very general terms: strengthening 
the national spirit; modernizing the state; building social capital; building 
physical infrastructure and preserving the environment; increasing the 
country’s prosperity and competitiveness; and developing the Barbados 
brand internationally. 
These targets involve objectives that are also somewhat vague. For 
example, the fifth target, “increasing the prosperity and competitiveness 
of Barbados,” has the following objectives: to substantially increase the 
growth rate; to reach full employment; to ensure the strengthening of the 
microeconomic fundamentals; to respect food security and nutritional 
security; to create an entrepreneurial society; to develop an information 
society; to promote productivity and competitiveness; to boost exports 
of goods and services; to integrate Barbados into the global economy; to 
attain world-class excellence in services; and to fully develop the financial 
system and promote the private sector so that it takes economic leadership. 
The indicators to be used to monitor progress are also general, such as 
growth of no less than 5 percent, sustained growth in market capitaliza-
tion, and significant growth in savings and investment rates. For each of 
the six goals, there are strategic guidelines to facilitate progress toward the 
goals, as well as some general compliance indicators. 
Brazil: Productive Development Policy (PDP)
To sustain the expansionary cycle of the period 2003–07, the Produc-
tive Development Policy (Federal Government of Brazil 2008) poses four 
general challenges: expand supply capacity, strengthen the balance of pay-
ments, raise innovation capacity, and strengthen SMEs.
To meet these challenges successfully, quantitative targets were estab-
lished at two levels. The first level has aggregate macrotargets for 2010 
that are considered feasible and that can be monitored; this level should 
allow the direction and scope of the PDP to be shown clearly. The mac-
rotargets contemplate an increase in gross fixed capital formation, a rise 
in private spending on innovation, an increase in Brazil’s share of interna-
tional exports, and a higher number of exporting SMEs. The specific tar-
gets to be met in each of the PDP’s programs conform to the same criteria 
defined by the macrotargets: feasibility and the possibility of monitoring. 
The PDP’s policies are arranged on three levels. First are systemic activi-
ties that go beyond the level of firms and sectors, and that affect the per-
formance of the overall productive structure—such as tax policy, financing 
policy for investment and innovation, and legal security. In the second 
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level are strategic issues of public policy purposely chosen because of their 
importance to the country’s long-term productive development. Six areas 
were prioritized in this level for policies with strategic impact: the region-
alization or decentralization of production; the strengthening of micro and 
small enterprises; increasing exports; productive integration with Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with an initial focus on Mercosur; integration 
with Africa; and environmentally sustainable production. 
In the third level are structuring programs for the productive system; 
geared to strategic objectives, these activities take the diversity of the 
domestic productive structure as a reference. They include:
• Mobilizing programs in strategic areas: the industrial health com-
plex, information and communications technologies, nuclear energy, 
the industrial defense complex, nanotechnology, and biotechnology. 
• Programs to strengthen competitiveness in the automotive complex; 
capital goods; textiles and clothing; wood and furniture; personal 
care, perfumes, and cosmetics; civil engineering; the services com-
plex; the naval and cabotage industry; hides, leather, and handi-
crafts; agroindustry; biodiesel; plastics; and others. 
• Programs to consolidate and expand leadership in the aeronautical 
complex; oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals; bioethanol; mining; 
iron and steel; cellulose and paper; and meat.
Each of the favored sectors within the three programs has specific instru-
ments to attain its goals. These can be grouped into four general spheres: 
incentives—tax incentives, credit, risk capital, and economic subsidies; 
government procurement—direct purchases by the administration and 
those of state firms; regulation—technical, economic, and competition-
related; and technical support—certification and standards; trade promo-
tion; intellectual property; human resource training; and business training. 
Chile: National Strategy on Innovation for Competitiveness
As a central pillar of its competitiveness strategy (Consejo Nacional de 
Innovación para la Competitividad 2007), the Chilean government identi-
fied eight priority sectors for cluster development: aquaculture, tourism, 
copper mining, offshoring, food processing, fruit growing, pig raising and 
aviculture, and financial services. A policy was set out to underpin cluster 
development. It consisted of establishing public-private governing boards 
to coordinate each cluster; undertaking the tasks necessary to develop 
clusters associated with the budget recommendations for 2008; establish-
ing criteria on selectivity and budget commitments for the instruments 
used to promote business innovation; using instruments that increase 
social capital and that also build consensus on a shared vision of the 
future among the actors in a cluster; building research capacity to support 
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the development of high-potential clusters; and attracting foreign capital 
to the priority sectors. 
Following are the primary goals outlined by the National Council on 
Innovation for Competitiveness for developing each cluster: 
• Mining: maintain a world-leader position and develop chains among 
suppliers. 
• Aquaculture: be a world leader in salmon production and diversify 
the product range. 
• Tourism: make the country a leading destination for special-interest 
tourism in areas such as ecotourism, adventure tourism, and cruises. 
• Food processing: strengthen Chile’s position as a producer of pro-
cessed foods with high value added.
• Fruit growing: retain global leadership in primary fruit growing.
• Offshoring: make the country a regional leader in offshoring services 
with high value added.
• Pig raising and aviculture: maintain high growth rates in the industry 
• Financial services: increase the scope and depth of the financial sec-
tor as a domestic platform and possible regional center. 
The fate of these initiatives in the new Piñera, very skeptical of govern-
ment interventions in the market, remains to be seen.
Colombia: National Development Plan 2006–10
The National Development Plan 2006–10 (DNP 2007) gave priority to six 
objectives: democratic security; poverty reduction and fostering employ-
ment and equity; high and sustained growth; environmental and risk man-
agement that promotes sustainable development; increasing the efficiency 
and transparency of the state; and development of specific areas such as 
gender equity, youth, ethnic groups, the regional dimension, and foreign 
and migration policy. 
The National Development Plan includes the main conclusions of 
the Internal Agenda for Productivity and Competitiveness. The Internal 
Agenda was put together by representatives of the productive sector, 
national and regional governments, academia, and workers. It identi-
fied the most promising productive chains in the world economy and 
programs and projects to foster productive transformation. The produc-
tive development strategy has two complementary substrategies: one is 
crosscutting and the other features high-impact sectoral programs. The 
first can be broken down into five lines of action: business development, 
innovation, and technological development; savings, investment, and 
financing; physical capital; human capital; and institutions for produc-
tive development. 
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In turn, each of these lines of action rests on different pillars. For 
example, the area of business development, innovation, and technological 
development has five pillars: 
• Fostering innovation and technological development for competi-
tiveness. 
• Competitiveness associated with business productivity. 
• International insertion and trade facilitation. 
• Proper operation of the internal market. 
• Specific productivity and competitiveness strategies for microenter-
prises and SMEs. 
The high-impact sectoral programs consist of support for the develop-
ment of products, chains, clusters, activities, or sectors that are deemed to 
be potential sources of employment and revenue, and that can compete 
successfully at the international level. The following sectors or produc-
tive chains were identified as priorities: some agroindustrial production; 
tourism; handicrafts; information and communications technologies and 
software development; transport and logistics; and professional services 
(starting with health care). In the traditional manufacturing sector there is 
a proposal to promote mid-tech chains with the potential to grow in inter-
national trade. 
Costa Rica: National Development Plan 2006–10 
The National Development Plan 2006–10 (Government of Costa Rica 
2007) was drawn up on the basis of a program of the then current gov-
ernment, and thus sought to be the institutional expression of the com-
mitments made by the president in his campaign. It follows five lines of 
action: social policy, productive policy, environmental policy, institutional 
reform, and foreign policy. 
These five areas are subdivided into 16 institutional sectors that cover 
the structure of the government as defined by executive decrees. Some 
of these sectors are the social sector and the fight against poverty; the 
productive sector; foreign trade; infrastructure and transport; and the 
environment, energy, and telecommunications. Strategic actions have been 
developed for each of these sectors. The 135 actions were defined through 
a multisectoral effort in the public sector, whereby the institutions in each 
sector had to prioritize a set of 10 strategic activities or programs for the 
targets and sectoral policies of the plan. 
The strategic activities are in three overall groups: 
• A contract with citizens, which does not require legal reforms but 
does depend on the will of the government. 
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• The political commitment, which depends on agreements with the 
legislature.
• Dialogues for the “Costa Rica of the Bicentennial” initiative, which 
consists of activities to promote arenas for pluralist debate on the 
country’s future.
Compliance indicators for each of these activities were devised, as were 
preliminary estimates of the financial requirements to carry them out, with 
a view to guiding the preparation of the national budget. 
Mexico: National Development Plan 2007–12 
The National Development Plan 2007–12 establishes a strategy centered 
on the search for sustainable human development. The plan was shaped 
largely by the project “Visión México 2030,” which enabled the authori-
ties to describe a desirable and possible Mexico, triggering an exercise in 
planning and forecasting that sought to broaden the country’s develop-
ment horizons. 
The plan has five main lines of action: rule of law and security; a com-
petitive, job-creating economy; equal opportunities; environmental sustain-
ability; and effective democracy and a responsible foreign policy. Each of 
these areas entails various general objectives. Regarding “a competitive, 
job-creating economy,” for example, there are 13 goals: tax policy for 
competitiveness; efficient financial system; national pensions system; fos-
tering productivity and competitiveness; SMEs; the rural sector; tourism; 
comprehensive regional development; telecommunications and transport; 
energy, electricity, and hydrocarbons; the water sector; and construction 
and housing. 
A specific number of strategies is to be pursued for each of the objec-
tives. “Fostering productivity and competitiveness,” for example, has six 
strategies: 
• Devising a national competitiveness agenda involving the three 
branches of government, the three levels of governance, and the pri-
vate sector, with a view to securing the commitment of the various 
political and social actors. 
• Preparing agendas for competitiveness in economic sectors of high 
value added and high technological content, as well as in precursor 
sectors, and reconfiguring the traditional sectors to create better-
paid jobs. 
• Reforming regulations to lower the costs of opening and running a 
business. 
• Promoting economic competition and freedom of association and 
fighting against monopolies. 
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• Furthering and facilitating scientific research, technological adap-
tation, and innovation to boost the productivity of the national 
economy. 
• Taking advantage of the international context to foster the develop-
ment of the Mexican economy. 
Each strategy in turn has it own lines of action, which give rise to pro-
grams devised by the ministries and agencies involved. 
Panama: Agreements of the National Concertation for 
Development (CND) 
The CND (Gobierno de Panamá/Sistemas de las Naciones Unidas 2007) 
was based on four “tables for dialogue”: 
• The Well-Being and Equity Working Group centered on strength-
ening the social services system; increasing, focusing, evaluating, 
and monitoring social spending; and implementing employment and 
revenue-creation policies. 
• The Working Group on Economic Growth and Competitiveness 
tackled the largest number of issues, including macroeconomic-
fiscal stability, decentralization, and local development; policy 
on employment, labor, and minimum wages; agriculture and in-
dustry; and the financial and commercial sectors and logistical 
centers. 
• The Education Working Group dealt with access and coverage; 
quality of education; education in values; and improving the quality, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and decentralization of the national educa-
tion system. 
• The Working Group on Institutional Modernization focused on citi-
zen participation and the empowerment of the population, the judi-
cial apparatus, accountability, access to information, modernization 
of the public administration, ethics, and decentralization and citizen 
security. Two subtables were created, one on justice, ethics, and 
citizen security, and the other on health. 
With the change in the coalition government in 2009, there was some 
doubt whether the National Concertation for Development would con-
tinue as a potent force in policy making. This doubt has become a reality 
(Kenney and Castillo 2010; Davis 2011). The members of the new gov-
ernment played only a marginal role in the initiative and some officials 
of the administration—including the new president (a businessman)—
excluded themselves. The CND made no provision for transition mecha-
nisms that would enable the intervention of political factions that did 
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not take part in the working groups for dialogue. The new government 
assumed authority to continue or interrupt the process. 
Peru: National Competitiveness Plan 
The National Competitiveness Plan was prepared in 2005 by the National 
Competitiveness Council of Peru. In 2006 priority was given to six basic 
strategic lines of action: 
• Competitive chains. Productive chains are the main line of action 
because the principal efforts to increase exports of value added are 
made through them. Hence, the competitive chains make up the 
strategic area around which the others are arranged. For that rea-
son, it was decided that the CNC’s technical secretariat would ini-
tially focus on promoting productive chains, devising strategies for 
clusters to raise productivity, and encourage innovation in six areas: 
agroindustry (coffee, cacao, and chocolate, agro-export products, 
Andean grains); wood and furniture; fisheries and aquaculture; tex-
tiles and clothing (cotton and wool); tourism and handicrafts; and 
software. The cotton-textiles-fashion productive chain is currently 
in operation. Work is carried out in four subgroups corresponding 
to the bottlenecks identified in a World Bank report: supply of high-
quality cotton at competitive prices; market diversification, market-
ing-trade intelligence, and trade facilitation; improvements in the 
chain’s technological profile and industrial productivity (including 
upgrading skills and the capacities of professionals and workers); 
and social and environmental responsibility, labor policies, and the 
development of internationally competitive practices. 
• “Perú Innova.” This line of action promotes research, science, tech-
nology, and innovation to raise productivity and increase exports 
of higher value added. The projects include creation of the Science, 
Technology and Innovation Program Fund, which is financed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank; the institutionalization of the 
network of Centers for Technological Innovation; and strengthening 
of the Integrated Quality System. 
• “Perú Emprende.” The goal here is to identify and reward those 
business initiatives that involve new investment and a new sup-
ply of products and services. The program also targets initiatives 
related to the creation of partnerships and agreements that allow 
new firms to be established. Progress has been made on preparing a 
national public-private program to promote business capacity and 
the creation of new firms, as well as workshops on policies to foster 
entrepreneurship and new businesses. 
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• “Intermesa.” This action line focuses on simplifying red tape to fa-
cilitate procedures to export and set up new companies. Projects that 
have already begun include Exporta Fácil, the Single Foreign Trade 
Window, and a Law of Administrative Silence. 
• Regional competitiveness. Thus far there have been assessments of the po-
tential to implement comprehensive regional competitiveness programs. 
The programs cover physical infrastructure, education, productive de-
velopment, workplace training, administrative management, and institu-
tional strengthening. A lack of financing has interrupted the process. 
• Monitoring competitiveness. This program has allowed for the prep-
aration of statistics to calculate competitiveness indexes. So far, prog-
ress has been made on building regional competitiveness indexes. 
Notes
 1. Depending on the characteristics of the product, the exploitation and 
export of natural resources generated (albeit limited) forward and backward links 
in the local economy. Domestic manufactures also developed due to transport costs 
and a high level of tariff protection.
 2. Ocampo (2006) points out that the high tariffs of the 19th century were 
motivated by a desire for tax revenue and not by an explicit industrialization 
policy.
 3. Many fashionable theories of development in the period encouraged state 
coordination of investment. For example, see Nurske (1953) and Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943).
 4. Technological capacity was created in the late 1940s with the establishment 
of the Brazilian Society for Scientific Progress and the National Research Council. 
The Aeronautical Technological Institute spawned what today is Embraer, which 
has been highly successful in aircraft sales. EMBRAPA, set up in the 1970s, helped 
with technologies that gave rise to the large agrobusiness firms of today. The 
renowned ethanol program was launched in this period. With PND II, Petrobras 
began to develop the technology that has made it a leader in offshore oil explora-
tion (Schwartzman 2001; Martínez-Diaz and Brainard 2009).
 5. As noted in the introduction, the cutoff date of the analysis of country data 
generally is 2007–08 with only selective updates.
 6. We have been told that the strategies were prepared as programs instead of 
a formal, comprehensive national plan to avoid having to address political sensi-
tivities about the word “planning,” which is associated with the military dictator-
ship. For more detail, see the annex.
 7. The policies of the PAC are grouped into five areas, notably investment in 
transport, energy, sanitation, housing, and water resources. The PACTI includes 
the expansion and consolidation of the national innovation system, implementa-
tion of technological innovation in firms, research and development in strategic 
areas, and science and technology for social development. This plan is linked to the 
PDP, as is the National Education Development Plan. 
 8. Meléndez and Perry (2009) and Gómez Restrepo et al. (2008) provide a 
summary of these policies.
 9. The domestic agenda effort was motivated largely by the expectations of a 
free trade agreement with the United States. 
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 10. National Planning Department, Colombia (2005), Visión Colombia 2019 
Segundo Centenario, http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Pol%C3%ADticasdeEstado/
Visi%C3%B3nColombia2019/tabid/92/Default.aspx.
 11. Arias (2007, 2).
 12. An example is the decision to upgrade the quality of FDI activities to take 
account of the country’s higher wage level relative to its neighbors and Asia. 
 13. Government of Costa Rica (2007, 28).
 14. For an analysis of this process, see Moguillansky (1999).
 15. The system included an excessive number of support instruments, more 
than 130 specific and permanent funds or programs with burdensome protocols 
that made it hard to meet deadlines, and a multiplicity of government actors with 
little coordination among themselves. 
 16. For an analysis of these policies, see Agosin, Larrain, and Grau (2009). 
 17. That is, diversifying away from sugar cane, the traditional export product.
 18. See the Presidency of the Government of Mexico (2007a and 2007b, 
respectively) for the texts of the development plan and the vision. 
 19. These are tax policy for competitiveness; an efficient financial system; a 
national pension system; promotion of employment and improved labor relations; 
promotion of productivity and competitiveness; comprehensive regional develop-
ment; and promotion of small and medium enterprises, the rural sector, tourism, 
telecommunications and transport, energy, electricity and hydrocarbons; the water 
sector; and construction and housing.
 20. The prospect of extending the plan beyond the incumbent government 
depends on the attainment of a degree of public consensus.
 21. Barbados’s plan is similarly vague.
 22. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, in the successful cases, crisis has some-
times been a catalyst for formation of a public-private alliance. 
 23. The representatives of business and labor were elected by their own 
organizations.
 24. The protocols are guiding principles to reach agreement between the mem-
bers of the partnership; they do not become laws, although sometimes they lay the 
groundwork for future legislation. Five protocols have been signed since 1993 on 
economic stabilization and collective bargaining (1993–95); forming partnerships 
on wage restraint and productivity (1995–97); building a sustainable social and eco-
nomic partnership (1998–2000); creating a modern economy with social inclusion 
(2001–04); and stressing the importance of a CARICOM common market (2005–
07). The fifth protocol, which extended the previous protocols, was itself extended 
for two additional years, probably because of a certain stasis in the partnership. 
 25. To prepare the Barbados National Strategic Plan (2005–25), the govern-
ment extensively consulted with the members of the partnership. Indeed, one of the 
issues in the plan is strengthening the partnership and giving it legal institutional 
expression in the constitution.
 26. Continuity was also facilitated by the 14-year tenure in office of the Barba-
dos Labor Party (1994–2008). The role of the partnership under the new govern-
ment remains to be seen.
 27. National Competitiveness Report 2008–2009, http://www.compite.ws/
spccompite/content/page.aspx?ID=34.
 28. The political party of the current Martinelli administration refused to par-
ticipate as it did not want the appearance of supporting the Torrejos government 
(Kenney and Castillo 2010).
 29. Future Ministerial Innovation Commission in accordance with the project, 
composed of the ministers of the Economy, Education, and the Treasury.
 30. Interview with Hugo Arias, communications director, National Innovation 
Council for Competitiveness.
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 31. Interview with Paulo Teixeira, Department of Competitiveness and Tech-
nology, Federation of Industries of São Paulo State.
 32. Interview with Lucía María Maldonado, executive vice president of Brazil’s 
Foreign Trade Association. 
 33. Interview with Paulo Mol, manager of Industrial Studies and Policies, 
National Confederation of Industry, Brazil.
 34. It was probably helpful that the managers of the branches of the foreign 
firms were themselves Mexican.
 35. Law 25.849 and Regulatory Decree 1191/2004.
 36. These were the Argentine Viticultural Union, Association of Viticultural 
Cooperatives of Mendoza, Bodegas de Argentina, Mendoza Winegrowers Associa-
tion, and Winegrowers and Wine Producers Center of East Mendoza.
 37. According to Ross Schneider (2009), the governor of Mendoza had presi-
dential ambitions, and thought he would benefit from having supported the devel-
opment of an innovative and competitive industry in his province.
 38. Sustainability (millennium development goals), biofuels, biodiversity, transport 
logistics and infrastructure, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, air transport, con-
struction, tourism, jewelry, and offsets (technology transfer based on defense contracts).
 39. Created from the merger of the Corporación de las Zonas Francas de 
Exportación S.A., the Centro para la Promoción de las Exportaciones, and the Con-
sejo Nacional de Inversiones with a view to intensifying and diversifying exports.
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Implementing a Strategic Vision
We have seen that a central feature of modern industrial policy is the 
development of intelligent medium- to long-term strategies through con-
struction of public-private alliances that can maximize capture of relevant 
information and build consensus on the future direction of the national 
economy and the nature of public interventions. A government can have 
a great strategy backed by public consensus, but all is for naught if the 
public sector lacks the political commitment and technical capacity to 
implement the strategy. This chapter focuses on aspects of Latin America’s 
compliance with the operational principles related to implementation.
The Search for Political and Technical Leadership
High-level leadership at the political and technical levels has been crucial 
to the success of the development strategy in our 10 extraregional success 
cases, as well as of the public-private alliance that should underpin it. This 
same principle, which is so important in effective policy implementation, is 
not always taken into account in Latin America. Indeed, our study of nine 
countries in the region finds leadership in convening the economic and 
social actors to support development of strategies but an occasional lack of 
presidential commitment to implementing those strategies. In some cases 
the strategy has been used only as a partisan political platform. In 2007, 
for example, Oscar Arias, then the president of Costa Rica, acknowledged 
that politics was traditionally the driving force behind economic strategies 
in his country, and, as noted in the previous chapter, he promised that his 
government would follow through on implementing the strategy.1 
As shown in part one, the higher the public institution responsible for 
overseeing the strategy and the agencies that implement it are in the politi-
cal and bureaucratic hierarchy of the central government, the greater is 
Table 7.1 Ministries and Agencies in Strategic Areas of Export Development 
Country Lead ministry or organization Executing agencies 
Argentina
Export promotion Secretariat of Industry, Trade and Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
Under-Secretariat of Trade Policy and 
Management ExpoAr Foundation
Innovation promotion Ministry of Science and Technology National Agency for Scientific and 
Technological Development, INTA, INTI 
others
Promotion of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
Under-Secretariat of Industry Secretariat of 




Tourism promotion Ministry of Tourism and International 
Transport
Barbados Tourism Authority 




Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Development
Barbados Agency for Microenterprise 
Development
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Commerce
Invest Barbados
Fund Access
National Council for Science and Technology
Brazil
Export promotion Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade
Development Bank of Brazil (BNDES), Bank 
of Brazil, regional banks, financial agents of 




Innovation promotion Ministry of Science and Technology National Research Council Embrapa, CAPEZ 
FIOCRUZ, FNDCT/FINEP, FAPESP (São 
Paulo)
Industrial promotion Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade
Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development, 
BNDES, SEBRAE, FINEP, APEX, CAMEX, 
and others. 
Chile











Export and FDI promotion Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism




Competitiveness promotion National Planning Department
National Competitiveness Administrative 
System
National Competitiveness Commission 
Regional competitiveness commissions
Innovation promotion National Planning Department
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism
Colciencias
Colombian fund for the modernization and 
technological development of micro, small, 
and medium enterprises 
(continued)
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Table 7.1 Ministries and Agencies in Strategic Areas of Export Development (continued)
Country Lead ministry or organization Executing agencies 
Costa Rica
FDI attraction Private sector
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship




Export promotion Nonstate public body PROCOMER
Mexico
Export and FDI promotion Economy Secretariat PROMEXICO
All the programs implemented by various 
agencies concentrated in one organization
Industrial development 
promotion





Secretariat of Labor and Social Security, and 
business associations





Competitiveness promotion Presidency of the Council of Ministers National Competitiveness Council; 
PeruCompite
Export promotion Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism Commission for the Promotion of Peru for 
Exports and Tourism (PROMPERU)
Innovation promotion Ministry of Education CONCYTEC
Fund for Innovation, Science and Technology 
(FINCYT), PERUCOMPITE
Source: Authors, based on official information.
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its power to coordinate and effectively manage the strategy. Shortcomings 
in applying this principle have been one of the problems in promoting 
science, technology, and innovation in Latin America, where initially the 
executing agencies were overseen by councils and commissions that had 
little funding and no real authority in the government hierarchy. These 
circumstances have been changing, however, and among the countries 
examined here, innovation is now becoming a field for a ministry of its 
own, improving the governance profile. 
The other point to consider is the relationship between the public orga-
nizations overseeing the productive activities of the economy and the min-
istry of finance. In Latin America finance ministries have often assumed 
de facto lead on microeconomic policy as well as their traditional one in 
macroeconomic policy. Indeed, backed by power and technical compe-
tence finance ministries gained in the era of the Washington Consensus, 
sometimes this leadership, or attempt at it, was the result of a “raid” on 
the portfolio of another weaker ministry charged with productive activi-
ties outside the financial sector.2 This situation is unfortunate. As noted 
in part one, the decision-making criteria and leadership of finance min-
istries are culturally oriented around issues such as stabilization plans, 
control of inflation and fiscal balance, financial services and the like; the 
microeconomic requirements of industrial policies and associated public 
interventions are not typically within their equalize disposition or compe-
tence. In the extraregional countries, the finance ministry typically takes 
part in the committee or council that draws up the development strategy 
and establishes the budgetary framework, but it usually does not techni-
cally lead policies in the real sector. The pertinent ministers in nonfinancial 
productive sectors have the decisive voice in a context of fiscal oversight 
by the finance ministry. The solution then is not to transfer industrial poli-
cies to the ministry of finance but rather to build up, with the urgency it 
merits, the institutional capacity of line ministries supporting productive 
transformation.
At the same time, in Latin America it is apparent that the more margin-
alized the territory or region in which the development agency operates, 
the greater the difficulty in finding motivated and capable private sector 
leaders to consolidate public-private collaboration and to ensure success-
ful implementation of programs. One example is the difficulty the Chilean 
government has faced in creating and operating Regional Agencies for 
Economic Development. Promoted by President Bachelet,3 these regional 
organizations sought the participation of social and economic actors in 
efforts to distribute more of the benefits of the country’s growth to the 
regions. Several factors aggravated the challenge: many entrepreneurs did 
not have much association with each other (formal or informal) and were 
geographically dispersed, and many actors had only modest capacities. 
Some of the regional counterparts of Colombia’s National Competitive-
ness Commission exhibit the same collaborative limitations.
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Formulas to Support Leadership 
There are several formulas to support the leadership of the ministries and 
agencies responsible for leading the strategy. One is to appoint publicly 
respected figures who generate respect and confidence to lead the insti-
tution. Unfortunately, in Latin America, the tendency of governments 
to grant insufficient attention to medium- and long-term strategies has 
meant that this area of government activity has not attracted the most 
distinguished leadership.
Just as political leadership is needed, so too is high-level technical lead-
ership. We saw this in the case of Ireland’s Forfás agency, the think tank 
of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment that coordinates the 
agencies that carry out the export development strategy. The same role 
is played by the Economic Development Board in Singapore, and was 
undertaken by Finland’s former Science and Technology Policy Council. 
Latin America generally lacks organizations of such technical leadership. 
Another constraint on ministerial and agency leadership in Latin America 
has been the limited ability of governments to promote a professional 
civil service that would allow countries to develop ever more trained 
permanent public sector personnel at every level and to build up the insti-
tutional memory that is needed for effective strategies and deployment 
of industrial policies.4 A first hurdle in this regard is the prevalence of 
staff without contractual arrangements consistent with development of a 
career of public service. In some countries the staff work under a system 
of “honoraria,” or special location and services contracts that create a 
“parallel public service” vulnerable to changes in government (Echebarría 
2006). As Baruj, Kosacoff, and Ramos (2009) observe in reference to 
Argentina, these ad hoc personnel systems have several implications. First 
they lend themselves to a high degree of politicization, with attendant 
effects on the professionalism of the staff, and this leads to a lack of 
knowledge and memory arising from experience because of high turnover; 
Argentina is not the only country to suffer from such structural weakness.5 
Moreover, the high turnover caused by changes in government is not con-
fined to senior positions occupied by people who have the head of state’s 
trust but extends to secretaries and under-secretaries, department heads, 
and even chiefs of unit and contract consultants. A result is that the new 
officials, lacking institutional memory, are not committed to continuing 
or strengthening even the successful or potentially successful programs 
implemented by the outgoing government; hence those initiatives often 
cease to be carried out and new ones are put in their place just because 
the status quo is associated with a previous government. This endemic 
“refounding syndrome” created by the political cycle plagues many of the 
countries in the region (Machinea 2005).
These personnel difficulties not only affect the effectiveness of policy 
implementation but also lead to instability in public institutions, weakening 
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their authority. Lack of stable institutional links inhibits continuous interac-
tion within the government and with private clients As the study of Argentina 
noted, in many cases these links stem from personal relationships among 
the individuals who are circumstantially leading each institution; they are 
not ground in an institutional foundation that permits continuity over time. 
Technical and professional links are also lacking because many agencies have 
only small technical teams with limited capacity to network. Moreover, lack 
of a long-term vision on the part of the state means there often are no opera-
tional medium-term actions plans in the policy sphere, like a business plan in 
the management of a company, that would foster continuity. This failing is 
particularly notable because it means that policies are subject to short-term 
and crisis-related reactions that ignore the medium-term needs of firms.
Finally, the low salaries of public officials relative to wages in the private 
sector is another factor that militates against the agencies’ professionalism, 
productivity, leadership, and capacity to delegate tasks. Little information 
about salaries is available, but a study of the pay of senior officials in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, compared with senior executives in the pri-
vate sector, shows significant differentials—private salaries are more than 
50 percent higher on average in most of the countries studied (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico); Chile had the biggest 
differential at 70 percent (Marconi, Carrillo, and Cavalieri 2003). Clearly, 
salaries that are not even minimally attractive impede the recruitment of 
talented and corruption-free personnel to the public sector. Closing or 
narrowing the public-private wage gap, as most of the successful extrare-
gional countries have done, as well as creating professional public career 
paths that generate pride and prestige in the workforce, could foster recruit-
ment and retention of talent and improved performance in Latin America’s 
public sector, a key player in the deployment of industrial policies.
The study also notes the lack of effective assessment mechanisms for 
salaries and performance. And the salary structure is confused, lessening 
transparency and contributing to the breakdown of the wage hierarchy. 
One of the problems identified in the study is how often and how intensely 
the authorities resort to the aforementioned parallel indirect payment 
mechanisms that are not conducive to transparency in wages policy and 
that often have been a source of political controversy that has tarnished 
the image of public service. 
These findings are confirmed by another study on wage differentials 
between workers in the public and private sectors in Chile.6 National 
household surveys from 1990 and 2000 carried out by the Ministry of 
Planning and Cooperation (Mideplan) provide data that facilitate a com-
parison of public and private sector workers by gender and with similar 
human capital characteristics—that is, similar levels of education and 
experience, among other things. A notable finding is that the average 
salaries for public officials were well below those of private officials at 
both the start and end of the 1990s; the biggest gap was for workers in 
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the municipalities. Although public sector wages have been improving in 
recent years, those of the senior executives have remained fairly static. As 
Waisbluth (2006) noted, in some cases senior private sector executives 
were paid between 200 percent and 500 percent more than senior public 
sector officials. The example he gave is telling: including the senior man-
agement allowance, the director of a public hospital earned four to five 
times less than the director of any private clinic. And the hospital director 
must work exclusively at the hospital, a demand that is not made in the 
private sector. Clearly all these situations make participation in public 
service less attractive to the “best and brightest,” who are a necessary 
ingredient for a competent civil service capable of leading industrial poli-
cies in support of economic catch-up. 
In sum, it is important to remember that the state is a major player in 
society and the quality of its interventions is only as good as the people 
involved. In this context, and in the important role of private-public alli-
ances in policy formation, the deficient professionalization of public service 
in much of Latin America could be considered the Achilles’ heel of public 
policy, especially policy supporting productive transformation. Indeed, 
as observed in an earlier chapter, no country has managed to converge in 
income with rich countries without a technically competent and highly 
motivated professional public civil service. Hence the professional career 
structures usually found in central banks and ministries of foreign affairs 
and finance of Latin America must be extended to those ministries and agen-
cies that more directly oversee promotion of productive transformation.
Forecasting Exercises: A Tool to Support Leadership
Instilling a culture of medium- to long-term strategic thinking in govern-
ment is important, and so-called future studies have contributed to this 
objective in many countries. These studies help governments foster joint 
undertakings between the public and private sectors and to promote a 
long-lasting alliance around the search for strategic definitions. This tool, 
which convenes many actors to deliver and analyze information, allows 
countries to remain alert to changing competitive conditions and oppor-
tunities to enhance social well-being and to prepare for them. To that end 
scenarios are devised and discussed with the different actors, and long-
term conclusions are fed into policy making and strategic positioning.
The experiences of the European and Asian countries that engage in 
such exercises shows that they can be very useful in building capacity to 
look at and assess the possibilities of the future, but they are also helpful 
in establishing a common view among various actors with opposing inter-
ests. In Latin America multilateral organizations such as ECLAC’s Latin 
American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning and 
UNESCO,  have promoted various Latin American meetings on training 
and prospective exercises. 
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Only a few countries of the region have regularly used this tool to 
strengthen the design of their long-term strategies. Brazil made some 
attempts with the project Brazil 2020, a national-level program that 
unfolded under the first Cardoso government (1994–98) (Popper and 
Medina 2008). Mexico also used the tool to help prepare parts of “Visión 
México 2030” under President Calderón. However, according to Popper 
and Medina (2008), in most cases these exercises have been sporadic, the 
results have not been assessed, and they have not necessarily been trans-
lated into policy decisions, because the countries of the region lack the 
capacity to adapt them creatively to the local context. The growing politi-
cal awareness of the importance of strategies, as well as efforts to engage 
the future, suggests the need for a more proactive approach for prospective 
exercises in the region. 
Leadership Also Depends on Available Financial Resources
The strategies and plans of Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, and Panama have 
financing for implementation; this funding obviously is extremely impor-
tant for the effective execution of programs and policies. In Brazil the 
participation of the Ministry of Finance in the Executive Secretariat of the 
Productive Development Policy was a highly significant step in the govern-
ment’s commitment to the program, as well as in creating a long-term and 
shared buy-in on the part of the ministry officials. In contrast to some of the 
past action plans, Brazil’s Action Plan on Science, Technology and Innova-
tion had a committed budget for implementation during its four-year life. 
Colombia is an interesting case, because its National Development Plan 
serves as the basis of budgeting.7 The government is thus able to imple-
ment policies in line with the strategy. However, as noted earlier, at the end 
of 2009 resources had not yet been allocated to the promotion of the new 
sectoral activities targeted in the national competitiveness strategy.
In Costa Rica the Arias government made a substantial effort to ensure 
that the institutions quantify their financial requirements for activities and 
for meeting the proposed targets. The exercise provided an overall budget-
ary framework for the National Development Plan 2006–10, in contrast 
to the complete absence of budgetary allocations in previous plans. By 
law, Panama has committed financing equivalent to 35 percent of its canal 
revenue for the period 2004–14 for projects to fulfill the plans agreed to 
in the National Concertation for Development.
In general terms, and apart from the often weak fiscal base of the 
governments in the region, efforts to finance implementation of strate-
gic policies and programs in Latin American countries face a three-fold 
problem. First, agency program budgets tend to cover current operating 
costs, leaving inadequate resources for program implementation. Sec-
ond, programs may have a significant budgetary allocation for incen-
tives, but the necessary drawdown of disbursements to carry forward 
implementation is subject to the uncertainties of discretionary political 
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and budgetary allocations.8 Third, the execution of a program and its 
results might receive little publicity, leaving components of the business 
community and civil society unaware of the program and thus unable to 
appraise its usefulness to their needs. (This matter is related to transpar-
ency, an issue examined in a later section.)
Chile’s CORFO, an agency that has been emulated in other Latin American 
countries, is an example of an agency that spread too few resources over 
too many programs. A study by Agosin, Larrain, and Grau (2009, 13) 
found that this dispersion left little chance of achieving a critical mass 
of support for success. A similar situation prevailed in the same agency’s 
Management Office of Financial Intermediation, preventing the agency 
from acting as an effective development bank. The portfolio of CORFO’s 
Office of Investment and Development represented about 1 percent of the 
entire Chilean financial system in 2006, far less than similar agencies such 
as Nafin in Mexico (9.7 percent) and Bancoldex in Colombia (3.5 percent). 
Hence Agosin and his colleagues recommended concentrating the available 
resources on the more promising programs. In addition to the shortage of 
financing, there is the problem of the funding being tied to the vagaries of 
the budget cycle. In an environment of uncertainty about the political com-
mitment to a medium- to long-term strategy, additional uncertainty about 
the budget can limit the credibility of management. For priority programs 
there is a need to move toward a commitment to multiyear budgets, at least 
in an indicative way, to extend the horizon of programs and policies to 
the medium and long term. Panama’s financial scheme and Chile’s special 
funding of innovation are moves in this direction.
On the Need for Coordination
Coordinating, as well as facilitating, the proper implementation of pub-
lic policies, is, to a large degree, a political function inasmuch as it 
should be undertaken with strategic awareness and established priorities 
(Martín 2005). Coordination also may be one of the biggest challenges 
for effective pubic management of industrial policies. The presence of 
a lead agency that specializes by thematic area is the exception in the 
region, as table 7.2 indicates. Typically, several agencies coexist, often 
with overlapping mandates, and they often operate horizontally, leading 
to serious problems with coordination of policies and instruments The 
problems worsen if there is no explicit strategy to serve as a framework 
for action on the part of the ministries and agencies. 
The often dysfunctional nature of relations between the agencies stems 
partly from the traditional way in which the institutional structure was set 
up. For example, Brazil’s science and technology organizations date from 
the early 20th century. The country’s innovation system was consolidated 
between the 1950s and the 1970s, when the state had a marked influence 
on the economy; in the 1990s a more competitive, open-market model was 
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superimposed on the old structure. This asynchrony in the organizational 
structure has persisted to this day. As Pacheco and Corder (2009) point 
out, the upshot was the overlapping of legal norms and instruments, which 
hampered joint and coordinated action by the government. 
The Lula government made a serious effort to coordinate the Productive 
Development Policy (PDP). Overall responsibility for coordination falls 
to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce (MDIC), which 
links the PDP programs with the other ministries involved in the plan and 
with the Casa Civil, a part of the presidency. The Casa Civil is charged with 
coordinating the other medium- and long-term action plans that make up 
the government’s development strategy. The administrative coordination 
within the PDP falls to the Executive Secretariat, whose activities are  over-
seen by two agencies and a ministry: the Brazilian Industrial Development 
Agency (ABDI), the National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES), and the Finance Ministry. The Secretariat and the MDIC spear-
headed a significant effort to coordinate a complex series of thematic and 
sectoral programs that are to be implemented at the national and state 
levels. The National Industrial Development Council (CNDI), the highest 
arena for dialogue and debate between the public and private sectors, was 
to oversee these organizations, but its participation has been weak.
The lower rectangles in figure 7.1 indicate five types of activity, each 
with a significant number of programs, coordinated by various agencies. 
Unlike in the past, the activities of the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation were closely related to firms. Thus there was a real effort to 
link the ministry’s own action plan with the objectives of the PDP.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the state’s great challenge regard-
ing the PDP is the capacity of the leading agencies (after almost two 
decades of the atrophying effects of the Washington Consensus) to play an 
effective role and the ability of these agencies, including BNDES, to bring 
about true dialogue among the agencies, coordinate their different pro-
grams, and encourage them to act in consultation with the private sector 
in implementing a medium- and long-term agenda. All this is a relatively 
novel approach in Brazil, and the results remain to be seen.
In 2006 the Colombian government created the National Competitive-
ness System to enhance the coordination of its policies for raising productiv-
ity and competitiveness. Decree 2828 establishes this system, which incor-
porates representatives of the public sector, business, and other actors in 
civil society that affect the country’s competitiveness. The system produces 
rules that govern the interactions among the actors, and thus it coordinates 
activities related to the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of the 
policies needed to strengthen Colombia’s competitive position.
The National Competitiveness Commission, which oversees this sys-
tem, convokes meetings of the different representatives in the system, 
advises the government on policy, assigns responsibilities and encour-
ages articulation among actors in charge of implementation of agreed 
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Figure 7.1 Coordination of Brazil’s Productive 
Development Policy
Source: Government of Brazil, Productive Development Policy.
Notes: MF = Ministry of Finance, MPOG = Ministry of Planning 
MCT = Ministry of Science and Technology.
actions, develops indicators for monitoring and evaluating the initiative’s 
progress, and undertakes outreach with civil society (figure 7.2). At the 
same time the commission promotes creation of sister commissions in the 
regions with which it works to identify local counterpart issues regarding 
competitiveness.
To support this mission, the commission in 2007 created a mixed techni-
cal secretariat with delegates from the National Planning Department, the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, and the Private Sector Competi-
tiveness Council. The Presidential Office for Competitiveness and Produc-
tivity oversees the secretariat’s work. The secretariat meets frequently to 
prepare technical documents that served as proposals for the commission’s 
discussions. Also for each strategic area or objective, the commission is sup-
posed to develop a matrix of products and support activities, including goals 
and deadlines for implementation, and to designate who is to do what. This 
role is central to the monitoring of the competitiveness system.
Because of the institutional complexity, effective coordination is espe-
cially crucial to the system’s effectiveness. In this regard, the government’s 
own assessment was that additional efforts were needed to improve coor-
dination between government agencies and between them and the private 
sector. A study prepared by Gomez Restrepo, Botiva, and Guerra (2008) 
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detected institutional disarticulation, which led to duplication of functions 
in the system. This and other diagnostics all point to a need for greater 
clarity in the role of the different entities participating in this initiative.
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, federalized governments present 
one a special challenge in coordinating public policies. The problems can 
arise from excessive decentralization with a consequent dilution of dia-
logue between national and provincial-level policies or from exaggerated 
centralism on the national government’s part, which causes it to overlook 
regional requirements. As Baruj (2007) and Baruj, Kosacoff, and Ramos 
(2009) note, in Argentina there is a high degree of operational central-
ization among institutions and programs. Most of the instruments are 
designed and applied centrally by executing agencies within the adminis-
trative headquarters of each of the government organizations in Buenos 
Aires. This centralization has several negative consequences: a disconnect 
with regional problems and polices; mistrust among the actors and a lack 
of demand for the instruments; waste of resources; and a shortage of tools 
to deal with undetected problems. The development and consolidation of 
sister regional agencies with formal lines of coordination with the central 
government and transparent channels of communication with the relevant 
stakeholders in each of them would eliminate many of these barriers to the 
effective implementation of the strategies, programs, and policies. 















Figure 7.2 Colombia’s National Competitiveness System
Source: Colombia, Presidential Office for Competitiveness and Productivity.
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Integrated Programs and Incentives to Meet the Goals 
of the National Development Strategy 
Implementing integrated programs and incentives for meeting strategic 
goals is an issue not unrelated to coordination. Table 7.2 offers a highly 
compressed summary of the kind of incentives and instruments available 
in seven Latin American countries in the areas of export promotion, inno-
vation, attraction of foreign investment, competitiveness, and industrial 
development.9 In general terms, all seven countries use similar fiscal and 
financial incentives. Since the implementation of the economic reforms 
under the Washington Consensus, program and policy design has tended 
to be biased toward overly horizontal incentives. That being the case—and 
given the shortage of resources, the frequent lack of strategic guidance in 
the policies, and the proliferation of instruments—the programs’ impact 
can become diluted. 
In recent years countries have tended to refocus their productive devel-
opment strategies by retaining horizontal incentives but focusing more 
attention on certain sectors and activities deemed to have particular poten-
tial for growth, technological development, and international integration. 
In Brazil, for example, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
had funds to stimulate business innovation in strategic sectors. Notably, 
these resources had been approved by law, which established the amount 
to be devoted to the activities being promoted (CEPAL 2004, 222). In the 
2000s Chile began to move to prioritize certain sectors apart from the 
natural resources that have traditionally been the central focus. The gov-
ernment had introduced selective incentives to attract investment to these 
sectors, such as the offshoring activities of multinational companies, using 
CORFO’s Management of Development and Investment programs. For its 
part, Colombia now pays special attention to a small number of sectors 
in traditional and selected new activities that have been chosen because of 
their export potential.10
In our extraregional examples, successful programs for implementing 
strategies, plans, and policies are linked together and complement each 
other. In Singapore, for example, the Economic Development Board led the 
executing agencies, coordinating an integration of programs and incentives 
applied in support of industrial and export development. In Latin America 
few organizations have been given a similar mission of providing a holis-
tic and comprehensive vision of the system of programs and incentives. 
The Executive Secretariat of the Productive Development Policy in Brazil 
could (or should) play such a role, as should also be the case of Colombia’s 
National Competitiveness Commission. This integrated approach is impor-
tant because a promotion instrument’s effectiveness is often related less to 
the way it individually acts on an objective than on the way it links up with a 
series of other instruments, complementing them in coordinated interaction. 
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Strategic pillar Instruments
Argentina
Export promotion Pre- and post-export credits, financing assets and product development; financing for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), duty drawbacks, temporary admittance regimes, free zones, 
special sectoral regimes, and financing fairs and exhibitions 
Promotion of technological 
capacity and innovation
Credits 
Subsidies and tax relief
Promotion of foreign investment Credits 
Tax relief 
Brazil
Export promotion Pre- and post-export credits, financing assets and product development, financing SMEs
Credit insurance system for exports, trade promotion
Duty drawbacks, exemption from value added tax (VAT)





Support for technology parks 
Fund for the development of business incubators 
Use of government procurement to stimulate innovative firms





Export promotion Pre- and post-shipment credits, financing assets and product development, marketing costs
Financing fairs and exhibitions 
Support to SMEs in management and training




Comprehensive incentives packages through research consortia, clusters—regions
FDI promotion Investment attraction programs in priority areas
Investment subsidies (CORFO)
Colombia
Export promotion Export financing, fiduciary services, insurance
Tax reimbursement certificates
Tax relief, customs and foreign trade facilitation
Special economic export zones, special export programs 
Export competitiveness agreements 
Competitiveness and innovation 
promotion
Cofinancing business projects, including R&D, with grants, subsidies, and credits
(continued)
224 Table 7.2 Selective Illustration of Some Instruments Used to Promote Export Development and Innovation 
Strategic pillar Instruments
Costa Rica
Attracting foreign investment Specific agreements with multinationals on investment profits
Development of industrial parks
Development of infrastructure 
Creation of free zones
Tax exemptions
Foreign trade promotion Design and coordination of programs to attract FDI for exports
Technical and financial support to the Ministry of Foreign Trade to manage special export 
regimes 
“Costa Rica Provee” program: production chains with multinationals
Mexico
Export promotion Pre- and post-export credits; financing assets and product development; financing SMEs, 
insurance 
Economic Development Fund 
Duty drawbacks, exemption from VAT 
ALTEX: support to export-intensive companies (tax relief)
IMMEX: programs for the promotion and operation of the export maquiladora industry 
PITEX: temporary import programs for export production 
Promotion of sales in foreign markets
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Innovation Mixed and sectoral funds
Scholarships for the training of scientists and technologists
Financing scientific research
Grants and other subsidies for innovation and technological development
Special programs and funds
Tax credits to the industrial sector
Peru
Export promotion Tax credits, duty drawbacks, tax exemptions in free zones
Tools for analyzing competitiveness, international fairs, training programs, special workshops
Innovation promotion Financing technology missions, purchase of research equipment, financing for individual 
firms and partners for innovation
Source: Authors, based on official sources.
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Brazil’s Productive Development Policy seeks, among other things, to 
coordinate support instruments to advance the strategic area of commu-
nications and information technology. As illustrated in figure 7.3, each 
of the major challenges in the initiative executing agencies is assigned 
responsibility for implementing the program. The agencies involved are 
accountable to different ministries, which are committed to the strategy 
and are coordinated by the ABDI and the MDIC. These agencies seek 
to coordinate the incentives so as to provide comprehensive support to 
firms in the sector, improving their innovation capacity, furthering their 
international integration, and upgrading their export capacity. For each of 
the other strategic areas, the Productive Development Policy has a similar 
array of integrated objectives and support instruments. 
This system is different from Brazil’s tradition of “silos,” where there 
were few connections, for example, between export promotion and tech-
nology and innovation policy, even though previous governments had 
good intentions in this regard. One author described Brazil’s trade and 
technology policies as “completely disconnected” under the old system: 
“On the one hand, trade policy accords little importance to technol-
ogy and concentrates on credit. On the other hand, technology policy 
practically ignores the needs of exports” (Tigre 2002, 277). According 
to Pacheco and Corder (2009), the reasons for this lay in the priorities of 
the policies and in the institutional arrangements. For export promotion, the 
priorities were financing, guarantees, tax relief, and international negotia-
tions. Innovation promotion, meanwhile, traditionally centered on creating 
knowledge and training human resources, and only recently on supporting 
innovations in businesses. In effect, one initiative was unconnected to the 
other, creating unfilled gaps in the necessary chain of support.11
The incentives instruments in Argentina have suffered from silos that 
promote a lack of coordination and complementarity. Baruj (2007) cites 
the example of different cluster programs run by different institutions that 
are unconnected to each other and that proceed in parallel. Different agen-
cies use similar financial instruments and sometimes implement programs 
similar to those already offered by private institutions, without capital-
izing on the learning experiences of those latter entities (for example, the 
“SME Map” drawn up in the under-secretariat for small and medium 
enterprises was not articulated with the SME Observatory in the Argen-
tine Industrial Union that had long experience in the field). Baruj points 
to two immediate results of this failure to connect: programs are too 
superficial and thus of little help to firms that already have surmounted the 
initial, basic hurdles; and a lack of institutional specialization undermined 
a sustained process of learning and self-correction. 
According to Bizberg (2008), Mexico’s large number of government 
programs to improve the competitiveness of Mexican companies (more 
than 130 in total) was a problem, because entrepreneurs found it hard to 
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Figure 7.3 Brazil’s Incentives in Communications and Information Technology
Source: Government of Brazil, Productive Development Policy 2008.
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to them.12 Since the programs were implemented by different organizations 
unconnected to each other, the bureaucratic requirements for using them 
differed from program to program, discouraging businesses from applying 
for them.13 As discussed in chapter 5, businesses are unwilling to partici-
pate in programs that in their view involve too much red tape and that are 
too slow to produce results relative to commercial opportunities. Until 
1996 no institution in Mexico was responsible for coordinating industrial 
promotion programs, and thus there was a duplication of effort and little 
follow-up. An Intersecretarial Commission on Industrial Policy was set 
up later to establish such coordination (Berry 2002), but it was unable to 
rationalize organization of support windows for each of the main prob-
lems facing Mexican industry: developing businesses; promoting suppliers; 
financing; and technological training, development, and research.14 
The fragmentation of policies and their lack of effective articulation 
caused some agencies in countries to take steps to strengthen their joint 
work. In Chile, for example, the export promotion programs run by PRO-
CHILE, an agency that reports to the Foreign Ministry, traditionally had 
little contact with CORFO, the agency responsible for promoting produc-
tion and innovation, which answers to the Economy Ministry. Nonetheless, 
the need for a more comprehensive policy on innovation geared to export 
development led the two institutions to join forces; their first initiative 
was a program called Exploring and Researching Foreign Markets. With 
this new financing incentive, the agencies hoped that companies would 
differentiate their products and their strategy of integration into foreign 
marketing chains, thereby exploiting heretofore unidentified opportunities. 
Finally, a common problem in the region has been the “archeologi-
cal park” of incentives that grows larger each time a new government 
introduces its own support programs for firms without assessing and 
rationalizing existing initiatives. This practice creates a mass of often 
contradictory incentives (Baruj, Kosakoff, and Porta 2006). The cause is 
related to various factors such as poor coordination, lack of consensually 
based, proactive long-term strategies, the so-called refounding syndrome 
(described earlier), a dearth of evaluation of program effectiveness, and 
probably a dose of state capture too (capture is easier to achieve when 
coordination is poor and no evaluations are taking place).
Minimizing Risks of State Capture: 
Transparency and Evaluation 
A series of factors can reduce the risk that particular interests will cap-
ture the state and unduly influence the development and implementation 
of strategies. Some of these have already been discussed. A true public-
private dialogue in a well-structured and governed alliance, one conducted 
in the spirit of protecting a public good, helps to minimize capture. So too 
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does a professionalization of the civil service, as well as reasonable pay 
commensurate with responsibilities. The other key ingredients are trans-
parency and mechanisms to evaluate programs and incentives. 
Transparency is measured by the extent to which an institutional system 
allows interested citizens or organizations to efficiently acquire enough 
pertinent, reliable, high-quality information about the institution’s opera-
tions in the economic, social, and political spheres. When relationships are 
not transparent, there is a serious risk of firms being extorted by politi-
cians, of state capture by the firms, or of other connivances that run coun-
ter to the public interest. This kind of situation spurs mistrust in the best 
of circumstances and corruption in the worst, undermining the prospect 
of effective agreements between the public and private sectors on develop-
ment and of effective industrial policies. Transparency helps make policies 
more effective by facilitating discovery of overlapping activities among 
agencies and programs. In some countries little effort is made to publicize 
the activities of each agency (and even to do so within the agencies 
themselves)—in part because of fragmentation and turf struggles The 
upshot is the loss of an overall vision of the institution and of the possibili-
ties for interaction and coordination with other agencies’ activities. Trans-
parency can significantly help strengthen public-private alliances, fostering 
more trust, confidence, and accountability among the actors.15 Mean-
while, a well-governed alliance can be a guardian of transparency of indus-
trial policies. From this perspective, there is indeed a growing awareness 
in the region of the importance of public transparency, as manifest in new 
laws dedicated to its promotion. Indeed, transparency laws and procedures 
are becoming quite widespread in the region.16 For example, Chile has a 
relatively new transparency law to which all public agencies, including the 
development institutions, are subject.17 In addition to the establishment 
of the Transparency Council, the law stipulates that state organizations 
must provide all the information requested by citizens within 20 days. 
Additionally, government departments must use their websites to provide 
current information on matters such as their structure, staff, the salaries of 
the employees, contracts signed with other institutions, transfers of funds, 
and the results of any audits. The public must also be informed of the 
design, amounts, and access criteria for subsidies and other benefits that 
the agency provides, as well as the beneficiaries of social programs under 
way. The Transparency Council is tasked with overseeing compliance with 
the new legislation and with protecting the right to obtain information 
from state institutions.18 Citizens who do not receive the information they 
have requested can appeal to the council, which will determine if the infor-
mation sought is legally in the public domain. Although the Transparency 
Law has not yet been fully implemented (it calls for people to be trained, as 
well as the effective use of technology in all public offices, including those 
in the regions and municipalities), its enactment is a major achievement 
demonstrating a broad political will to tackle the issue.19
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Evaluations are also important because, in addition to revealing infor-
mation on the effectiveness of policies and programs, they are fundamental 
tools for transparency and good governance. Evaluation were not used 
much in the 1970s and 1980s, but in the 1990s some countries began 
using them in their strategies, programs, and policies. Where the practice 
does exist, however, it is often not carried out systematically and often 
focuses on compliance with programmatic outputs rather than on assessing 
whether the program had the desired impact vis-à-vis a specified objective. 
Chile and Colombia are good examples of the evolution of evaluation 
in the region. Evaluation of public policies in Chile dates back to 1990 
when democracy was restored (Marcel 1998). The first efforts at evalua-
tion involved ministerial objectives, which were extended to the regional 
governments in 1995. But this initiative was brought to an end because 
of its excessive bureaucratization. The reform and modernization policy 
pursued by President Eduardo Frei (1994–2000) provided a new incentive 
for the government to pursue evaluation schemes, namely, the Strategic 
Plan for the Modernization of Public Management (1997–2000), in which 
one of its basic principles was efficiency and effectiveness in government 
activities. 
According to Olavarría (2008), the plan gave a great deal of authority 
to the Finance Ministry’s budget department (DIPRES). Under the Lagos 
administration (2000–06), DIPRES devised a form of evaluation known 
as the Comprehensive Spending Assessment. The aim was to identify the 
extent to which there is consistency between the Treasury’s institutional 
mission, its strategic goals, its structure and functional set-up, and the 
goods and services that it produces; appraise its capacity to implement the 
public policies with which it is entrusted; and assess the results in terms of 
effectiveness, efficiency, quality, and the level of resources used in achiev-
ing those results (DIPRES 2003). 
Chile’s Mideplan also evaluates public investment projects, but the 
power rests with DIPRES, which biases the criteria of the evaluations 
toward those that are relevant to the Finance Ministry’s objectives. As 
Waisbluth (2000) notes, and as we saw earlier regarding successful prac-
tices in countries like Finland, evaluation is not simply an activity carried 
out when an initiative is completed; it is an ongoing, permanent process 
that should be part of a management style based on objectives and results. 
In Chile project evaluation was undertaken only at the level of investment 
projects. The aim should be to extend evaluation to all public interven-
tions from their inception, something that Waisbluth imagines would be 
politically difficult to implement. According to Olavarría (2008, 12), 
Analysis of the situation reveals the need for more coordinated, 
institutionalized and stabilized evaluations of public policies, pro-
grams and projects in Chile. The country constantly exhibits con-
cern about the proper use of public resources and the effectiveness 
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of state interventions, and much progress has been made in the 
evaluation field since 1990. But the next challenge is to devise an 
evaluation system that has a stability conferred by regulations and 
that formalizes the roles of the different public institutions. This 
would avert institutional tensions and the duplication of functions. 
Coverage should be increased—both the number of interventions 
and the stages of the public policies assessed—and the methods used 
in the evaluations should be improved. 
Finally, in Colombia, emphasis has been placed on creating a National 
System of Management Evaluation (SINERGIA). Resolution 063 is 
intended to strengthen management capacity in public investment; analyze 
the efficiency and effectiveness of formulating and implementing policies, 
programs, and projects; determine compliance with targets; consider qual-
ity, defects, coverage, and impacts; and generate appropriate information 
for decision making and resource allocation.  The system covers the insti-
tutions and agencies of the public administration under the coordination 
of the National Planning Department.
The designers of Colombia’s evaluation system also emphasized that 
evaluation of management is the best possible tool to bring about a change 
in the culture of public administration, because it allows for public assess-
ment and accountability. According to Ospina Bozzi (2001), while the sys-
tem had been well thought-out and had met several of its goals, there were 
still problems of implementation, caused partly by a lack of coordination 
between administrative levels, and partly by the political context within 
which the system was created and implemented. Ospina Bozzi argued that 
because of the high level of deficient governance and uncertainty, senior 
management did not dare to risk imposing accountability on their teams, 
and instead focused on other, less important priorities. Finally, evalua-
tions tended to focus more on whether agreed programs were completed 
than on whether they effectively met their stated objectives for enhancing 
competitiveness.
Notes
 1. Speech by President Oscar Arias Sánchez, January 27, 2007. http://www.
nacion.com/ln_ee/2007/enero/25/opinion972615.html.
 2. This usually occurred in emerging high profile priority initiatives in trade, 
competitiveness, and innovation. 
 3. See Seminario Agencias Regionales de Desarrollo, CorpAraucanía, and 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 14, 2006.
 4. Almost all Latin American countries have laws in place calling for a profes-
sional civil service, but few have fully implemented the laws (Grindle 2010).
 5. See Echebarría (2006) for a study of 18 countries.
 6. Bustos Muñoz (2003). 
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 7. Preparation of the budget entails a discussion in the National Council on 
Economic Policy, and the joint work (albeit not very well coordinated) of the Trea-
sury and the National Planning Department. 
 8. Or they depend on international technical cooperation that often ties the 
country to the bureaucracy and agenda of donor organizations.
 9. It should be noted that all the countries have pursued free trade agreements 
and consider them as a tool to promote exports and attract FDI.
 10. As mentioned, it remains to be seen if resources will be allocated to promot-
ing the consolidation of the “new” sectors highlighted in the national competitive-
ness strategy. 
 11. It has been illegal in Brazil to grant incentives for innovation to businesses, 
a factor that widened the gap between universities, centers of excellence, and 
businesses. The new legislation and the Action Plan for Science, Technology and 
Innovation seek to tackle this problem.
 12. Six different institutions are involved in business promotion policy at the 
federal level. 
 13. Bizberg (2008) has detected conflict between the different agencies. For 
example, the Law on Innovation being promoted by Concamin and the Economy 
Secretariat passed through the Chamber of Deputies but was blocked in the Sen-
ate by CONACYT itself, because the latter had not been given the central role. 
 14. Bizberg (2008); interview with Yeidckol Povlensky, ex-president of  the 
National Chamber of Transformative Industries (CANACINTRA), June 26, 2007.
 15. As our successful cases have shown, this transparency still allows certain 
aspects of partnership processes to remain confidential.
 16. See the Organization of American States Country Guide on transparency 
rules in the Americas. www.oas.org/es/sap/dgpe/guia_mecanismos.asp.
 17. Transparency Law 20285, promulgated August 11, 2008. 
 18. The Transparency Council was to have four members proposed by the 
presidency and ratified by the Senate. It was to be instituted within 60 days of the 
date of promulgation.
 19. Another example is the creation of the Ministry of Transparency and Anti-
Corruption in Bolivia. Under the Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz Law of Transpar-
ency and Anti-Corruption, approved by Congress in 2010, the ministry was given 
broad powers to pursue these two major objectives, which are also priority areas 
in the Plurinational State of Bolivia’s National Development Plan 2006–10. The 
Correa government in Ecuador also has a new comprehensive framework for trans-
parency in government (Apaza 2011).
 20. The components of the National System for the Evaluation of the Results 
of Public Administration are: Follow-up of results—constant verification of com-
pliance with the targets and priority goals set by the ministries and administrative 
departments, so as to devise the guidelines for the National Development Plan and 
the government’s plans and programs; Focused evaluations—exhaustive analyses 
of the operation, impact, and development of the government’s main policies and 
programs; and Dissemination of results—providing the public and interested stake-
holders with the results of evaluation and follow-up, to provide feedback to the 
government, ensure accountability, and activate social control. 
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Conclusions: The Three 
Main Pillars of Our 
Operational Principles
In part one, we reviewed 11 operational principles on how to conceptual-
ize, develop, and execute industrial policies for economic transformation 
and catch-up, using strategies of support for export development as the 
organizing objective to illustrate the points. These 11 principles were 
inductively generated from detailed case studies on “how” public sectors 
in 10 extraregional countries—most of which are models of successful 
postwar catch-up with rich countries, and all of which have performed 
better than Latin America—organized themselves to formulate and imple-
ment strategies for economic transformation and development. While 
each of these countries differs from the others in many ways, observing 
the “how” (in addition to the “what”) of their public policy organization, 
when reduced to its bare substance, allowed us to identify these quite 
generic operational principles. We then selectively illustrated the concrete 
forms in which the principles uniquely manifested themselves in our extra-
regional success cases. 
Latin America has not succeeded in sustaining a postwar process 
of catch-up, and generally has slipped even further behind the richer 
countries. Indeed, the region has been a laggard for most of its history. 
Chile narrowed the income gap for more than a decade beginning in 
the late 1980s, but even before the great world recession of 2008–09 its 
growth had slipped back to lackluster levels. Although many other South 
American countries experienced record levels of growth in the early 2000s, 
much of it was induced by unusually high commodity prices and easy inter-
national finance conditions that few expect to be fully repeated even in a 
recovered world economy. As the world economy showed some signs of a 
recovery in 2010, many commodity prices were still buoyant, in no small 
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part owing to China’s remarkably sustained hyper-growth rates. Aside 
from the question of the sustainability of China’s voracious demand for 
commodities, reliance on commodity prices for growth entails historically 
proven risks and serious vulnerabilities that only economic diversification 
and upgrading in the world’s hierarchy of production can reduce. More-
over, the recovery is expected to lead to a “new normal” world economy, 
with new opportunities, but even bigger competitive challenges, for the 
region.
An X-ray of Latin America suggests that notwithstanding pockets 
of excellence—such as aeronautics or deep sea hydrocarbon explora-
tion in Brazil and the auto complex in Mexico—systemically speak-
ing, the region’s productive sectors and entrepreneurial spirit have not 
been “pumped up” enough to reach beyond obvious static comparative 
advantage, whether by preparing to occupy openings for upgraded activ-
ities created by countries moving out of higher-level industries where 
they are losing competitiveness (Lin and Monga 2010), by a riskier 
strategy of developing learning and capacities to pursue the unexpected, 
or by a combination of both. In any event, the region’s static comparative 
advantage is not enough to produce the very high rates of growth that 
the region needs to sustain for decades if its income levels are to converge 
with those of rich countries. 
 Moreover, productivity in the region lags its competitors in many areas 
of existing comparative advantage. With few exceptions, the region’s com-
petitiveness indicators are poor. Even those countries that fare better in the 
aggregate, such as Chile, seriously underperform in many subindicators of 
dynamic competitiveness, including education, research and development, 
and innovation. Many of the countries of the region have been slow to 
diversify their economies and export products. When significant diversifi-
cation has taken place, it has been either horizontally in natural resources, 
a pattern which on its own historically has been an unreliable means of 
successful catch-up, or in manufactures with low value added and knowl-
edge content and often dependent on trade preferences. Nevertheless, each 
of these types of export activity has much untapped potential as a base for 
bigger and better economic performances.1
The depressive effects of the world economic recession of 2008–09 also 
present challenges. On the one hand, countries have to deal with adjust-
ments, economic stimulus in the short term, and correction of potential 
macroeconomic imbalances in the medium term. But these adjustments 
must be consistent with promotion of medium- to long-term economic 
transformation. As we observed in chapter 1, many of the adjustments 
of the 1980s, and even the 1990s, were inconsistent with this objective. 
Successful national economies—Singapore is one example—made neces-
sary short-term adjustments during the crisis but integrated them with 
proactive strategic longer-term thinking, coupled with related retooling 
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and investments, to fully exploit new opportunities that will emerge as the 
world economy recovers.
The First Pillar: A Proactive Medium- to 
Long-Term National Strategic Vision Is Essential 
The first of the 11 principles is that a country needs to look ahead to 
the medium and long term to determine not only how it will compete 
today but also how it will progressively upgrade itself to close in on 
the technological frontier where high incomes are located. The criti-
cal component for achieving this vision is a strategy that projects itself 
ambitiously, but realistically, toward climbing up the world’s produc-
tion hierarchy. Lagging economies need to foster emulation of produc-
tive activities in richer countries through continuous capacity building, 
knowledge accumulation, learning, and innovation. We have pointed out 
that market failures, institutional obstacles, and attitudinal barriers, such 
as a preference for the status quo, make it unlikely that, on a systemic 
basis, free market forces alone will drive a process of catch-up; indeed, 
market forces may even risk locking countries into low-level comparative 
advantage. As Adelman (2000) has observed, new and better comparative 
advantages are not a gift of markets but are the result of “man-made” 
policy and programs that enable market forces to deliver structural trans-
formation and accelerated growth.
Although industrial policy has been a subject of a heated, unresolved 
debate since the beginnings of capitalism, we and others find that his-
torically few countries have been able to catch up to richer countries 
without intelligent industrial policies deployed in medium- to long-term 
strategies for economic transformation. These strategies, characterized by 
focused objectives and selectivity in either horizontal or vertical applica-
tions, have been gradually built up explicitly or tacitly in most historical 
processes of catch-up.2 In our group of success cases, the best performers 
have deployed strategies based on industrial policies, some expressed in 
formal national plans. In all of them proactive integration with the world 
economy has been a goal, but with the timing, speed, and modalities dif-
fering from country to country and based more on pragmatism than on 
any conventional economics textbook formula.
Rigorous empirical analysis has been inconclusive about the impact 
of industrial policies (IPs) in successful East Asian cases of catch-up. 
This is not surprising, given the many technical difficulties in evaluating 
the impact of a single, precise industrial policy incentive at the ground 
level, not to mention IP in higher degrees of aggregation and across coun-
ties, as is often the methodological perspective. But industrial policy is 
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unquestionably associated with successful economic transformation, as 
documented by several pioneering and comprehensive case studies dis-
cussed in chapter 2. Moreover, when countries with industrial policies 
have failed in their transformation efforts, as many have, the cause has 
usually been identifiable flaws in design or execution rather than the 
industrial policy approach itself. Meanwhile, attempts to demonstrate that 
successful East Asian economies were fundamentally based on neoclassi-
cal market principles is, with the exception of Hong Kong SAR, China, a 
stretch, to say the least.
We (and others) contend that few of the arguments against industrial 
policy are cogent. The one valid argument is that IP requires a state 
capacity that many governments may not initially have. However, the 
Washington Consensus has advocated selective policies in many complex 
social areas and encouraged governments to build necessary state capac-
ity for that purpose, often with the assistance of multilateral agencies. 
We think that experience and logic are sufficiently compelling to suggest 
that Latin America should risk a “bet” on industrial policies subject to 
certain conditions we lay out in this concluding chapter. The bottom 
line, however, is that, in our opinion, the question is not whether Latin 
America should do IP, but rather how to do IP right.
Latin America was an earnest student of the Washington Consensus. 
The consensus made positive contributions in some areas, most notably in 
underscoring the importance of macroeconomic stability and engagement 
with the world economy. However, as the region attempted to convert to 
the market fundamentalism required by the Washington Consensus, it 
found itself lagging or flagging in the convergence race, while countries 
elsewhere, less observant of the consensus orthodoxy, achieved catch-up. 
This result has contributed to the growing interest in Latin America in 
government promotion of medium- to long-term strategies for economic 
transformation supported by IP. Indeed, industrial policy is rapidly return-
ing to the center of the Latin America development agenda after being 
demonized during the era of the Washington Consensus. In reality, IP 
never disappeared from the region, but under the weight of the dominant 
neoliberal ideology, it was for the most part without strategic focus and 
hence sporadic and incoherent.3 The new IP has often manifested itself 
as a response to the emergence of competitiveness strategies, often moti-
vated by the challenge of signing onto North-South free trade areas. Some 
countries, like many in Central America, focus on improving existing com-
petitiveness and clusters—IP “in the small,” in the words of Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Sabel (2008).4 Other countries, either modestly (Colombia, 
Chile) or expansively (Brazil), combine IP in the small with strategies to 
create new comparative advantages (IP “in the large”).
The new strategies in the region are not always operational, however. 
In some cases they are only generic aspirational statements with little 
guidance on exactly what is to be done, how it is to be done, and who will 
do it. Some strategies have so many priorities that in the end there is no 
conclusions: the three main pillars 239
strategic prioritization at all, or even any hint of the sequencing of desir-
able actions. In other cases there are uncertainties about the allocation of 
resources—will they arrive to strategically pinpointed areas or activities, 
and will they be enough? Will the strategy be, as often has been the case, 
just a piece of paper used for short-term political motives? Then there is 
uncertainty about continuity and commitment between political cycles.5 
Among the cases we reviewed, in recent years Brazil and Colombia would 
seem to have the most sophisticated strategies for productive transforma-
tion in the region—and, while not without their flaws, to be the least 
plagued by these and other problems outlined in chapter 6 concerning 
emerging medium- to long-term strategies. 
National plans, once common in Latin America, fell into disuse with 
the debt crisis and the political delegitimization of the strategy of import 
substitution industrialization in the 1980s and 1990s. A few countries 
such as Colombia and Costa Rica, even though plagued by some of the 
problems mentioned above, did keep a planning exercise in place. We 
believe that for countries well behind the technological frontier, such as 
those in Latin America, reinstituting or seriously committing to formal 
and truly operational multiyear national plans would be a valuable tool 
for productive transformation. Serious planning would force forward-
looking thinking, serve as a coordinating tool for government, and pro-
vide accountability in the allocation of resources. Plans could be indicative 
in their overall goals, but operationally specific and adjusted annually 
to new realities. Or they might focus on broad guidelines, as in Finland 
where executing agencies are authorized to execute strategic policies and 
programs as they see fit but are held accountable by responsible ministries 
and the overarching council that prepares the three-year guidelines for 
policies and financing of programs for productive transformation. And, of 
course, an annual budget for the plan would have to be committed. Plans 
would have sectoral or cluster development as an objective, along with 
strategic horizontal initiatives to respond to the emerging world industrial 
organization where broad networking endogenously drives innovation—
an “open industrial policy,” in the words of Sabel (2009). The bottom 
line requirement, however, is a real political commitment to the plan and 
its implementation. We saw in chapter 6 that in 2007 Costa Rica’s then-
president Oscar Arias committed to transforming the country’s national 
planning exercise from words to deeds. Intelligent national plans with the 
Arias imperative would serve the region well. 
The Second Pillar: The Support Role Played 
by Public-Private Alliances Is Critical to Success
Looking forward with specific strategic goals is only one part of the 
equation—and not the lead variable. Successful catch-up countries deploy 
public-private alliances as inputs to the development and implementation 
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of industrial strategies. In the era of globalization the private sector domi-
nates in markets and has a clear competitive advantage over governments 
in gathering specific contextual information about market behavior. It also 
can identify government failures, being victim of some of them. However, 
the private sector has limits too, stemming from uncertainty, myopia, and 
a tendency to favor the status quo. Fear of not being able to fully appropri-
ate the returns to innovation, coordination problems, and constraints on 
access to information beyond a familiar market context can also restrict 
private sector activity. Meanwhile, governments have advantages in deal-
ing with the aggregates of the big picture, providing national leadership 
and coordinating and producing public goods. Governments can also 
strategically engage with multinationals that can serve as ports of entry 
to new knowledge and international links. Working together construc-
tively through a public-private alliance, and thus maximizing the input of 
national talent and capabilities, the public and private sectors are more 
likely to develop an intelligent strategy than either party can working 
alone. Buy-in from economically and politically relevant stakeholders out-
side both government and the business sector can multiply the prospect of 
gaining agreements that will survive changes of government. 
Although the state must collaborate intimately with the private sec-
tor in an alliance, it must be careful not to be captured by special inter-
ests, or achieving what Evans (1995) called “embedded autonomy.” This 
admonition is easy to voice but harder to follow. The government must 
implement process and institutional designs that reduce the always present 
risk of capture by special interests. Moreover these requirements are not 
static but must constantly evolve, like the development strategy itself, in 
response to changing internal and external circumstances. Meanwhile, in 
developing countries mistrust between business, academia, and govern-
ment is often historical, creating serious challenges to alliance formation. 
These challenges can be overcome only by effective political leadership, 
coupled with a technically credible and engaged public sector. There are 
no formulas; each country must find its own way of creating local condi-
tions for public good–like alliances and maintaining them over time. It 
can be done because countries have done it—to the benefit of formulating 
and sustaining effective medium- to long-term strategies for economic 
catch-up.
The most successful of our extraregional examples have had stable, 
nationally focused alliances, most of them formally structured with func-
tional input from the main economic forces in the country. The configura-
tion and governance of the alliances have been tailored to accommodate 
the political, cultural, and economic realities of each specific country. 
Nevertheless, key elements of some of the most effective alliances have 
been real political support at the highest level of government, relevant 
high-level social representation without an unmanageable number of par-
ticipants, and closed-door deliberative, problem-solving exercises (with 
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neutral technical support) that periodically produce public policy recom-
mendations. Moreover, these alliances combine a focus on growth and 
competitiveness with social cohesion as a way to encourage consensus 
around a true national vision with maximum commitment, financial and 
otherwise, to a strategy. The best alliances also penetrate deeply into the 
public bureaucracy through participation on boards of directors and advi-
sory councils. As a general proposition, the autonomy of the state is not 
in question. The autonomy is achieved by the institutional design of the 
alliance and its governance procedures as well as by the availability of a 
professionally driven and motivated state bureaucracy.6 But even well-
designed alliances can fail. We showed how long-successful alliances in 
Ireland and Spain devolved into dysfunctional relationships and were 
captured (by the construction and finance sectors) in part because of the 
complacency bred by previous success and the failure of the institutional 
design to evolve appropriately.
Most Latin American countries have traditionally had uncomfortable 
private-public relationships, including with multinationals, which, when 
strategically engaged, can serve as ports of entry to new knowledge and 
international linkages. This situation has to change. And indeed, as 
part 2 illustrated, the situation is slowly changing in some countries. 
Barbados has a long tradition of a tripartite alliance inscribed in law. 
Other countries have emerging alliances, many of them also mandated 
legislatively. 
But these alliances also face problems. Internal governance of the alli-
ance can be dysfunctional, unable to solve problems or reach consensus, 
as appears to have been the case in Barbados in the 2000s. The highest 
levels of government in almost all Latin American alliances have declared 
formal support for them but then often have failed to back the declaration 
with action, making the alliances somewhat toothless. The low political 
legitimacy of the alliances turns them into shops of “cheap talk” and 
discourages dedicated private representation at the high level required 
for public credibility and influence. The alliances tend to have an exces-
sively large number of participants, moreover, which can be unwieldy for 
governance and consensus building. Adequate resources for administra-
tive support and, especially for objective, high-caliber technical support 
for true problem-solving deliberation, are the exception rather than the 
rule. Penetration of the alliance in the public bureaucracy generally is still 
limited, and the ministries or agencies in charge of productive sectors and 
the resources at their disposal are often not credible for the private sec-
tor clients. Procedures to avoid capture by special interests are generally 
inadequate. A vacuum of real political leadership and poor governance 
often leads the players to make “end runs” around the alliance to push 
their own bilateral agendas. These weaknesses in the governance of alli-
ances are critical, because, in the modern interpretation of IP, it is out 
of the social and institutional processes of an appropriately organized 
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alliance that effective public polices, support programs, and their effective 
implementation emerge. 
Creating an effective alliance is itself a process of trial and error. Multilat-
eral agencies—such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), the Organization of American States, and the Inter-
American Development Bank, and regional development banks, such as the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank, and the Andean Development Corporation—could support 
locally based diagnostics of the governance of existing public-private alli-
ances and studies of options for creating alliances where they do not exist, 
to exploit the growing recognition of the functional importance of alliances 
for the emergence of intelligent industrial as well as other policies. 
The Third Pillar: Execution
This leads us to the third critical ingredient for support of economic trans-
formation: state capacity.
Part 1 showed that the most successful extraregional cases have a pro-
fessional and motivated state bureaucracy that can act as a credible part-
ner in a functionally designed public-private alliance, can formulate a 
strategy with associated policies and support programs that draw on the 
insights and capabilities of the alliance, and can effectively implement the 
strategy. Indeed, the big secret of success in our extraregional cases—and 
in the history of economic catch-up—is effective execution of strategy and 
programs by a well-organized and capable government. The bottom line is 
that execution is often the difference between success and failure.
In short, a highly professional, capable, and motivated state bureau-
cracy that can strategize with the private sector and can implement the 
strategy at different levels within government without capture by spe-
cial interests is the sine qua non for successful industrial policies. More-
over, a professional management corps creates an institutional memory 
that fosters learning and a degree of continuity between governments. In 
Latin America few state bureaucracies meet these criteria. Indeed, the lack 
of a highly qualified professional civil service may be the Achilles’ heel of 
the region’s efforts to catch up with rich countries. This is even more of 
a handicap in an era of global networking where horizontal cooperation 
and delegation of decision making becomes of increasing importance for 
effective management. Under the Washington Consensus, government 
service became an inferior good. Low pay, low morale, hiring based on 
who you know rather than what you know, limited career paths with 
management posts filled by ad hoc contracts, and high turnover at top 
levels of management, especially when one government succeeds another, 
have been the norm. 
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Central banks and finance ministries, the ports of entry for the 
Washington Consensus, have tended, along with ministries of foreign 
affairs, to be exceptions to the norm. The quality and esprit de corps of 
these pockets of excellence in government need to be extended to govern-
ment as a whole and expressed in the development of a highly profes-
sional, technically capable civil service based on decent pay, meritorious 
recruitment of the best and brightest, training opportunities at home and 
abroad, career paths for line and top management positions, and explicitly 
sanctionable codes of conduct. This same goal has to be extended to local 
levels, especially in federal political systems.
Multilateral development agencies have increasingly been concerned 
about being catalytic agents of the private sector. Perhaps the best cata-
lytic role they could play for the private sector would be to support more 
intensively the development of excellence in civil service systems and the 
efficacy of public sector organization for executing industrial and other 
policies. In effect, government is only is good as the people in it and the 
organizational setting in which they work.
Another important factor in our success cases is the delegation of stra-
tegic leadership to ministries and agencies charged with overseeing the real 
economic sectors of industry, trade, technology, and innovation. Finance 
ministries in these countries focus on ensuring that the strategy is consis-
tent with overall fiscal balance, and they provide inputs to strategies, espe-
cially in financial services. But the ministry of finance is not the dominant 
voice on the direction of strategy or the modalities of implementation. In 
Latin America finance ministries led the adjustments that have allowed 
the region to manage crisis and consolidate a culture of macroeconomic 
stability. This important achievement has made them a powerful voice in 
government that has often extended to areas of policy where they have 
little competency, or cultural disposition, especially in areas that need sup-
port of industrial policy. This overreach has been made easier by the mar-
ginalization of ministries and agencies overseeing real productive activities 
in government decision making during the era of the Washington Consen-
sus. The competence, power, and influence of these public entities must be 
strengthened if Latin American countries are to catch up with the richer 
countries. This strengthening will require policies that permit these entities 
to recruit and retain “the best and brightest” to help plan and execute the 
development strategy as well as support from the highest levels of govern-
ment and the private and civil society stakeholders involved. 
State bureaucracies also must be encouraged to think strategically and 
long term after 25 years of policy driven by mainstream macroeconomics 
with short-term policy horizons based on faith in the benign forces of the 
market. The real-sector complex needs a powerful, highly trained, and 
respected technical “brain,” similar to agencies and councils in Ireland, 
Singapore, Finland, and Korea highlighted in part 1. Many Latin Ameri-
can countries have not yet established a focal point in government devoted 
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to thinking about medium- to long-term strategies; in those countries 
where such a focal point does exist, its capacity for strategic thinking and 
influence atrophied during the ideological age of structural reforms or has 
been captured by the dynamics of the political cycle. Here again multilat-
eral institutions can provide assistance in developing, or strengthening, a 
“neurological” center in Latin American governments to support strategic 
thinking, the development of pragmatic strategies, and their execution 
using sound modern industrial policies.
State bureaucracies in Latin America also probably should create 
additional space for long-term thinking by embedding complementary 
or specialized sister units in individual ministries and executing agencies; 
promoting a culture of longer-term thinking for economic policy and pro-
grams within these entities would help to override any remaining “path 
dependency” on the short termism of the market era fundamentalism. 
Periodic “future studies” exercises would be another way, in addition to 
structured alliance forums, for the public sector as a whole to engage with 
civil society in strategic thinking.
A critical factor in our extraregional success cases is government lead-
ership in the area of productive transformation—both the active political 
leadership of the top level of government (president, prime minister, vice 
president, or deputy prime minister) and the leadership of a dedicated 
ministry or executing agency with appropriate technical manpower, strong 
top management, and the financial resources to implement agreed prior-
ity mandates. Neither of these types of leadership is common in Latin 
America. The presence of political leadership in priority areas tends to 
be a formality, transitory, or nonexistent. And designated ministries and 
their agencies tend to be politically or technically weak, face diffuse or 
competing mandates, and are unable to mobilize adequate resources from 
the general budget.
Coordination is as important as leadership in implementing a strategy. 
Most of our success cases use multiple instruments to achieve coordination 
in priority areas of the strategy. Coordination in the central government is 
another big shortcoming of execution in Latin America. Mandates among 
ministries and executing agencies often are unclear, creating duplication 
and excessive turf wars, even including the bureaucratic drama of stronger 
ministries unilaterally carrying out wholesale “raids” on established man-
dates of weaker ministries.7 Where they exist, assigned coordinating agen-
cies may have insufficient power to coordinate, because of either shortages 
of technically qualified staff and top management or an inferior position 
in the bureaucracy’s hierarchy. In federated states, the task of coordinating 
actions of the central government and the states can be extremely difficult. 
Some type of formal or tacit division of labor might overcome those diffi-
culties. Alternatively, state modules of the overall national program could 
be developed and monitored, as Brazil is trying to do with its Productive 
Development Policy.
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Another dimension of execution is effective management of incentives. 
This is a vast area where Latin America can learn much from many of 
our success cases. Some, but far from all, of the major points of attention 
would be:
• Incentive programs should have clear ex ante quantifiable objec-
tives; assessment of risks, including private sector firms’ “gaming” 
the incentives; and procedures to manage those risks using adminis-
trative procedures that balance rigor with timeliness and the need to 
avoid an undue burden on beneficiary firms.
• In the framework of coordination, it is important to integrate the 
application of programs and incentives. When programs and incen-
tives are designed in discrete compartments, as is often the case in 
Latin America, there is the risk of “gaps” in coverage of critically 
interrelated activities that undermine the synergies needed to achieve 
strategic objectives. This lack of attention to more integrated pro-
grams design not only leads to gaps but also dulls awareness of the 
need to upgrade support programs to meet more complex objectives 
as firms progressively overcome obstacles and are ready to master 
new capabilities.
• At the same time priorities need to be established in the set of inte-
grated programs to avoid the common flaw in the region of having 
too few resources chasing too many objectives, eroding the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of any single program.
• In Latin America an incentive program often becomes an entitle-
ment. Hence, incentive programs should be a consistent response 
to the agreed strategy for productive transformation and not an 
ad hoc response to special lobbies. Sunset clauses can help ensure 
that incentive programs are automatically evaluated and withdrawn 
when the support is no longer needed or when objectives are not 
being met. 
• Rigorous evaluation of support programs must occur on a regular 
basis and be explicitly incorporated in the cost of administration. 
Moreover, the evaluation must focus on the impact of the program 
in meeting ex ante indicators of the objectives for productive trans-
formation, such as productivity, quality, innovative products and 
processes, and new market penetration. This kind of evaluation 
is technically very challenging and a new area for governments to 
undertake, but an inevitable one for effective strategies and the em-
bedded autonomy of the public sector.
• As industrial policy matures, incentive programs will increasingly 
focus on supporting innovation for a “leap” to new and upgraded 
activities or products. Support will naturally have a higher risk of 
failure than incrementalism. Hence, there is a need for some toler-
ance of losses, which can be nevertheless mitigated by good strategy 
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and program design aided by rigorous evaluation. In activities such 
as discovery of new cost-feasible activities and innovation, where 
experimentation is a key objective, a support program with a very 
high rate of success is probably a flawed program. Nevertheless, as 
we saw in Finland and Ireland, if program design gets it mostly right 
(and commitment to rigorous evaluation is a critical support tool), 
the subsidies contained in incentives can actually be an investment 
in growth that generates a fiscal return. 
• Latin America needs to build the five basic instruments deployed 
by our success cases to avoid state capture: development of a highly 
motivated and professional civil service; a representative public-
private alliance; transparency; regular and rigorous evaluation of 
the strategy, executing agencies, and support programs; and codes 
of conduct and prudential procedures for public and private players 
of the alliance.
Where to Begin?
Latin American countries are in very different states of development and 
have different state capacities, none of which mirror those observed in 
most of our success cases. Nevertheless, almost all Latin American coun-
tries have experience in horizontal state interventions, and many have 
moved toward more focused IP “in the small” (strengthening existing 
comparative advantage or already emerging new activities with clear signs 
of success). As mentioned, some like Brazil, and to a lesser extent Colom-
bia and Chile, have embarked on IP in the large too (promotion of basi-
cally new activities, products, and sectors).8 Governments should work on 
incremental improvements in their current setting. 
First, where possible, more political and technical capital has to be 
invested in diagnosing and strengthening the institutional design and 
governance of public-private alliances along the lines discussed here 
and in chapter 3. Where political and technical capital is not available, 
consideration should be given to launching experimental pilot programs 
at the national (or at sectoral or regional levels where interests are more 
homogeneous). In designing pilot alliances, aside from some of the 
governance issues raised in this book, special care should be taken in 
assessing the traditional nature of the interaction of the relevant parties, 
their interests, relationships with the government, and disposition to 
consensus building, because these factors will help tailor realistic objec-
tives and the composition of representation. Deepening the alliances’ 
interaction with the public bureaucracy by securing their participation 
on executing agencies’ boards of directors and advisory panels should 
also be on the agenda. We would also council less trepidation about 
internationalizing the alliance through encouraging representation of 
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cooperative multinationals with economically important operations in 
the country of strategic interest and about creating international advi-
sory panels in strategic areas to support IP formulation as well as to 
have more “antennas” in international networks.9 
Second, parallel to strengthening the design and governance of alli-
ances, there should be major investment in strengthening state capacity in 
the areas discussed above. Improving capacity should be treated with the 
urgency of a “national emergency.” It will require political leadership and 
consensus building because existing public resources will have to be real-
located and new resources mobilized through a more solid tax base than 
is found in most Latin American countries. 
Third, and closely linked to the two previous points, governments must 
tighten the design and management of interventions to enhance their effec-
tiveness for support of private sector upgrading and in a prudent manner 
that minimizes risk of state capture.
Finally, multilateral development agencies in Washington should 
rethink their traditional skepticism about industrial policy and embrace 
the concept as an historically valid, pragmatic tool for supporting catch-
up. This will not be easy given their path dependency on the Washington 
Consensus era. However, in recent years thinking about industrial policies 
has strongly evolved, and a modern school of thought has much to offer 
the region. Moreover, countries in Latin America are moving ahead to 
explore the IP tool on their own anyway. We hope the multilateral agen-
cies will catch up in their own thinking and accompany Latin America in 
doing it right this time.10
With political awareness and leadership at home, deliberation and nation-
ally oriented problem solving by high-level representatives of civil society in 
public-private policy alliances, a state organized to build a professional civil 
service with the capacity to technically lead and effectively implement the 
right industrial policies, and a little pragmatic help and encouragement from 
their multilateral friends, the region’s countries will be better positioned 
to generate the strategic directions for productive transformation that are 
needed “to make” Latin American economies tigers too.
Notes
 1. Many countries, such as Finland and Sweden in our group of success cases, 
have experienced catch-up starting with a base of natural resources. However, 
they proactively pursued  policies that supported the progressive adding of value 
and encouraged migration to new, upgraded,  and  more knowledge-based activi-
ties in manufacturing. Natural resources per se are not a “curse,” as some have 
argued,  but catch-up depends on exploiting these resources in a way that makes 
them a platform for adopting ever more sophisticated activities with endogenous 
processes of learning, capacity building, absorption of technology,  and innovation 
(Stijns 2001).  Meanwhile, although the Caribbean Basin, stimulated by U.S. trade 
preferences, has significantly diversified its exports, only limited progress has 
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been made in using these preferences as a platform for more than just low-wage 
employment.
 2. The closer  a country comes to the technological frontier, the more diffuse 
and subtle industrial policies become. They rarely disappear altogether, however, 
as happens in most  developed countries  (Lin and Monga, 2010).
 3. The policy often has been a response to some interest group. Moreover, as 
we observed in chapter 7, layers of IP were superimposed on each other through 
inertia as government succeeded government, creating an “archeological park” of 
incentives, often inconsistent with each other or with economic transformation.
 4. Kurtz and Brooks (2008) call these state-mediated supply-side interven-
tions a less orthodox  type of “embedded neoliberalism.”
 5. There unfortunately is a  “refounding syndrome” in Latin America that 
seems to make new governments abandon the microeconomic objectives (when 
they exist) of the previous government and start at “zero kilometer.” This tendency 
in part reflects a lack of consensus about the long-term objectives of the country.
 6. In Malaysia the alliance by law must give preferences to the native Malay 
population, a mandate originally perhaps useful for social cohesion but increas-
ingly recognized to be in need of adjustment. The Irish Alliance, once  considered 
by some to be the gold standard, has fallen into difficulty for several reasons, some 
of which are related to a progressive and  excessive institutional dispersion of  its 
governance.
 7. Raids have occurred frequently in conjunction with negotiation of trade 
agreements, especially when these were hot topics in the 1990s. This same phe-
nomenon of raids is reoccurring in the new hot topic: national competitiveness and 
innovation.
 8. IP also can be used for an organized “death” of uncompetitive indus-
tries that minimizes destruction of skills and knowledge that are useful for new 
activities.
 9. Many of the old battles with foreign corporations were in natural resource 
extraction where there were large rents to be distributed. This is much less an issue 
in competitive manufacturing and services.
 10. A recent working paper coauthored by the World Bank’s  chief economist 
is an encouraging sign (Lin and Monga, 2010).
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